Crofter Properties Ltd v Genport Ltd
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Mr. Justice McCracken |
| Judgment Date | 10 September 2002 |
| Neutral Citation | [2002] IEHC 94 |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 10 September 2002 |
[2002] IEHC 94
THE HIGH COURT
BETWEEN
AND
Citations:
DE ROSSA V INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS 1999 4 IR 432
MCINTYRE V LEWIS 1991 1 IR 121
ROOKES V BARNARD 1964 AC 1129
Synopsis:
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Damages
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution - Exemplary or punitive damages - Factors to be considered - Intention of such damages - Right to set off - Whether award of costs can be set off - Whether relief against forfeiture should be granted unconditionally (1996/25P - McCracken J - 10/9/02)
Crofter Properties Ltd v Genport Ltd - [2002] 4 IR 94
Facts: the plaintiff sued for non-payment of rent and the defendant counter claimed for malicious prosecution. There was an appeal to the Supreme Court and the case was remitted to the High Court to assess damages, determine the defendant’s right to set off and its right to relief against forfeiture.
Held by McCracken J in assessing general damages at £50,000 and in assessing exemplary damages at £250,000 that the defendant was entitled to general damages based on the likelihood of, inter alia, loss of reputation and that punitive damages should be awarded if the conduct of the guilty party required them to be punished but without regard to the possibility of a windfall to the innocent party from such an award of punitive damages. The total amount of damages awarded to the defendant could be set off against all sums owing by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of rent, however, any costs awarded to the defendant could not be set off against sums owing. Relief against forfeiture could not be granted unconditionally but only upon the defendant tenant remedying the breach of covenant which led to the forfeiture, in this case, the payment of rent.
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice McCracken delivered the 10th day of September, 2002.
The facts of this case were set out in detail in my judgment of 23 rd April 2002 and do not need to be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that the Supreme Court have held that telephone calls made by Caroline Devine were made by her as found in the Supreme Court judgment of Murray J. at p. 7 "in her capacity as a person with an important position in the affairs of the company for the purpose of furthering its interests and in such a manner as to engage the responsibility of the respondents for her actions." The case has been remitted to me to assess damages, determine the defendants right to set of and its right to relief against forfeiture.
There is no express evidence of actual loss suffered by the defendant as a result of the allegations in the telephone calls made by Caroline Devine. However, there is certainly general evidence that the morale of the staff in Sachs Hotel was affected, and also general evidence that members of the Garda Siochana were frequent customers of the hotel and may have been affected. It must be remembered that the defendant is a company, and a company of itself is not capable of having feelings which can be injured by false allegations. However, a company does have a reputation, and that reputation can be injured, and I believe I am certainly entitled to infer in the circumstances of this case that there probably was some injury to the reputation of the company, and some loss of efficiency of its staff by reason of these allegations. However, I fully accept the arguments on behalf of the plaintiff that this is not a comparable situation to, for example, De Rossa -v- Independent Newspapers (1999) 4I.R. 432, where similar very serious allegations of criminal offences and indeed of acts against the State were made in a Sunday newspaper. The publication in this case was to members of the South Eastern Regional Crime Squad in the United Kingdom, but with the clear intention, and knowledge, that the allegations would be repeated by that authority to the Garda authorities in this country, and I think with the equally clear intention that they would be acted on by the Garda authorities. At the end of p. 5 of his judgment in the Supreme Court Murray J. said:-
"Having regard to all the parties named in the allegations which were made to the police by Ms. Devine in my view, one could only conclude that the allegations contained in those phone calls were motivated by this relationship and calculated to damage not only Genport directly by making express references to that company but also indirectly by making damaging allegations against Princeton and its directors."
At p. 6 he the further finding:-
"Having regard to all the facts and circumstances I am fully satisfied that the only proper inference to be drawn from the actions of Ms. Devine is that as a person deeply involved in a responsible position for the affairs of the respondent company and in the furtherance of its interests sought to damage the appellants in the hope that this would somehow assist the respondents in their objective of regaining possession of the hotel which it has leased to the appellants."
One these findings there is a clear indication that it was the plaintiffs intention to damage the defendant, and it should be noted that the principles in the plaintiff, namely Hugh Tunney and Caroline Devine, had both been involved in the hotel trade, and would have known the type of allegations which would damage a hotel business such as that operated by the defendant. I think therefore that the defendant is entitled to some substantial general damages, based on the likelihood of loss of various kinds including loss of reputation. In this judgment I intend to refer to damages in the old currency, and I will assess general damages in favour of the defendant in the sum of £50,000.
It is quite clear that these calls were made maliciously and, as the Supreme Court held in the passage quoted above that these telephone calls were made maliciously and with the intention of causing damage. The behaviour of Ms. Devine, and in the light of the Supreme Court judgment, of the plaintiff was quite beyond the bounds of normal civilised behaviour and far outside any accepted commercial relationship. It was calculated to damage the defendant unlawfully and through unlawful means to gain a benefit for the plaintiff. I also think that the proper inference to be drawn from the fact that the allegations were made to police authorities in the United Kingdom rather than in this jurisdiction was that giving false and misleading information to a police authority is of court a criminal offence. I have no doubt...
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