Abdelaatti v College of Anaesthesiologists or Ireland and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Garrett Simons
• Judgment Date: 09 April 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 200
• Docket Number: 2022 733 JR

Between

Ahmed Abdelaatti

Applicant

and

College of Anaesthesiologists of Ireland Medical Council Minister for Health Ireland and The Attorney General

Respondents

[2025] IEHC 200

2022 733 JR

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Appearances

Dean Regan (with John Rogers SC) for the applicant instructed by FH O'Reilly & Co Solicitors

Conor Duff (with Helen Callanan SC) for the first respondent instructed by Hayes Solicitors LLP

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 9 April 2025

INTRODUCTION

1 This judgment addresses two procedural motions as follows. The first is a motion seeking the discovery of documents. The second is a motion seeking the delivery of further and better particulars. The only issue outstanding in respect of this latter motion is the incidence of legal costs.

OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICANT'S CASE

2 The disagreement between the parties in relation to the discovery of documents centres on whether the categories sought are “ relevant” and “ necessary”. It is requisite, therefore, to examine the pleadings in the proceedings with a view to identifying the nature and extent of the issues in dispute.

3 The proceedings seek to challenge the current regime for the training and accreditation of specialist doctors. There are a number of pathways by which a doctor can obtain registration in the specialist division of the register of medical practitioners. Section 47(1) of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“The Council shall, in accordance with the relevant criteria specified in rules made under section 11, register in the Specialist Division the following medical practitioners: […]

(b) every medical practitioner who is granted evidence of satisfactory completion of specialist training by a body approved under section 89(3)(a)(ii);

[…]

(f) any medical practitioner who satisfies the Council that the practitioner has completed a programme of training and has acquired sufficient experience in specialised medicine of a standard considered by the Council to be adequate for the purposes of registration in the Specialist Division.”

4 The Applicant has been entered on the specialist register pursuant to the mechanism under section 47(1)(f) (above). The Applicant has been granted a Certificate of Specialist Doctor.

5 The Applicant claims that he is entitled to be granted a Certificate of Satisfactory Completion of Specialist Training in Anaesthesiology in circumstances where, or so it is asserted, he has completed six years of specialist training under the supervision and guidance of the College of Anaesthesiologists of Ireland (“ the College”) and the Medical Council.

6 The core of the Applicant's case is that it is impermissible for the Respondents to provide a dual certification of doctors in the Irish State. It is said that the European Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications (Directive 2005/36/EC) stipulates that the certification of doctors ought to be harmonised and that it is not, therefore, permissible for the Irish State to certify its own doctors with a title and designation of qualification recognised inside the Irish State under the guise of those doctors receiving on-scheme training, and then separately to certify non-scheme trainees, who are, on the Applicant's argument, also trained within the Irish State, with a different title and designation of qualification used solely outside of the Irish State.

7 This claim is denied by the Respondents. It is contended that the Applicant has conflated two distinct certificates, namely a Certificate of Satisfactory Completion of Specialist Training (“ CSCST”) and a Certificate of Specialist Doctor (“ CSD”). The Medical Council describes the function of a CSD as being for the purposes of evidencing that an individual has met the minimum standards of training and experience set down in Article 25 and Annex V of Directive 2005/36/EC.

8 It is further contended by the Respondents that a CSCST in Anaesthesiology is only available to a doctor who has successfully completed the Specialist Anaesthesiology Training Programme (“ SAT Programme”) approved by the Medical Council and administered by the College. The Applicant has not participated in the SAT Programme. The College has expressly pleaded that it is not empowered to grant a CSCST to someone who did not apply for and complete the SAT Programme. It is denied that the College supervises or monitors any form of training doctor other than the trainees who are registered under the SAT Programme.

