Bell v Dublin Airport Authority Plc

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Gerard Hogan,the President
Judgment Date15 December 2016
Neutral Citation[2016] IECA 384
Date15 December 2016
CourtCourt of Appeal (Ireland)
Docket NumberNeutral Citation Number: [2016] IECA 384 [2014 No. 1142] [2013 No. 541] [2014/1142]

[2016] IECA 384

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Ryan P.

Hogan J.

The President

Sheehan J.

Hogan J.

Ryan P.

Neutral Citation Number: [2016] IECA 384

[2014 No. 1142]

[2013 No. 541]

[2014/1142]

BETWEEN /
TERESA BELL
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
- AND –
DUBLIN AIRPORT AUTHORITY PLC.
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Negligence – Standard of care – Evidential basis – Respondent seeking damages for negligence– Whether trial judge imposed the incorrect standard of care with regard to the legal duty resting on the appellant

Facts: The plaintiff/respondent, Ms Bell, at Dublin Airport on 16th January 2009, tripped and fell on an air bridge between the aircraft and the terminal as she disembarked from a Rome to Dublin flight. The plaintiff pleaded her claim in negligence against the defendant/appellant, Dublin Airport Authority (DAA) and did not pursue the carrier, Aer Lingus. The DAA denied negligence, pleaded contributory negligence and put injuries and quantum in issue. The defendant also pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim against the airport on the basis that she was restricted to suing the carrier, pursuant to the provisions of the Montreal Convention governing international air travel. Instead of adopting that procedure, she proceeded against the DAA. The negligence alleged was that DAA did not have wall signs at head height to alert people to the fact that there were steps in the flooring of the walkway. Concerning the Montreal Convention, the trial judge accepted the argument made by the plaintiff's counsel that EU Council Regulation EC 2027/1997 at Article 4 permitted the plaintiff to bring her action because it provided that nothing in the Regulation shall imply that the Community air carrier is the sole party liable to pay damages. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal submitting that the trial judge, in making a finding of negligence against the defendant, imposed the incorrect standard of care with regard to the legal duty resting on the defendant concerning the safety of passengers disembarking from the aircraft onto an air bridge.

Held by Ryan P that the defendant's appeal must succeed on the issues of negligence and the Montreal Convention. Ryan P held that there was no adequate evidential basis for a finding of negligence as made by the trial judge. Ryan P held that the fact that some measure can be envisaged in retrospect that would or might have prevented the accident is not the test; neither is it enough for the evidence to establish that a different arrangement is in place elsewhere. Ryan P held that the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was in breach of its duty to take reasonable care in the circumstances, which means that it failed to do something that it ought to have done if acting with reasonable care or that it did something that it should not have done. Ryan P held that the evidence did not establish failure by the DAA to take reasonable care in the circumstances.

Ryan P held that the Court would allow the defendant's appeal and dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT of the President delivered on 15th December 2016
Introduction
1

This case concerns an accident that happened at Dublin Airport shortly after 2pm on 16th January 2009 when the plaintiff tripped and fell on an air bridge between the aircraft and the terminal as she disembarked from a Rome to Dublin flight. The plaintiff pleaded her claim in negligence against the Dublin Airport Authority ('DAA') and did not pursue the carrier, Aer Lingus. The DAA denied negligence, pleaded contributory negligence and put injuries and quantum in issue. The defendant also pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim against the airport on the basis that she was restricted to suing the carrier, pursuant to the provisions of the Montreal Convention governing international air travel. Instead of adopting that advantageous procedure, she erroneously proceeded against the Airport Authority.

2

The bridge is telescopic, extending outwards from the airport terminal towards the aircraft door. The particular model of bridge in use at the time was a common type made by a large American manufacturer. The nature of the construction, particularly the fact that it was telescopic, meant that it was stepped as it extended towards the aircraft. The steps, or saddles, are approximately two inches in height. There is also a small gap below the step. Each step is highlighted by luminous yellow paint extending the full width of the passage and some six inches in length. The evidence of the plaintiff's engineer and all the other witnesses is that the steps were visible.

3

The plaintiff tripped on one of these steps. She testified that she did not see it. Her case was that the step was obscured from view because of the other passengers ahead of her on the bridge going towards the airport terminal. The evidence of another passenger called by the plaintiff put the number of persons in front of the plaintiff at less than ten.

