Barrington and Another v Attorney General and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Twomey
• Judgment Date: 11 March 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 143
• Docket Number: RECORD NUMBER HP 2024 2749

Between

Teresa Barrington and Sean Barrington

Plaintiffs

and

The Attorney General and Tailte Éireann and Promontoria (Oyster) DAC and David O'Connor and BDO and M.R.C.S Ltd and Paul Garavan

Defendants

[2025] IEHC 143

RECORD NUMBER HP 2024 2749

THE HIGH COURT

Injunction – Set aside – Legal advice – Plaintiffs seeking to reverse a decision of a High Court judge – Whether there were exceptional circumstances which would justify the High Court in making an order setting the High Court judge’s order

Facts: The plaintiffs, Ms and Mr Barrington (the Barringtons), were assisted by an unqualified litigation adviser in relation to their dissatisfaction with a High Court decision which rejected their application for an injunction regarding a property in Galway. Rather than appealing that decision to the Court of Appeal, they brought an application to another High Court judge to reverse the decision of the first High Court judge. The Barringtons claimed that there were several irregularities with the order and that Nolan J did not comply with the law in reaching his decision. In particular, they claimed that Nolan J did not comply with the Constitution, that he did not comply with caselaw of the High Court, that he did not comply with the caselaw of the Supreme Court, that he did not follow the Rules of the Superior Courts, and that he breached fair procedures.

Held by Twomey J that the Barringtons had made numerous errors, while being given assistance by an unqualified litigation adviser. In particular, Twomey J noted that the Barringtons had not brought any changed circumstances, evidence of fraud, or anything similar (which, in any event, if it existed, could or should have been brought to the attention of Nolan J) which would have justified Nolan J in setting aside his own decision; instead, they had chosen to apply to a different judge to set aside Nolan J’s order. For that reason, it seemed to Twomey J that the exceptional circumstances, which would be needed to justify the Court in making such an order, were completely absent. More generally, as regards the claim by the Barringtons that Nolan J had not granted them a fair hearing, it appeared to Twomey J that Nolan J went out of his way to suggest that they make an application to adjourn the proceedings to allow them time to mend their hand. Twomey J held that this was clearly because they had produced no evidence that would enable Nolan J to grant the interlocutory injunction that they were seeking; they declined to take up his suggestion. In the circumstances, rather than there being grounds for the order to be set aside, it seemed to Twomey J that Nolan J’s decision was the only one open to him; accordingly, this was patently not a case where one High Court judge could exercise the most exceptional jurisdiction of setting aside a decision of another High Court judge.

Twomey J held that the foregoing facts (as well as the fact that the Barringtons required five defendants to attend court for two separate hearings in relation to matters which did not concern them) all established that the Barringtons’ real problem was their own acts and omissions, all done with the assistance of Mr Macken, and not anything done by Nolan J. Based on those acts and omissions, Twomey J refused the application to set aside the order.

Application refused.

JUDGMENT OF Mr. Justice Twomey delivered on the 11 ^th day of March, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1 It seems clear to this Court that it would not be tolerated if ‘quack doctors’ (i.e. people who were not medical practitioners under the Medical Practitioners Act, 2007) were walking around our hospitals giving pseudo medical advice to patients in hospitals, when those patients are at their most vulnerable. It seems equally inconceivable that operating theatres would be occupied as a result of unnecessary surgery being performed on the ‘medical’ advice of these quack doctors causing other patients to have their surgery delayed.

2 Yet the equivalent is happening on a daily basis in our courts. This is because litigants are having their cases delayed as court sittings are being taken up dealing with nonsensical applications which are being pursued on the pseudo legal advice of people who are not legal practitioners under the Legal Services Regulation Act, 2015 and so, are ‘quack lawyers’ or, as Noonan J. described them, ‘hob lawyers’. 1 These unqualified litigation advisers are giving this ‘legal advice’ on a daily basis in our courts to lay litigants, when they are at their most vulnerable, since they face serious litigation.

