Caldbeck v Stafford and Lindemere

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 24 January 1930
• Date: 24 January 1930
• Court: High Court (Irish Free State)

Caldbeck v. Stafford & Lindemere.

In re JENNINGS, Deceased; CALDBECK

and

STAFFORD and LINDEMERE

Will - Construction - Bequest of "the use of all money" for

beneficiary's lifetime - Meaning of "money."

A testatrix made her will as follows:—"I wish my granddaughter, B. K. M. L., to have the use of all my money for her lifetime. I now revoke all former wills." At the date of her death the testatrix was possessed of cash on current account in her bank and cash on deposit account, money due to her for pension as the widow of an army officer, a sum of India 5¹/₂ per cent. Stock, with dividends accrued thereon, a sum of War Stock, with dividends accrued thereon, an undivided interest in leasehold property, an apportioned part of rents of leasehold property in which she had a life interest, an apportioned part of dividends on stocks in which she also had a life interest, and an undivided interest in freehold property.

Held that the word "all" was introduced into the will to insure a wide interpretation being given to the expression "my money," and, accordingly, B.K.M.L. was entitled to a life interest in all the said property except the interest in the freehold.

The authorities do not coerce the Court to hold that there is no derivative or secondary sense of the word "money" that has the sanction of common user and so allows the application of the principles laid down in Scale-Haynev. Jodrell, [1891] A.C., at p. 306, and in Cave v. Horsell, [1912] 3 K.B., at p. 543, and accordingly the Court is entitled to hold that the word was, in point of fact, used in a derivative, and not in its primary sense.

Observations of Kay J. in In re Cadogan; Cadogan v. Palagi, 25 Ch.D., at p. 157, applied; In re Taylor; Taylor v. Tweedie, [1923] 1 Ch. 99,followed; In re Gates; Gates v. Cabell, [1929] 2 Ch. 420, distinguished.

Summons to determine certain questions arising on the construction of the will of Anastasia Jennings, who died on the 6th May, 1928. Her will, which was dated the 14th May, 1924, was as follows:—"I wish my granddaughter, Beryl Kathleen Moira Lindemere, to have the use of all my money for her lifetime. I now revoke all former wills." Letters of administration, with the will annexed, were, on the 2nd May, 1929, granted forth of the principal Probate Registry of the Irish Free State to the plaintiff, who was the son and heir-at-law of the testatrix. The defendant, Florence Anna Stafford, was a daughter of the testatrix, the other defendant being Beryl Kathleen Moira Lindemere, the granddaughter of the testatrix, mentioned in the will. The principal question arising upon the construction of the will, and the one with which this report deals, was whether the said Beryl Kathleen Moira Lindemere was entitled to a life interest in the entire property of the testatrix, which was enumerated in the summons, and is set out infra in the judgment of Meredith J.

Cur. adv. vult.

Meredith J. :—

This is one of the many cases of an extremely short will, in which the interpretation of the word "money" has led to much difficulty.

The will is in the following terms:—"I wish my granddaughter, Beryl Kathleen Moira Lindemere, to have the use of all my money for her lifetime. I now revoke all former wills."

At the date on which the testatrix made her will there was a sum of £167 8s. 2d. to the credit of a joint account in the names of herself and her husband at the National Bank, Dun Laoghaire; she had also a sum of £470 19s. 5d. India 5¹/₂ per cent. Stock, a sum of £500 5 per cent. War Stock, certain undivided shares of leasehold property, and certain other interests, which would terminate on her death, and are therefore immaterial. At the date of her death, four years later, her property consisted of:—

(a) The sum of £170 19s. 7d. on current account in the Surbiton Branch of the National Provincial Bank;

(b) The sum of £310 15s. 11d., with accrued interest, on deposit account in the said branch of the said bank;

(c) The sum of £1 18s., pension due as widow of an Army officer;

(d) The sum of £470 19s. 5d. India 5¹/₂ per cent. Stock, with dividends accrued thereon;

(e) The sum of £1,212 9s. 5d. 5 per cent. War Loan, with interest accrued thereon;

(f) An undivided share in some leasehold property;

(g) The sum of £3 12s. 6d., being an apportioned part of rents of leasehold property in which she had a life estate;

(h) The sum of £18 19s. 10d., being an apportioned part of dividends on stocks in which the deceased had a life interest;

(i) An undivided interest in some real estate; and

(j) An undivided interest in some real estate, now vested in the Land Commission under the Land Act of 1923.

