Coughlan v The Minister for Defence
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice Meenan |
| Judgment Date | 29 January 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] IEHC 118 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | [2013 No. 7560 P.] |
| Date | 29 January 2019 |
[2019] IEHC 118
THE HIGH COURT
Meenan J.
[2013 No. 7560 P.]
IRELAND
Personal injury – Negligence – Statute barred – Defendants seeking an order striking out and/or dismissing the proceedings – Whether the plaintiff’s claim was statute barred
Facts: The plaintiff, Mr Coughlan, was a member of the Irish Defence Forces. During the course of his employment as an aircraft mechanic at Casement Aerodrome he alleged that he was exposed to various dangerous chemicals and solvents on an ongoing basis as a result of which he suffered severe personal injury, loss and damage. These injuries included skin rashes, sleep disturbance, fatigue, mood changes and short term memory difficulties. He further alleged that he developed yellowness of the skin and eyes and on a number of occasions suffered from bloody diarrhoea. As a result of these injuries he alleged that he was discharged from the Defence Forces and is on an invalidity pension. The personal injury summons listed some 24 particulars of negligence, breach of duty and breach of contract as against the defendants, the Minister for Defence, Ireland and the Attorney General, their servants or agents. Essentially, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide a safe system of work, failed to provide him with appropriate training for the safe handling of the chemicals and solvents he was required to work with and that necessary safety measures to protect him from the ill-effects of those chemicals and solvents were not implemented. The defendants issued a notice of motion seeking the following reliefs: (i) an order striking out and/or dismissing the proceedings pursuant to the Statute of Limitations Act 1957 - 1991 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claim was statute barred as against the defendants and was bound to fail; (ii) in the alternative, an order pursuant to O. 25 and/or O. 35 and/or O. 36 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court directing that the question, as to whether the plaintiff’s action as against the defendants was barred by the provision of the Statute of Limitations 1957, be adjudicated upon the court as a preliminary matter.
Held by Meenan J that, as of January 2009, the plaintiff had the knowledge required under s. 2 of the Statute of Limitations (amendment) Act 1991 to start the two-year limitation period running; that period expired in January 2011.
Meenan J held that, as proceedings were not issued within that period, the defendants were entitled to the reliefs sought at para. (i) of the notice of motion.
Relief granted.
The plaintiff in these proceedings is a former member of the Irish Defence Forces. During the course of his employment as an aircraft mechanic at Casement Aerodrome the plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to various dangerous chemicals and solvents on an ongoing basis as a result of which he suffered severe personal injury, loss and damage. These injuries include skin rashes, sleep disturbance, fatigue, mood changes and short term memory difficulties. The plaintiff further alleges that he developed yellowness of the skin and eyes and on a number of occasions suffered from bloody diarrhoea.
As a result of these injuries the plaintiff alleges that he was discharged from the Defence Forces and is now, at the age of 42, on an invalidity pension.
The personal injury summons lists some 24 particulars of negligence, breach of duty and breach of contract as against the defendants, their servants or agents. Essentially, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to provide a safe system of work, failed to provide the plaintiff with appropriate training for the safe handling of the chemicals and solvents he was required to work with and that necessary safety measures to protect the plaintiff from the ill-effects of these chemicals and solvents were not implemented.
The defendants delivered a full defence which pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiff's claim is statute barred as the proceedings were commenced outside the period permitted by the Statute of Limitations Act 1957 as amended by the Statute of Limitations (amendment) Act 1991 (the Act of 1991) and the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004.
The defendants issued a notice of motion seeking the following reliefs: -
(i) An order striking out and/or dismissing the within proceedings pursuant to the Statute of Limitations Act 1957 - 1991 (as amended) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court on the grounds that the plaintiff's claim is statute barred as against the defendants and is bound to fail.
(ii) In the alternative, an order pursuant to O. 25 and/or O. 35 and/or O. 36 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court directing that the question, as to whether the plaintiff's action as against the defendants is barred by the provision of the Statute of Limitations 1957 as amended, be adjudicated upon this Honourable Court as a preliminary matter.
The plaintiff is relying upon the provisions of the Act of 1991 in respect of his ‘date of knowledge’. I will set out the relevant dates later in this judgment.
This is not the hearing of a preliminary issue but nonetheless the Court has limited jurisdiction to assess evidence as to when the plaintiff acquired the appropriate knowledge to start time running under the Act of 1991, an assessment which could lead the Court to decide that it ought to strike out these proceedings on the grounds that they are bound to fail.
The jurisdiction of the Court to grant the relief being sought by the defendants is necessarily limited, as indeed it should be. This has been emphasised repeatedly in the case law of the Superior Courts. In Barry v. Buckley [1981] I.R. 306 Costello J. stated at p. 308: -
‘This jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases; but it is one which enables the Court to avoid injustice, particularly in cases whose outcome depends on the interpretation of a contract or agreed correspondence.’
The case before this Court does not involve the interpretation of a contract or agreed correspondence. It does, however, involve the interpretation of an expert report received by the plaintiff. I refer also to the Supreme Court decision in Keohane v. Hynes & Ano. [2014] IESC 66. In the course of his judgment therein, Clarke J. (as he then was) stated that a court cannot seek to resolve conflicts of fact in applications to dismiss as being bound to fail but rather is required to accept the facts as deposed to on behalf of the plaintiff. Clarke J. further stated: -
‘6.9 In summary, it is important to emphasise the significant limitations on the extent to which a court can engage with the facts in an application to dismiss on the grounds of being bound to fail. In cases where the legal rights and obligations of the parties are governed by documents, then the court can examine those documents to consider whether the plaintiff's claim is bound to fail and may, in that regard, have to ask the question as to whether there is any evidence outside of that documentary record which could realistically have a bearing on the rights and obligations concerned. Second, where the only evidence which could be put forward concerning essential factual allegations made on behalf of the plaintiff is documentary evidence, then the court can examine that evidence to see if there is any basis on which it could provide support for a plaintiff's allegations. Third, and finally, a court may examine an allegation to determine whether it is a mere assertion and, if so, to consider whether any credible basis has been put forward for suggesting that evidence might be available at trial to substantiate it. While there may be other unusual circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the court to engage with the facts, it does not seem to me that the proper determination of an application to dismiss as being bound to fail can, ordinarily, go beyond the limited form of factual analysis to which I have referred.’
Though the Court is bound to accept the facts as deposed to by the plaintiff it is, nonetheless, entitled to look at a particular document, in this case an expert report, and conclude whether or not it supports the plaintiff's contentions as to when his ‘date of knowledge’ was.
The relevant statutory provision is s. 2 of the Act of 1991: -
‘(2) (1) For the purposes of any provision of this Act whereby the time within which an action in respect of an injury may be brought depends on a person's date of knowledge (whether he is the person injured or a personal representative or dependant of the person injured) references to that person's date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts:
(a) that the person alleged to have been injured had been injured,
(b) that the injury in question was significant,
(c) that the injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty,
(d) the identity of the defendant, and
(e) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant;
and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person's knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire —
(a) from facts observable...
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