Director of Public Prosecution v CC and Another

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judge: Ms Justice Iseult O'Malley
• Judgment Date: 13 March 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IESC 11
• Docket Number: S:AP:IE:2024:000008

Between:

The People (at the suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions)

Respondent

and

C.C.

Appellant

and

The Attorney General

Amicus Curiae

[2025] IESC 11

O'Donnell CJ.

Dunne J.

Charleton J.

O'Malley J.

Murray J.

Collins J.

Donnelly J.

S:AP:IE:2024:000008

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

THE SUPREME COURT

Sentencing – Murder – Severity of sentence – Appellant seeking to appeal against sentence – Whether sentence was unduly severe

Facts: The appellant was convicted of a murder committed in 2021 when he was 14 years old. The trial judge imposed a life sentence but scheduled a review by the court after a period of 13 years. After an unsuccessful appeal against the murder conviction, the appellant pursued an appeal against the sentence. Essentially, his argument at the level of principle was that a child should not be given an indeterminate sentence. The Court of Appeal concluded that a life sentence with a review date was an appropriate way to sentence juvenile offenders who commit murder. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The appellant submitted that children should be sentenced under a regime that prioritises their rehabilitation, and that sentences should adequately reflect their status as children and take account of their personal circumstances. With regard to the sentence imposed in his case, the appellant said that in principle there are no circumstances in which a life sentence should be imposed on a child.

Held by the Supreme Court that a sentencing court does not have jurisdiction to reserve for itself a power to review a sentence; the power under the Children Act 1908 to review the detention of a child convicted of murder no longer exists. The Court held that where a determinate sentence imposed on a child is of a length that will necessarily mean that some or all of it will be served in prison, there is no objection to suspending some part of it. Since the applicable custodial regime in respect of the suspended part will be imprisonment, the Court held that the procedure under s. 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 should be used for that part, and not s. 144 of the Children Act 2001. The Court held that a life sentence is not mandatory in the case of a child convicted of murder; it should be imposed only in those exceptional cases where the intentions and actions of the child resembled those of an adult, as where it is shown that there was premeditation, or planning including planned efforts to conceal guilt, or deliberate luring or exploitation of the victim, or sexual violence or gratuitous brutality.

The Court allowed the appellant’s appeal in relation to the applicability of s. 93 of the Children Act 2001. Accordingly, the Court made a declaration that the terms of the section applied to the appellant in respect of the proceedings before the Central Criminal Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court notwithstanding the fact that he reached the age of majority during the currency of those proceedings. The Court noted that the trial judge imposed a life sentence, with a court review date, on the appellant. Having regard to the foregoing analysis, the Court held that that intended review could not be carried out; this did not mean that the appellant’s detention was in any way unlawful but the inclusion in the sentence order of a future review amounted to an error in principle which should be corrected by an appellate court. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal against sentence.

Appeal allowed.

Judgment of Ms Justice Iseult O'Malley delivered the 13 ^th day of March 2025

INTRODUCTION

1 The appellant in this appeal has been convicted of a murder committed in 2021, when he was just 14 years old. The trial judge imposed a life sentence but scheduled a review by the court after a period of 13 years. The central issues in the appeal concern the propriety of imposing a life sentence on a child, the jurisdiction of a sentencing court to review and modify a sentence during its currency and the effect, if any, of including such a review in respect of a life sentence for a child. The reasons why the trial judge adopted that mechanism will also have to be examined, in order to determine what options are available to a sentencing judge dealing with the very difficult task of sentencing a child who has committed the offence of murder. In particular, this entails consideration of the question whether it may be possible to suspend or part-suspend a determinate sentence of detention.

