Campbell v County Sligo Golf Club and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Maurice Collins
• Judgment Date: 25 May 2023
• Neutral Citation: [2023] IECA 132
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Docket Number: Record No 2021/165

Between

Colm Campbell

Plaintiff/Appellant

and

County Sligo Golf Club, The Golfing Union of Ireland National Coaching Academy Ltd and Kevin Le Blanc

Defendants/Respondents

[2023] IECA 132

The President

Collins J

Faherty J

Record No 2021/165

THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Unapproved

No redactions required

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Maurice Collins delivered on 25 May 2023

1 This is Mr Campbell's appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court (O' Hanlon J) dismissing his claim against the Defendants arising from an injury sustained by him on 28 March 2016 as a result of being struck by a golf ball while spectating at the West of Ireland Amateur Golf Championship at the County Sligo Golf Club at Rosses Point, Co. Sligo. Mr Campbell had sued the County Sligo Golf Club (described in the Personal Injuries Summons as the “ owners and operators” and “ occupier” of the Rosses Point course) and the Golfing Union of Ireland (said in the Personal Injuries Summons to have been responsible for the administration of amateur golf in Ireland) 1 as well as Mr Le Blanc, who was a competitor in the West of Ireland Championship and whose golf ball had struck Mr Campbell as he played his second shot into the 11 ^th green during his quarter-final match.

2 The Court heard the appeal and reserved its judgment. In due course, the Court finalised its judgment, the appeal was listed for judgment for 12 May 2023 and the parties notified accordingly. At that point, Mr Campbell's solicitors (with the consent of the other parties) wrote to the Court informing it that all issues had been resolved between the parties, that Mr Campbell was unconditionally withdrawing his appeal and that the only orders required from the Court was an order vacating all costs orders made in the High Court, with no order to be made as to costs in this Court. In the circumstances, the Court was requested not to deliver its judgment.

3 Where an appeal has been fully argued – as was the case here – this Court is, as a matter of principle, entitled to proceed to give judgment, notwithstanding that the appeal has been settled and that the parties do not wish that judgment be delivered. So much is clear from McDonagh v Sunday Newspapers [2017] IESC 59, [2018] 2 IR 79, in which the Supreme Court gave judgment on an appeal though asked not to do so in circumstances where the case had been settled (though they agreed not to indicate the specific amounts they would have substituted for the damages awarded by the jury). As McKechnie J explained at the start of his judgment:

“[124] Immediately prior to the intended delivery of this judgment, the court was informed that all matters had been compromised between the parties and that a final settlement of this litigation had been reached. As part of this compromise it was agreed between the parties that the court would be asked not to deliver judgment, and so an application to that effect was made. However, because the judgments which were about to be delivered dealt with matters which are of general public importance, the court decided to proceed as originally planned, subject only to an agreement by those who intended to nominate a specific damages figure, not to do so.” (my emphasis).

4 The entitlement of a court – whether an appellate court or a court of first instance — to give judgment in such circumstances is also well-established in England and Wales: see ( inter alia) Barclays Bank PLC v Nylon Capital LLP [2011] EWCA Civ 826, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 912 and the recent decision of the Queen's Bench in Jabbar v Aviva Insurance UK Ltd [2022] 4 WLR 68 which surveys the authorities. In his judgment in Barclays Bank PLC v Nylon Capital LLP, Lord Neuberger MR put the position thus:

“[74] Where a case has been fully argued, whether at first instance or on appeal, and it then settles or is withdrawn or is in some other way disposed of, the court retains the right to decide whether or not to proceed to give judgment. Where the case raises a point which it is in the public interest to ventilate in a judgment, that would be a powerful reason for proceeding to give judgment despite the matter having been disposed of between the parties. Obvious examples of such cases are where the case raises a point of law of some potential general interest, where an appellate court is differing from the court below, where some wrongdoing or other activity should be exposed, or where the case has attracted some other legitimate public interest.

[75] It will also be relevant in most cases to consider how far the preparation of any judgment had got by the time of the request. In the absence of good reason to the contrary, it would be a highly questionable use of judicial time to prepare a judgment on an issue which was no longer live between the parties to the case. On the other hand, where the judgment is complete, it could be said (perhaps with rather less force) that it would be a retrospective waste of judicial time and effort if the judgment was not given.

[76] The concerns of the...