Byrne v Sheedy

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 21 December 1955
• Date: 21 December 1955
• Court: Supreme Court

Supreme Court.

Byrne v. Sheedy

JAMES F. BYRNE

Plaintiff

and

JOHN J. SHEEDY, Defendant (1)

Negligence - Personal injuries - Contributory negligence - Failure to keep proper look-out - Evidence - Duty to yield right of way to vehicle approaching from right of driver - General Bye-Laws for the Control of Traffic, 1937 (Stat. R. and Or., 1937, No. 222), Article 9, paras. (5) and (7).

Witness Action.

The plaintiff, James F. Byrne, brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused to him as a result of the negligent driving of the defendant, John J. Sheedy, when his car collided with the plaintiff's car as he was driving over an intersection of streets in the city of Dublin on the 4th February, 1953. The plaintiff, who was driving a Ford 8 h.p. van had driven along Parliament Street and was crossing the junction where Parliament Street is intersected on the east by Wellington Quay and

on the west by Essex Quay with the intention of crossing Grattan Bridge, which was straight ahead. While crossing the intersection a collision took place between the plaintiff's van and a Commer station wagon which was being driven along Essex Quay in the direction of the City by the defendant. The collision took place at 5 a.m.; the morning was dry, the street lighting good, and both cars had lights. There was no traffic in the immediate vicinity other than the two vehicles which came into collision. At the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff, counsel for the defendant applied to the trial Judge (McLoughlin J.) for a direction that the case be withdrawn from the jury on the ground,inter alia, that even if there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, there must be a finding of negligence against the plaintiff, on his own evidence, and there was no room for the third question. The trial Judge refused to accede to the application, and left two questions to the jury on the issue of negligence, viz. 1, Was the defendant negligent? 2, Was the plaintiff negligent? The jury answered the first question submitted to them in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds, inter alia, that on the evidence the jury ought to have found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, that the evidence did not justify the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence; and that the finding of the jury that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence was without any evidence and was contrary to the evidence, to the weight of the evidence and was perverse.

A collision occurred between the plaintiff's motor-van, driven by him across an intersection of streets in the city of Dublin, and the defendant's station wagon, which was being driven along a thoroughfare on the plaintiff's left. As he entered upon the intersection, the plaintiff saw no vehicle approaching. When he had travelled some distance across the intersection, the plaintiff's van came into collision with the defendant's station wagon which, unknown to and unobserved by the plaintiff, had approached from his left. As a result of the collision the plaintiff suffered severe injuries and he instituted proceedings in the High Court in which he claimed damages for the injuries which, he alleged, had been caused by the negligent driving of the defendant. At the hearing, on the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, counsel for the defendant applied to the trial Judge to enter a verdict for the defendant on the grounds that there was no evidence of negligence of the defendant fit to be submitted to the jury, and that even if there was such evidence, that there must be a finding of negligence against the plaintiff, on his own evidence, and the best that could be established, from the point of view of the plaintiff, was joint negligence with no room for the third question, and accordingly the plaintiff had not discharged the onus of proving that the accident was caused by the defendant's negligence. The trial Judge declined to accede to this application and at the conclusion of the case submitted the following questions to the jury:—1, Was the defendant negligent? 2, Was the plaintiff negligent? On the jury answering the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative, judgment was entered for the plaintiff.

On an application by the defendant to the Supreme Court to set aside the verdict and judgment so entered for the plaintiff and to enter judgment for him it was

Held by the Supreme Court (Maguire C.J., Kingsmill Moore and Maguire JJ.; O'Daly J. dissenting) that the plaintiff could not be acquitted of negligence contributing to the accident and that the verdict of the jury must, therefore, be set aside and judgment entered for the defendant.

Held further by the Supreme Court (Maguire C.J., Kingsmill Moore and Maguire JJ.; O'Daly J. stating that he would express no concluded opinion upon the point) that Article 9, paras. (5) and (7), of the General Bye-laws for the Control of Traffic, 1937, should be read with Article 22 (1), and cannot be relied upon as absolving a driver from looking to his left when about to cross at a road junction where he can observe traffic approaching and avoid risk of accident by slowing down or pulling up.

The appeal was accordingly allowed.

Cur. adv. vult.

Maguire C.J. :—

This action which was for damages for negligence was tried by Mr. Justice McLoughlin with a jury. The jury found that the defendant was negligent and acquitted the plaintiff of contributory negligence. Damages were assessed at £6,000 for which sum judgment was entered for the plaintiff.

The defendant moves this Court to set aside the verdict and judgment so entered and enter a verdict for him.

The sole question for consideration is whether the jury were entitled having regard to the evidence to acquit the plaintiff of contributory negligence. Counsel for the defence at the close of the plaintiff's case asked that the case be withdrawn from the jury on the ground amongst others that even if there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant that there must be a finding of negligence against the plaintiff on his own evidence and that there was no room for what is known as the third question. The learned trial Judge, however, declined to accede to this application. The defendant went into evidence. The application for a direction was not renewed at the end of the defendant's case. This Court is, however, asked to say that the case should have been withdrawn from the jury as falling within the principle laid down in Coyle v. Great Northern Railway Co.(4).

The material facts are not seriously in dispute. The plaintiff who was driving a van of the Ford 8 h.p. type was on his way to the Cattle Market at 5...