D.B. v Minister for Health

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 26 March 2003
• Docket Number: [S.C. Nos.
• Date: 26 March 2003
• Court: Supreme Court

D.B. v. Minister for Health

In the matter of s.5(15) of the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997. D.B.

Claimant

and

Minister for Health and Children and the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal

Respondents

[S.C. Nos. 322 and 351 of 2002]

Supreme Court

Practice - Appeal - Time limits - Statutory time limit - Differences between non-statutory and statutory schemes - Whether claimant barred from appealing awards after expiration of time limit - Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997 (section 5(9)(a)) Regulations 1998 (S.I. No. 195) - Rules of the Superior Courts (No.7)(Appeals from Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal) 1998 (S.I. No. 392) O. 105A, r. 2(1).

Courts - Jurisdiction - Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal - Appeal - Specific questions of law - Statutory appeal - Whether award from Tribunal could be appealed after being accepted - Whether appeal limited to specific question - Whether additional grounds of appeal could be added - Rules of the Superior Courts (No. 7)(Appeals from the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal) 1998 (S.I. No. 392) O. 105A, r. 2(5) and (1) - Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997 (No. 34).

Statutory interpretation - Literal approach - Purposive approach - Legislative history - Words clear and unambiguous - Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997 (No. 34) ss.5(9)(a) and 5(15).

Practice - Locus standi - Tribunal - Notice of appeal served on Tribunal - Whether Tribunal party to appeal - Whether Tribunal has locus standi on appeal - Rules of the Superior Courts (No. 7)(Appeals from Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal) 1998 (S.I. No. 392) O. 105A, r. 3(4).

The Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997 was enacted to deal with the deficiencies of the previous non-statutory scheme which had been set up to compensate persons who had contracted Hepatitis C from the use of certain blood products. The non-statutory scheme did not provide for aggravated damages and there was no provision for appeal. The new statutory Tribunal was established on the 1st November, 1997 and any claim pending immediately prior to that date was to be heard and determined by the statutory Tribunal as if made under the Act of 1997. The claimant's case fell to be adjudicated in this manner. An award was made and accepted in writing by the claimant on the 24th November, 1997. Section 5(9)(a) of the Act provided that the claimant could either accept or reject the award or appeal the award under subs. (15) within one month. Section 5(15) provided that a claimant could appeal "any decision" made by the Tribunal to the High Court. By accepting the award, the claimant undertook to waive any rights he might otherwise have arising out of the circumstances of his claim.

The claimant appealed against his award on the 22nd April, 1999. The Minister for Health made a preliminary application arguing that (a) the High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal as the claimant had signed an acceptance of the award and (b) even if the High Court had jurisdiction, the appeal was brought out of time. The issue of whether or not the Tribunal had locus standi was also argued before the High Court.

The High Court (O'Neill J.) held, inter alia, that the acceptance of an award pursuant to s. 5(9) of the Act of 1997, did not exclude the bringing of an appeal to the High Court and although the time for bringing the present appeal had ended on the 22nd November, 1998, the court would use its discretion to extend the time to the 23rd April, 1999. He also held that the Tribunal had no locus standi to appear.

Leave to appeal on a specified question of law pursuant to s. 5(19) was given by the High Court on the following questions; (a) was the claimant barred from bringing an appeal after the time in s. 5(9)(a) had passed, (b) if not, was a claimant who had already accepted an award barred from appealing it and (c) did the Tribunal have locus standi to appear in an application to the High Court or in an appeal?

Held by the Supreme Court (Denham, Murray, McGuinness, Hardiman and Geoghegan JJ.), in allowing the appeal, 1, that, in the interpretation of statutes, the starting point should be the literal approach, the plain ordinary meaning of the words used. Where the literal approach led to ambiguity, lack of clarity, self-contradiction or absurdity, the purposive approach could be of assistance. It was also necessary to consider the statute as a whole.

Howard v. Commissioners for Public Works [1994] 1 I.R. 101and M. O'C. v. Minister for Health[2002] 1 I.R. 234;followed.

Per Geoghegan J.: That, when a legislative scheme replaced a non-legislative scheme and where there were obvious similarities of wording between the two schemes, the non-statutory scheme was for all practical purposes a legislative antecedent and part of the legislative history which could be considered in aid of interpretation.

Crilly v. T. & J. Farrington Ltd. [2001] 3 I.R. 251followed.

