Corcoran v Director of Public Prosecutons, Doherty v Director of Public Prosecutons, Rooney v Director of Public Prosecutons
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan |
| Judgment Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] IEHC 435 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | Record No.: 2021/110 JR Record No.: 2020/982 JR |
[2022] IEHC 435
Record No.: 2021/110 JR
Record No.: 2021/154 JR
Record No.: 2020/982 JR
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review – Fair procedures – Jurisdiction – Applicants seeking judicial review – Whether proceedings were conducted in a manner which failed to comply with the requirements of fair procedures
Facts: The applicants, Mr Corcoran, Ms Doherty and Mr Rooney, were each charged with offences contrary to ss. 252(1)(b) and 252(4) of the Children Act 2001 (as amended) arising from the alleged publication of a matter identifying the accused boys tried in respect of the murder of a child. On the 28th of October, 2020, the charges against the applicants came before the District Court. In each case the sitting Judge confirmed agreement with the respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions, that the matters were suitable for trial summarily and accepted jurisdiction. When the matter came before the District Court on the 2nd of December, 2020, specifically for the purpose of entering a plea or assigning a date, a different Judge was sitting. The Judge refused jurisdiction in a single ruling in which he confirmed that he was satisfied that the offences before the Court were unfit for trial summarily. Applications for leave to proceed by way of judicial review were moved. It was accepted on behalf of the applicants that a District Court Judge may be entitled to refuse jurisdiction at any point up to and including the conclusion of a summary trial, but it was contended that the District Court Judge should not do so of his own volition at an interlocutory stage during a procedural listing and when jurisdiction does not require to be addressed. The applicants’ position was that once the issue of jurisdiction is dealt with by one District Court Judge, another District Court Judge (or the original Judge) may not review or reconsider that issue at any stage until such time as the matter is substantively before him or her once more by way of an accused person being on trial for the offence when the court receives evidence or where an accused person pleads guilty and the court has to determine the issue of sentence. The District Judge’s approach was said to be unlawful because, in the absence of new material or information and in circumstances where he was not required to receive evidence or re-visit the question of jurisdiction, it was contended that it was not open to him to simply substitute his view for that of another District Court Judge and thereby assume a quasi-appellate role. It was further contended that in the absence of notice that the matter was before the District Court for a determination on jurisdiction, proceedings were conducted in a manner which failed to comply with the requirements of fair procedures. It was complained that in approaching the cases collectively and in failing to elaborate on his reasons for concluding that none of the cases involved minor offences which were suited for trial summarily, the Judge was in breach of his duty to give reasons. To this end, counsel in the Rooney case, in particular, sought to distinguish between the facts of the different cases pointing to a difference in culpability which warranted separate and individual treatment depending on whether the accused had simply retweeted a post authored by another (which it was suggested was the position in Rooney) or had engaged in a more active form of publication.
Held by the High Court that there was unfairness in the manner in which the District Judge approached the issue of jurisdiction without addressing the cases individually or acknowledging the differences between the cases in deciding on jurisdiction in all cases and therefore without demonstrating due consideration of whether the offence in the individual case was minor and triable summarily. The Court proposed making orders of certiorari quashing the orders of the Court made on the 2nd of December, 2020 in respect of the applicants.
The Court remitted the matters to the District Court for a plea or a date.
Applications granted.
JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 8 th day of July, 2022
. The Applicants in these proceedings are each charged with offences contrary to ss. 252(1)(b) and 252(4) of the Children Act, 2001 (as amended) arising from the alleged publication of a matter identifying the accused boys namely Boy A and Boy B, both of whom are children, tried in respect of the murder of Ms. Anastasia Kriégel, also a child.
. The alleged publication occurred in breach of reporting restrictions imposed by a court direction and arising as a matter of law pursuant to s. 252 of the Children Act, 2001 (as amended) which provides in relevant part:
“ 252.—(1) Subject to this section, in relation to any proceedings for an offence against a child or where a child is a witness in any such proceedings—
(a) no report which reveals the name, address or school of the child or includes any particulars likely to lead to his or her identification, and
(b) no picture which purports to be or include a picture of the child or which is likely to lead to his or her identification,
shall be published or included in a broadcast…
….
(4) Subsections (3) to (6) of Section 51 shall apply, with the necessary modifications, for the purposes of this section.”
. A breach of s. 252(1) of the 2001 Act is an offence under s. 51(3)(b) of that Act and it is provided that a person who publishes in breach of s. 252(1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable under s. 51(3)(c)(i) and (ii) of the 2001 Act on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £1,500 (euro equivalent) or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or both, or on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding £10,000 (euro equivalent) or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or both.
. The core issue for determination is whether, where a judge of the District Court has heard an outline of the facts for the purpose of determining jurisdiction in respect of a hybrid offence (that is an offence triable summarily or on indictment), has accepted jurisdiction and adjourned the prosecution for entry of plea or for a date, it is open to a different judge sitting on the adjourned date to re-hear an outline of the facts for the purpose of determining jurisdiction afresh before taking any further step in the proceedings. In addition, I must determine whether the decision to refuse jurisdiction for summary disposal in respect of the offences with which the Applicants are charged was made in breach of fair procedures consequent upon an absence of notice or a failure to properly reason the decision in each case.
. On the 28 th of October, 2020, charges against the Applicants came before the District Court sitting at District Court No.8, Criminal Courts of Justice (CCJ), Parkgate Street, Dublin 8 on foot of summonses issued pursuant to s. 1 of the Courts (No. 3) Act, 1986 returnable to that date. On that date the Applicants were among a number of other persons listed to appear before the Court accused of similar offences concerning the publication of various material allegedly identifying Boy A and Boy B. The consent of the Respondent to summary disposal was conveyed to the Court in each of the Applicants' cases.
. The sitting Judge (Judge O'Shea) heard the facts in each case and ruled on each case individually. He indicated that he would not proceed to refuse jurisdiction in the absence of an accused person because of the significance of the decision for them but would make a decision to accept jurisdiction with the consent of their legal representatives as there was no prejudice arising to them from such a decision. In each case he confirmed agreement with the Respondent that the matters were suitable for trial summarily and accepted jurisdiction. In each of the three cases the sitting District Judge addressed issues of disclosure and legal aid and adjourned proceedings to the 2 nd of December, 2020 for a plea of guilty or to assign a hearing date or as the order drawn recites “ for plea or date”. He made identical orders in each of the other six cases, having heard an outline of the facts and ruling on each case in turn.
. When the matter came before the District Court on the 2 nd of December, 2020, specifically for the purpose of entering a plea or assigning a date, a different Judge was sitting (Judge Hughes). At the outset, of his own motion and without application from the parties, the District Judge requested to hear the alleged facts. He heard the facts in each case sequentially without ruling on them individually. When he was reminded that the Respondent had directed summary trial and that District Judge O'Shea had accepted jurisdiction previously, he confirmed that he wished to rehear the facts for the purpose of determining jurisdiction and he pointed out that Judge O'Shea had not “ retained seisin”.
. Judge Hughes then proceeded to refuse jurisdiction in respect of all ten cases in a single ruling in which he confirmed that he was satisfied that “ the offences before the Court are not, in my opinion, minor in nature and are unfit for trial in the District Court summarily.” The District Court Judge maintained this position notwithstanding objections on behalf of the various accused persons, including the Applicants, that the Court had no jurisdiction to embark on a second hearing for the purpose of determining jurisdiction where this question had already been determined by another court and where the Court was not engaged in proceeding to hear the case or determine any substantive issue when arriving at a...
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