On behalf of the next-of-kin, it was contended by Mr. Kingsmill Moore that, apart from an explanatory context, the word "money" must, according to a long line of authorities, be construed in the strict legal sense of cash in hand or at call in the bank, and that in the present case there is no such context.

On behalf of the granddaughter, Mr. Price contended that there was sufficient in the context to show that the word was used in an enlarged sense, and that, once the meaning is extended, the authorities show that no line can be drawn until the word is taken to mean personal, as opposed to real, estate.

As to the suggested alternative to the so-called strict legal meaning, it seems to me that, in the case of a will in which legal phraseology is not adopted, if the Court has once come to the conclusion that the word is not used in what is called the strict legal sense, nothing could be more illogical than to look round for some other technical legal distinction, such as that between real and personal estate, and to suppose that the testator had that distinction in mind. Money in the sense of personal estate is not money in a sense that is either legal or popular. If the testator has not resorted to the strict legal sense, the logical course is to look for an ordinary popular sense in which the word may be presumed to have been used. The popular mind draws a very familiar distinction between spending money and saving money. The articles on which one spends one's money—articles ordinarily purchased to be used for the purpose, other than that of a means of exchange, for which they exist—such as clothes, furniture, a house to live in, are not regarded as money in the wide sense. But money invested is regarded as money saved, and is regarded as preserving the character of money.

Now, it seems to me to rest on a complete misapprehension to refer to this latter extended use of the term "money" as a popular use, if the word "popular" is to be understood in a derogatory sense as implying a use that is wrong or that betrays deficient education. The so-called strict legal sense of the term"money" is only the primary sense; and the so-called popular sense is only an extended and well-recognised derivative sense. Further, the so-called strict legal sense is as much a popularly accepted sense as the extended sense. The man in the street would ordinarily understand the question, "Have you got any money about you?" to refer to ready money. But where the phrase is, "It's his money she's after," the remark would on almost any imaginable occasion be taken to refer to money in the extended sense. "A man of money" and "a man of means" are used as convertible phrases. The primary sense is given as No. 1 in the Oxford Dictionary as follows:—"Current coin; metal stamped in pieces of portable form as a medium of exchange and measure of value." The derivative sense in question is given as No. 3: "Coin considered in reference to its value or purchasing power; hence, property or possessions of any kind viewed as convertible into money or having value expressible in terms of money." Adam Smith is cited as saying in the "Wealth of Nations": "Wealth and money . . . are, in common language, considered as in every respect synonymous."Murray's Magazine of June, 1890, is referred to for the passage: "He'll come into a lot of money some fine day."Many of the most commonly used words in the language have primary and derivative significations, between which a choice has to be made by considering the connection in which they are used. The very word "cash," so frequently used to express the legal meaning of the word "money," may mean either "ready money" or "prompt payment," as in the expression, "discount for cash," and both these meanings are derivative from the original and now obsolete meaning of a thing in which money can be deposited. The contest between the primary and a well-recognised derivative sense of a word can hardly be said to be one between a right and a wrong use.

The necessity of interpreting the particular sense in which a word is used is so much a matter of daily and hourly concern that the interpretation is generally arrived at quite instinctively, that is, without any deliberate process of reasoning and although there might be much difficulty in setting out the "why" and the "wherefore." "It is not easy to give reasons for such an expression. It is difficult to say more than that that is the effect which the perusal of the words in this will produces upon one's mind," per Lord Herschell in Scale-Hayne v. Jodrell(1).So, in interpreting a will, there may be such a thing as the ring of the words. But when the question has to be decided by Judges, the "whys" and the "wherefores" have to be forced to the surface, and the long line of authorities on the meaning of the common word "money," as frequently...