O'Callaghan v Ag
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | O'FLAHERTY J. |
| Judgment Date | 25 February 1993 |
| Neutral Citation | 1993 WJSC-SC 1137 |
| Docket Number | (216/92) |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Date | 25 February 1993 |
BETWEEN
AND
1993 WJSC-SC 1137
THE SUPREME COURT
Synopsis:
JURY
Verdict
Majority - Offence - Trial - Conviction - Enactment permitting verdict - Validity of enactment - (216/92 - Supreme Court - 25/2/93)- [1993] 2 I.R. 17 - [1993] ILRM 764
|O'Callaghan v. The Attorney General|
CONSTITUTION
Statute
Validity - Trial - Indictment - Jury - Verdict - Majority verdict of guilty - Majority of ten from panel of twelve jurors - Verdict permitted by statute - Legality - Essential features of jury trial - Secrecy of jury deliberations - Criminal Justice Act, 1984, s. 25 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Articles 38, 40 - (216/92 - Supreme Court - 25/2/93)- [1993] 2 I.R. 17 - [1993] ILRM 764
|O'Callaghan v. The Attorney General|
CRIMINAL LAW
Jury
Trial - Indictment - Conviction - Majority verdict - Verdict permitted by statute - Validity of statute - (216/92 - Supreme Court - 25/2/93)- [1993] 2 I.R. 17 - [1993] ILRM 764
|O'Callaghan v. The Attorney General|
Citations:
de BURCA V AG 1976 IR 38
CONSTITUTION ART 38.1
CONSTITUTION ART 38.5
CONSTITUTION ART 40.3
AG V HAMILTON UNREP SUPREME 21.8.92 1992/5/1247
AG V ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LTD UNREP QBD 12.11.92
DPP, PEOPLE V O'SHEA 1982 IR 384
DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY, HAMLYN TRUST LECTURE SERIES 1956
O'HAGAN, THE AMENDMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM IN IRELAND 1867 ILTSJ 580
AG, PEOPLE V LONGE 1967 IR 369
JURIES ACT 1976 S9(7)
JURIES ACT 1976 S23
JURIES ACT 1976 S24
JURIES (PROTECTION) ACT 1929
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1990
MIRROR GROUP (HOLDINGS) LTD, IN RE THE TIMES 12.11.92
pronounced pursuant to Art. 34.4.5 of the Constitution by O'FLAHERTY J. by direction of the Court, on the 25th day of February, 1993.
The High Court (Blayney J.) by judgment and order of the 22nd May, 1992 refused the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984was unconstitutional. On the 15th December, 1992 the Court dismissed the appeal brought on behalf of the plaintiff. The Court now gives its reasons for the decision reached.
On the 10th March, 1989 the plaintiff was tried in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court on charges of larceny and robbery and was convicted by a majority verdict of the jury, the majority being 10 to 2 for a conviction. He applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal against his conviction and on the 30th July, 1990 his application was refused. He then brought these proceedings by way of judicial review in which pleadings were delivered and in the course of which he sought a declaration that the provisions of section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984were unconstitutional and void; an order of certiorari quashing his conviction in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court and an order setting aside the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal confirming his conviction.
Section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984provides:-
(1) The verdict of a jury in criminal proceedings need not be unanimous in a case where there are not fewer than eleven jurors if ten of them agree on the verdict.
(2) The court shall not accept a verdict of guilty unless the foreman of the jury has stated in open court whether the verdict is unanimous or is by a majority in accordance with subsection (1) and, in the latter event, the number of jurors who agreed to the verdict.
(3) The court shall not accept a verdict by virtue of subsection (1) unless it appears to the court that the jury have had such period of time for deliberation as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity of the case; and the court shall not in any event accept such a verdict unless it appears to the court that the jury have had at least two hours for deliberation.
(4) The court shall cause the verdict of the jury to be taken in such a way that, where the verdict is one of not guilty, it shall not be indicated whether the verdict was unanimous or by a majority.
1(5) This section shall not affect the trial of any offence for which the court is required, upon the conviction of the accused, to sentence him to death or any trial commenced before the commencement of this section.
This section requires to be read in conjunction with sections 9 (7), 23,and 24 of the Juries Act, 1976which provide that a trial may continue with not less than ten jurors in certain circumstances. This Act, it is appropriate to point out, was passed after the decision of this Court in de Burca .v. Attorney General (1976) I.R. 38. The Act was designed to cure the defects in the previous legislation which required a property qualification for jurors and operated, in effect, to exclude women from jury service.
The grounds advanced in support of the plaintiff's challenge to the impugned legislation both in the High Court and in this Court (where, with leave, there was added an additional ground) may be thus summarised -
1. That a unanimous verdict was an indispensable feature of a trial with a jury on a criminal charge.
2. It was not within the constitutional competence of the Oireachtas to provide for majority verdicts by a jury on the trial of a criminal charge.
3. A unanimous verdict was an indispensable feature of a trial with a jury on a criminal charge in due course of law as provided for by Article 38.1 of the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of law.
4. That a unanimous verdict was an indispensable feature of a trial with a jury on a criminal charge as provided for by Article 38.5 of the Constitution, which provides (with exceptions which are not relevant) that no person shall be tried on any criminal charge without a jury.
5. That the reception of a majority verdict after the requisite statutory time period had elapsed constituted an impermissible interference with the decision-making process of a jury within the meaning of the provisions of Article 38.1; Article 38.5 and Article 40.3, which provides that the State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.
All these grounds of challenge were rejected by the learned trial judge. Before this Court an additional ground was permitted to be argued on the basis that certain cases had been decided which were not available for the High Court hearing viz. Attorney General .v. Hamilton; Supreme Court, August 21st, 1992 and Attorney General .v. Associated Newspapers Limited (a decision of a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division in England; November 12th, 1992). The submission in regard to this ground was that the right to jury trial guaranteed by Article 38.5 of the Constitution presupposes that the jury's deliberations enjoy absolute confidentiality in order to safeguard complete freedom of discussion in the jury room; that the free, uninhibited and unfettered discussion by the jury which is thereby entailed is unconstitutionally undermined by section 25 in that, by allowing for majority...
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