4

The negligence alleged was that DAA did not have wall signs at head height to alert people to the fact that there were steps in the flooring of the walkway. That was the evidence of the plaintiff's engineer, Mr. Wynn, which the judge accepted. The judge said:

'I find that the Defendants should have placed signs at eye level to warn passengers of the difference of the floor height. This action would have gone a long way towards eliminating the effect of the trip hazard at this location. Accordingly, I find that the Defendant was negligent in its failure to put warning signs on the locus of the accident.'

5

Concerning the Montreal Convention, the trial judge accepted the argument made by the plaintiff's counsel that EU Council Regulation EC 2027/1997 at Article 4 permitted the plaintiff to bring her action because it provided that nothing in the Regulation shall imply that the Community air carrier is the sole party liable to pay damages.

6

In my judgment, the defendant's appeal must succeed on the issues of negligence and the Montreal Convention. There was no adequate evidential basis for a finding of negligence as made by the trial judge; the evidence as accepted by the judge was insufficient to justify such a conclusion. The fact that some measure can be envisaged in retrospect that would or might have prevented the accident is not the test. Neither is it enough for the evidence to establish that a different arrangement is in place elsewhere. The plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was in breach of its duty to take reasonable care in the circumstances, which means that it failed to do something that it ought to have done if acting with reasonable care or that it did something that it should not have done. The evidence did not establish failure by the Authority to take reasonable care in the circumstances.

7

In regard to the Convention, I must also disagree with the conclusions of the High Court. There is high authority in decisions of the House of Lords on the corresponding provisions of the Warsaw Convention to the effect that the system of international air carriage regulation is complete, closed and exhaustive. These decisions are acknowledged by the Supreme Court. They mean that a plaintiff claiming injury in circumstances covered by the Convention can only claim compensation in accordance with its provisions. The Regulation that was invoked by the plaintiff in attempting to circumvent this restriction did not have the effect of overturning a key provision of the international agreements.

8

The relevant evidence in the case may be summarised as follows. The plaintiff recalled getting off the plane onto the air bridge. She had gone past the first saddle in the bridge without incident but she did not realise that there was a second saddle there and her foot got caught in it and she fell as a result. Explaining why she did not see the saddle, she said:

'There was a lot of people in front of me and everybody was moving very slowly, really, but there was a lot of people in front of me, a lot of people beside me and behind me. There was a lot of people in front of me, how many I don't know.'

She was unable to remember how many people were in front of her. She said that if she said four people she would be wrong and if she said 20 people she would be wrong. A fellow passenger, a Mr. Preskaytis, testified that he was behind Ms. Bell on the air bridge and that there were less than 10 people in front of him. Counsel asked him to confirm that that meant less than 10 for the whole corridor in front of him and he did so.

9

The plaintiff's expert was Mr. James Wynn, a consulting engineer practising in Ardee, County Louth. He inspected the air bridge on 5th November 2009. He referred to the telescopic nature of the air bridge which moves out from the Terminal into contact with the aeroplane. The sections slide out one under the other. He said there were several places in which warning signs could be put. In regard to the steps in the air bridge, he said 'they are painted yellow alright, presumably because somebody considers them to be a hazard'. As to whether the highlighting in yellow was sufficient on its own, he said:

'They're so obvious in both my photos and Mr. Watson's photos. When there's a crowd of people coming off, you are not, you know, you are not just looking downwards, you're looking forwards and you wouldn't see them in any way in advance if there were a few people in front of you. In fact, the whole thing, all the nice pictures on the left-hand side as you go out certainly draw your eye to Venice, more than looking downwards into the yellow strip.'

This was a reference to an advertising photograph on the side of the air bridge.

10

Mr. Wynn said that he had noticed on travelling through Gatwick Airport some time after his...

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2 cases
  • O'Regan v Ryanair DAC
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 10 Diciembre 2018
    ...the provisions of Article 17 of the Montreal Convention; and (iv) the implication arising from Bell v Dublin Airport Authority plc [2016] IECA 384 and particularly para. 47 which envisaged the joinder of a third party by a defendant airline even though a claimant may not be able to pursue t......
  • O'Regan v Ryanair DAC
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 10 Diciembre 2018
    ...not withdrawn; (iii) the defence delivered in October 2018; and (iv) the implication arising from Bell v Dublin Airport Authority plc [2016] IECA 384 and particularly para. 47 thereof. O’Connor J, therefore, gave liberty to the defendant to issue a third party notice in the form exhibited a......

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