3 This issue arose in this case because the plaintiffs (the “ Barringtons”) are being assisted by an unqualified litigation adviser in relation to their dissatisfaction with a High Court decision which rejected their application for an injunction regarding a property in Galway. However, rather than appealing that decision to the Court of Appeal, they brought an application to another High Court judge to reverse the decision of the first High Court judge.

Even to people with no legal expertise, this would be a nonsensical application to make, since one High Court judge does not hear, what in effect, is an appeal of another High Court judge's decision

4 As a result of this nonsensical application, a full half day in the High Court, which could have been used to deal with other cases, was wasted dealing with an application which no legal practitioner would have brought. For this reason, this case starkly highlights, not just the harme to lay litigants, but also the systemic harm which is being caused to the administration of justice by the significant number of unqualified litigation advisers who are ‘practising’ in our courts.

A criminal offence for an unqualified person to give litigation advice

5 An important backdrop to this issue is that it is a criminal offence for unqualified people to give litigation advice. This was highlighted in Start Mortgages Limited v Vincent Kavanagh and Madeleine (Ors Madeline) Kavanagh [2017] IEHC 433, where Noonan J. referred to the ‘disastrous consequences’ which arise when a litigant seeks advice from an unqualified litigation adviser, but also the criminal offence which is committed. At paragraph 29 he stated that:

“Quite how anyone would want to pay for bad advice and assistance which inevitably leads to disastrous consequences particularly when excellent professional advice is available at little or no cost, is something of a mystery. It is not without good reason that the legislature has made it a criminal offence for unqualified persons to draft documents for use in legal proceedings for reward – see s. 58 of the Solicitors Act, 1954 as amended.” (Emphasis added)

Unfortunately, one needs only spend a very short time in the Four Courts and to read any of the numerous High Court and Court of Appeal judgments (some of which are referenced herein) to see how openly and regularly section 58 and section 55(1) (which prohibits an unqualified person acting as a solicitor) of the 1954 Act would appear to be contravened. Despite this, this Court is unaware of any person ever having been prosecuted for a breach of these provisions.

6 In this case, there was uncontroverted sworn evidence, uncontradicted submissions, and an unchallenged statement from Nolan J. (at an earlier hearing in this case) that the Barringtons were being assisted in this litigation by a person with no legal qualifications. (It is imnportant to note that this evidence was provided to the Court in the context of a civil action by the Barringtons and so there is no claim of any offence having been committed by this person contrary to section 55 or 58 in this case).

The courts have been highlighting the problem of unqualified advisers for years

7 For many years the courts have been at pains to highlight the damage being caused to lay litigants and to the justice system by these unqualified litigation advisers. For example, in Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bank v Martin [2017] IEHC 707 at paragraph 11, Noonan J. stated:

“Without exception in my experience, these groups and individuals cause significant harm to those they purport to assist by giving them advice which is not just wrong, but entirely detrimental to the litigant's interests.” (Emphasis added)

8 Similarly in O'Hara v Ireland & Ors [2023] IEHC 268 at paragraph 2, O'Moore J. went to the trouble of listing some of the many written judgments where the courts had to deal with nonsensical ‘legal’ arguments provided by these unqualified litigation advisers. He also highlighted the very negative effect these unqualified litigation advisers were having on other litigants wating for their cases to be heard. At paragraph 1 et seq, he stated:

“In the last number of years, there has been a rash of cases instigated and prosecuted by persons representing themselves, in which it is claimed that the relevant plaintiff is protected from all court summonses and court orders by reference to provisions of the Constitution and of the Treaty of Europe. […] the nature of these cases suggests that there are unscrupulous people availing of the credulity of lay litigants and encouraging them to launch claims which, legally at least, make absolutely no sense. […] Judges consistently refer to the pressures on the court system caused by the fact that a large amount of cases have to be processed by a relatively small amount of judges. However, the ill – effects of this pressure are felt not predominantly by judges, but rather by litigants. It is individuals and businesses who have to wait lengthy periods for their cases to get on and often significant periods for judgments to be delivered after the cases have been heard. If courts have to deal with a raft of cases such as these (described by Simons J. in Fennell as raising arguments that are “simply preposterous” and by Roberts J. in Brennan as “simply unstateable”)...