2. That, in the Act of 1997, the Oireachtas made a clear distinction between the provisions applying to persons who received awards under the non-statutory scheme and those who received awards from the Tribunal including providing for different time limits. This differentiation of treatment was the policy adopted by the Oireachtas in the Act and as it was clear, unambiguous and neither self-contradictory nor absurd, it was not for the court to assume that a different and more equal approach was more suited to what the court considered to be the purpose of the Act. This would be to carry the purposive approach too far.

• M. O'C. v. Minister for Health [2002] 1 I.R. 234 considered.

3. That s. 5(9)(a) of the Act of 1997, in the normal and ordinary meaning of the words used, provided for three options, each of which was open to the claimant and each of which had a particular result within the scheme of the Act. The claimant had to decide which of the three options he wished to exercise within one month from the date on which he had been notified of the award.

4. That both those who were awarded compensation by the non-statutory scheme and those who were awarded compensation by the statutory Tribunal had a bundle of rights under the Act suitable to their positions. Those awarded from the non-statutory scheme were already"tribunalised" and they were simply given additional rights within the tribunal system. Where the claimant rejected the award or was deemed to have rejected it under s. 5(9)(b) of the Act, he then moved out of the Tribunal scheme entirely and would presumably proceed through the courts. But where the claimant appealed an award he remained within the scheme of the Tribunal.

5. That, as O. 105A, r. 2(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts provided that an appeal was to be issued within one month from the date of receiving notice of the making of the award or "within such greater period as may be prescribed by the Minister", this greater period was a statutory extension of the time limit rather than an ordinary extension of time by the courts under the rules. This express statutory time limit could not be extended even by invoking a rule of court permitting such an extension. The Minister had prescribed a"greater period" of time within which the claimant could exercise one of the three options but that decision had to be made within one month after the date on which O. 105A came into force.

Per Geoghegan J.: That it was entirely reasonable that persons who had received awards from the non-statutory scheme should be given an extended time for appealing because they had to learn first of the existence of the new Act and of any rights they might have. Furthermore, this longer period was not given by the Act itself but rather by the rules making committee of the Superior Courts.

6. That a claimant who wished to appeal an award by the Tribunal was barred from doing so after the time specified in s. 5(9)(a) of the Act of 1997 had passed.

7. That not all decisions made by the Tribunal were awards but an award was a decision for the purposes of s. 5(15) of the Act.

8. That a claimant who accepted an award could not in addition appeal against it.

Per McGuinness J.: That, where the claimant chose to accept the award and thereby waived any rights of action through the courts arising out of the circumstances of the claim, prima facie this combination of acceptance and waiver indicated finality as regards the claimant's claim.

9. That, as O. 105A, r. 3(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts required that the Tribunal be served with a copy of the appeal and because O. 125 of the Rules defined "party" as every person served with a notice of the proceedings, service of the proceedings on the Tribunal made it a party to the appeal, thereby giving the Tribunallocus standi.

10. That, although the Tribunal did not and should not have an interest in contesting the appeal on its merits, it did have an interest in ensuring that the procedure under the Act of 1997 was correctly applied and implemented.

11. That s. 5(18), in its unambiguous terms, allowed an appeal only on a "specified question of law" and did not allow other grounds of appeal to be added unlike certificates of appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal and planning and refugee matters.

Cases mentioned in this report:-

Bula v. Crowley [2003] 2 I.L.R.M. 55.

Capper v. Baldwin [1965] 2 Q.B. 53; [1965] 1 W.L.R. 610; [1965] 1 All E.R. 787.

Crilly v. T. & J. Farrington Ltd. [2001] 3 I.R. 251.

Davis Jenkins & Co. Ltd. v. Davis [1968] A.C. 1097; [1967] 2 W.L.R. 1139; [1967] 1 All E.R. 913.

M.D. v. Minister for Health and Children (Unreported, High Court, O'Neill J., 15th February, 2002).

Howard v. Commissioners for Public Works [1994] 1 I.R. 101, [1993] I.L.R.M. 665.

King v. Burrell (1840) 12 Ad & El 460.

In re MacManaway [1951] A.C. 161.

Mulcahy v. Minster for the Marine (Unreported, High Court, Keane J., 4th November, 1994).

M. O'C. v. Minister for Health [2002] 1 I.R. 234.

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