9 It is pleaded that the College is not responsible for the provision of a Completion of Satisfactory Training (“ CST”) certificate. It is pleaded that the only function which the College would typically have in respect of the provision of a CST certificate is to provide an expert opinion to the Medical Council on the specific experience and training of an applicant-doctor. The Medical Council are not bound by such expert opinion.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DISCOVERY

10 There was a large measure of agreement between the parties as to the legal test to be applied in determining an application for discovery. In particular, the parties agreed that “ relevance” falls to be determined by reference to the pleadings in accordance with the principles identified in Tobin v. Minister for Defence [2019] IESC 57, [2020] 1 IR 211 (at paragraph 57) and in O'Brien v. Red Flag Consulting Ltd [2021] IECA 172 (at paragraph 27).

11 There were, however, two aspects of the legal test upon which the parties were in disagreement. These are addressed, in turn, below.

Discovery in judicial review proceedings

12 The first area of disagreement relates to the approach to be taken to discovery in judicial review proceedings. Counsel on behalf of the Applicant submits that the necessity for discovery will be more difficult to establish in judicial review proceedings than in plenary proceedings. Counsel cites K.A. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2003] 2 IR 93 and Flynn v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2024] IEHC 687 in support of this proposition.

13 It is correct to say that—empirically—an order for discovery is less likely to be made in judicial review proceedings than in plenary proceedings. This reflects the practical reality that there is less likely to be any significant factual dispute in judicial review proceedings in respect of which discovery would be “ relevant” or “ necessary”. In most judicial review proceedings, the dispute between the parties will centre on the legality of a decision-making process. If and insofar as the court is entitled to engage with the substantive merits of an impugned decision, this is done through the lens of “ rationality” or “ reasonableness”. Any assessment of the “ rationality” or “ reasonableness” of an impugned decision will be carried out by reference to the materials which had been before the decision-maker. These materials will usually have been disclosed by the decision-maker and an order for discovery will not normally be necessary.

14 It should be emphasised, however, that the same legal test governs discovery in both judicial review proceedings and plenary proceedings. This principle is well established: see, for example, the following statement of the principle in Fitzwilton Ltd v. Mahon [2006] IEHC 48 (at page 12):

“In my view, the recent Irish authorities clearly establish that the same principles apply to discovery in judicial review proceedings as apply generally in civil proceedings, although, primarily by reason of the nature of the process, the relief afforded and the issues which arise in judicial review proceedings, the practical application of the principles may result in discovery being less frequently ordered in judicial review proceedings than in other civil proceedings. […]”

15 This principle has recently been reaffirmed in Flynn v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána. The High Court (O'Donnell J.) stated as follows (at paragraph 40):

“In the specific context of judicial review proceedings, it is clear that the same general rules apply. The point of distinction between judicial review proceedings and plenary cases is that more often than not there are fewer facts in issue and instead the focus is on the legality of a particular decision or series of decisions. As a result, the scope for discovery in judicial review tends to be reduced.”

16 The present proceedings are unusual in that, depending on how certain legal issues raised on the pleadings are determined, it may become necessary for the court of judicial review to resolve a significant factual dispute between the parties. This dispute centres on whether the self-guided specialist training undertaken by the Applicant is equivalent to that obtained by a trainee doctor who has successfully completed the Specialist Anaesthesiology Training Programme. This follows from the breadth of the legal challenge being advanced by the Applicant. This is not simply a case where an applicant contends that a decision-maker has erred in its operation of a statutory regime insofar as it pertains to the individual circumstances of the particular applicant. Rather, the present proceedings involve, in large part, a challenge to the very structure of the statutory regime. Depending on how this aspect of the challenge is determined, it may, as already indicated, become necessary for the court of judicial review to resolve a significant factual dispute between the parties. The onus of proof in relation to this issue lies with the Applicant.

17 It is precisely because the present proceedings are so far-reaching that an order has previously been made directing that the substantive hearing of this judicial review action be by way of a plenary hearing. The rationale for this order has been explained as follows: see Abdelaatti v. College of Anaesthesiologists of Ireland [2024] IEHC...