A.C. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Ms. Justice Bolger |
| Judgment Date | 05 July 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] IEHC 430 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | [2021/202/JR] |
In the Matter of Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (As Amended) and in the Matter of the International Protection Act 2015
[2022] IEHC 430
[2021/202/JR]
THE HIGH COURT
International protection – Credibility – Benefit of doubt – Applicants seeking an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the first respondent refusing international protection – Whether the first applicant discharged the burden of proof resting on her to establish credibility
Facts: The first applicant was a national of Zimbabwe where she was born and brought up. She was the mother of the second applicant who was born on 28 March 2005 when the first applicant was 20 years of age with her then boyfriend. He did not accept responsibility for his daughter and was physically violent to the first applicant when she was pregnant. The first applicant left her infant daughter in the care of her parents and travelled to South Africa to work. The first applicant said that in 2017 she learned that her daughter’s father wished to arrange a marriage for her daughter. Her claim that it was customary for young girls in Zimbabwe to be forced into arranged marriages when very young was verified by country of origin information. The first applicant’s sister lived in Longford and the first applicant had visited previously in 2016. In late 2017 she applied to the Irish Embassy in Pretoria for a visa to visit Ireland and arrived, with her daughter in the State on 17 March 2018. They both applied for international protection on 20 March 2018 based on the first applicant’s fears that if they were returned to Zimbabwe, the second applicant’s father, with his connections to the ruling party Zanu PF, would force the second applicant into an arranged marriage and that he would physically abuse the first applicant again in the future. On 6 January 2020 the applicants were notified by way of letter that pursuant to a report conducted in accordance with s. 39 of the International Protection Act 2015, the International Protection Office was recommending that neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration be given. The applicants’ appeal to the first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal, was unsuccessful. The applicants applied to the High Court seeking an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the Tribunal dated 8 January 2021 due to claimed flaws in how the first applicant’s credibility was assessed and the Tribunal’s application of s. 28(7) of the 2015 Act in determining whether the first applicant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Held by Bolger J that there was no reason to depart from the approach of Ferriter J in AH and ors v IPAT and Anor [2022] IEHC 84. Bolger J rejected the applicants’ contention that the facts of their situation allowed Ferriter J’s decision to be distinguished. Bolger J held that the first applicant failed to discharge the burden of proof resting on her to establish credibility and the Tribunal was entitled to decline to apply the benefit of doubt to those facts that remained in doubt.
Bolger J refused the application. Her indicative view on costs was that costs should, in accordance with s. 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act, follow the cause and the respondents were entitled to their costs against the applicants.
Application refused.
DECISION of Ms. Justice Bolger delivered on the 5th day of July, 2022
The applicants seek an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the first named respondent dated 8 January 2021 (“the impugned decision”) due to claimed flaws in how the applicant's credibility was assessed and the Tribunal's application of section 28(7) of the International Protection Act 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in determining whether the applicant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.
The applicant also sought an extension of time if necessary which was not opposed by the respondents. I am satisfied that the applicant's submissions on the delay in filing their application merits an extension of time.
For the reasons set out below I am refusing the applicants' substantive application.
The first named applicant is a national of Zimbabwe where she was born and brought up. She is the mother of the second named applicant who was born on 28 March 2005 when the first named applicant was 20 years of age with her then boyfriend, identified for the purpose of these proceedings as VM. VM did not accept responsibility for his daughter and was physically violent to the first named applicant when she was pregnant. The first named applicant left her infant daughter in the care of her parents and travelled to South Africa to work. Neither of them had significant contact with VM over the years but there was some contact with his family.
The first named applicant states that her father was politically active, as a member of the MDC opposition party, while VM was well connected with Zanu PF, the ruling party in the country.
The first named applicant says that in 2017 she learned that VM wished to arrange a marriage for her daughter. Her claim that it is customary for young girls in Zimbabwe to be forced into arranged marriages when very young was verified by country of origin (COI) information.
The first named applicant's sister lives in Longford and that applicant had visited previously in 2016. In late 2017 she applied to the Irish Embassy in Pretoria for a visa to visit Ireland and arrived, with her daughter in the State on 17 March 2018. They both applied for international protection on 20 March 2018 based on the first applicant's fears that if they were returned to...
To continue reading
Request your trial