Beades v Ireland The Attorney General
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | MacMenamin J.,Charleton J.,O'Malley J. |
| Judgment Date | 02 April 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IESCDET 75 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 02 April 2019 |
[2019] IESCDET 75
THE SUPREME COURT
DETERMINATION
MacMenamin J.
Charleton J.
O'Malley J.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COURTS AND COURT OFFICERS ACT 1995
AND
RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Plaintiff / Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal
| COURT: Court of Appeal |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 14 th March, 2018 |
| DATE OF ORDER: 25 th April, 2018 |
| DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 25 th April, 2018 |
| THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 24 th May, 2018 AND WAS NOT IN TIME. |
1. The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33 rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called “leapfrog appeal” direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. Accordingly it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purpose of this determination.
The application for leave filed, and the respondent's notice thereto, are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties in detail.
This application for leave to appeal to this Court arises in the following circumstances.
Having been nominated by the Government for appointment by the President of Ireland to the office of President of the High Court, Mr. Justice Peter Kelly was due to receive his warrant of appointment from the President of Ireland on the afternoon of the 21st December, 2015. On the 17th December, 2015 the applicant issued plenary proceedings seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Kelly J. was an unsuitable person for appointment, and was also ineligible by virtue of his then position as a member of the Court of Appeal (the reliefs sought in the plenary summons and statement of claim are fully set out in the judgment delivered by Dunne J. in the Court of Appeal, considered further below).
On the morning of the 21st, the applicant made an ex parte application for an injunction preventing the appointment from proceeding. The application was made to Baker J., who was dealing with the common law ex parte list. She adjourned it to 2pm on the same day and directed that the defendants be put on notice.
At 2pm, the defendants were legally represented and Baker J. commenced hearing the applicant. After a few minutes her registrar received a message indicating that the matter should properly be in the chancery list and should be transferred accordingly. The applicant contended that Baker J. had seisin of the matter – she disagreed and sent it to Gilligan J., who was dealing with the chancery list. Having heard the parties, Gilligan J. gave an ex parte ruling in which he refused the order sought.
Two motions were subsequently issued in the matter. The applicant sought judgment in default of defence, while the defendants sought to have the proceedings dismissed on the basis that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or were frivolous and vexatious. In a reserved judgment, Haughton J. acceded to the defendants” application (see Beades v Ireland [2016] IEHC 302). In so doing he found, inter alia, that the applicant had instituted and was conducting the litigation primarily for the improper purpose creating adverse and damaging publicity to certain judges, in particular to Kelly P.
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal. Three preliminary applications made by him were refused, being applications for a...
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