2 The appellant has reached the age of 18 while still engaged in the criminal justice court process. In the case of People (DPP) v P.B. [2025] IESC 12, which was heard at the same time as this appeal, the Court of Appeal held that in such circumstances the appellant was no longer entitled to the protection of anonymity conferred by the Children Act 2001. C.C. is by now also affected by the same issue. He adopts the submissions made by P.B., who contends that the proper interpretation of the statute means that he continues to be protected against public identification. The Court has also recently heard submissions in the appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions in Doe v. Director of Public Prosecutions where the issue of anonymity is argued from a different perspective. The three respondents in Doe say that by reason of blameworthy delay on the part of the gardaí and prosecution authorities they are no longer entitled to any of the protections extended to children by the Act and they seek to prohibit their trials on that basis. The right of a child not to be identified is examined in detail in that context.

3 For the reasons identified in the PB judgment, the Court holds that C.C. remains entitled to the protection conferred by s.93 of the Act and his identity may not be publicly reported.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The offence

4 C.C. was just 14 years old when he murdered Ms Urantsetseg Tserendorj on the 20 ^th January 2021, by slashing at her neck with a knife having failed to get any money when he attempted to rob her. The cut was small in extent but penetrated her carotid artery. Ms Tserendorj was a Mongolian national who had lived and worked here for about 15 years with her husband and two children. Despite surgery she died in hospital some days later. It is clear from the evidence of her family that her loss affected them profoundly.

5 The appellant committed two other offences on the same evening, both of which involved threatening a woman with a knife.

6 The appellant confessed his involvement to his family on the day after the stabbing, when the incident was reported on the radio, and agreed with them that he should go to the gardaí. Coincidentally gardaí called to his home about another matter shortly afterwards and he made spontaneous admissions to them about the stabbing. He told them that he had panicked and had not meant to do it. Despite his youth, it appears that he had a severe substance addiction at the time and wanted money for drugs. He offered a plea to manslaughter which was not accepted by the prosecution. His first trial, which focussed on the manslaughter/murder debate, ended in a jury disagreement. He was ultimately convicted of murder by a jury on the 11 ^th November 2022.

Sentencing

7 The sentencing hearing was conducted on a number of days between December 2022 and February 2023. It is clear from the transcript that counsel and the trial judge considered the options available to the court in some detail, including the possible availability of a review procedure. Counsel for the Director indicated that there were questions about the lawfulness of that procedure by reason of the judgment of this Court in People (DPP) v Finn [2000] IESC 75, [2001] 2 I.R. 25, but a possible source of jurisdiction was identified by reference to the judgment of Walsh J. in State (O) v O'Brien [1973] I.R. 50.

8 On the 8 ^th February 2023 the trial judge indicated a view that his only option was to impose a life sentence. His concerns about adopting a review mechanism were, firstly, that State (O) v O'Brien related to the provisions and terminology of the Children Act 1908, which had been repealed in its entirety; secondly, that the judgment in Finn had cast considerable uncertainty over the lawfulness of the review procedure, and, thirdly, he considered that the decision of the Court of Appeal in People (DPP) v. A.S. [2017] IECA 310 had made it clear that on a review date a court that had imposed a sentence of detention would have no power to suspend the balance of the sentence. In the light of that decision, the only options available at a review (if a review was legally possible) would be unconditional release or continued detention. However, he agreed to defer a final decision pending further enquiries being made as to whether a legislative solution was under consideration.

9 On the 16 ^th February 2023 the Minister for Justice and Equality stated in the Dáil that the Children Act 2001 would be amended to ensure that there were “sufficient alternative sentencing options to fully and partially suspended sentences”.

10 The trial judge then indicated that he was reassured by this statement and could feel confident that there would be an appropriate statutory provision in place by the date he proposed for a review. He proceeded to sentence the appellant to life detention with a review after 13 years. It was made clear that this would not prevent the appellant from applying for parole when eligible.

11 In passing sentence, the trial judge observed that the appellant had carried out an unprovoked, violent and frightening attack on a defenceless woman. He was undoubtedly young, but the reports did not indicate any particular immaturity or lack of cognitive faculties. He knew right from wrong. In mitigation, the judge accepted that the proffered plea to manslaughter had narrowed the issues in the trial and that there had not...