A.A. (Pakistan) v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal No.2

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 11 February 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IEHC 72
• Docket Number: [2018 No. 198 J.R.]
• Date: 11 February 2019
• Court: High Court

[2019] IEHC 72

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Humphreys J.

[2018 No. 198 J.R.]

BETWEEN

A.A. (PAKISTAN)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, IRELAND

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

(No. 2)

International protection – Certiorari – Points of exceptional public importance – Applicant seeking leave to appeal – Whether the applicant had a point of exceptional public importance

Facts: The High Court (Humphreys J), in A.A. (Pakistan) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal (No. 1) [2018] IEHC 769, rejected an application for certiorari of a decision of the first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal. The applicant sought leave to appeal. The first question of proposed exceptional public importance was “in finding that an applicant’s failure to apply for International Protection in the U.K. undermines his/her claim for protection, is there any significance to be attached to concerns in relation to the U.K.’s former “fast-track procedure” which was found to be “unlawful”. The second proposed question of exceptional public importance was “what are the ‘special circumstances’ as set out by the Court of Appeal in A.O. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [[2017] IECA 51] which would compel an international protection decision-maker to engage in an investigation into the authenticity of a document relied on by an applicant for international protection”. The applicant's third proposed question of exceptional public importance was “in the assessment of the weight of the material in an international protection application is a decision-maker required to apply the benefit of the doubt to a material fact, or to an applicant’s account in general”.

Held by Humphreys J that, in the No. 1 judgment at para. 7, he noted that at para. 4.9 of the decision under challenge, the tribunal listed ten pages of factors militating against the applicant’s credibility, as part of an unusually detailed, 50 page consideration of his claim. Humphreys J held that a large accumulation of such adverse factors meant that even if, counterfactually, the applicant had a point of exceptional public importance under any of the foregoing headings, this was not an appropriate case in which to explore any such issue because any one such item was hardly decisive in a context of a lengthy catalogue of matters undermining the applicant’s credibility. Humphreys J held that it was therefore neither decisive of the case nor in the public interest for such an appeal to be allowed.

Humphreys J held that the application would be dismissed.

Application dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 11th day of February, 2019

1 In A.A. (Pakistan) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal (No. 1) [2018] IEHC 769 I rejected an application for a certiorari of an IPAT decision. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal.

2 I have considered the caselaw on leave to appeal as set out in Glancré Teoranta v. An Bord Pleanála [2006] IEHC 250 (Unreported, MacMenamin J., 13th November, 2006) and Arklow Holidays v. An Bord Pleanála [2008] IEHC 2, per Clarke J. (as he then was). I have also discussed these criteria in a number of cases, including S.A. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2016] IEHC 646 [2016] 11 JIC 1404 (Unreported, High Court, 14th November, 2016) (para. 2), and Y.Y. v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 2) [2017] IEHC 185 [2017] 3 JIC 2405 (Unreported, High Court, 24th March, 2017) (para. 72). I have received helpful submissions from Mr. Eamonn Dornan B.L. for the applicant and from Mr. Nick Reilly B.L. for the respondents.

Applicant's first question

3 The first question of proposed exceptional public importance is ‘ in finding that an applicant's failure to apply for International Protection in the U.K. undermines his/her claim for protection, is there any significance to be attached to concerns in relation to the U.K.'s former ‘fast-track procedure’ which was found to be ‘unlawful’.

4 That question is totally fact-specific. It is a matter for the tribunal to consider and weigh any explanations by the applicant. The question does not raise a matter of any, still less exceptional, public importance. That is reinforced by the word ‘ former’ in the question, emphasising that the fast-track procedure no longer applies.

5 More fundamentally, I did not find that there was no significance...