Doherty v Blessville Unlimited Company

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr Justice Kennedy
• Judgment Date: 10 July 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 368
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [Record No. 6269S]

In the Matter of a Bankruptcy Summons Issued against Patrick Doherty by Blessville Unlimited Company, IDA Business Park, Ballynattin, Arklow, County Wicklow

Between

Patrick Doherty

Applicant

and

Blessville Unlimited Company

Respondent

[2025] IEHC 368

[Record No. 6269S]

THE HIGH COURT

BANKRUPTCY

Bankruptcy petition – Stay – Plenary proceedings – Applicant seeking to stay bankruptcy proceedings pending his pursuit of plenary proceedings against the respondent – Whether the applicant had established a fair question to be tried in the plenary proceedings which, if successful, would disentitle the respondent to the reliefs sought in the bankruptcy proceedings

Facts: The applicant, Mr Doherty, applied to the High Court seeking to stay bankruptcy proceedings pending his pursuit of plenary proceedings against the respondent, Blessville Unlimited Company (the petitioner). Originally, he also sought the stay on the basis that the proceedings should await the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of his appeal of an earlier ruling, but the delivery of that judgment rendered that ground moot. The remaining ground for this application related to plenary proceedings instituted by the applicant against the petitioner in 2023 alleging conversion and detinue, breach of the settlement original agreement and non-compliance with terms of the original consent order. He argued that the petitioner frustrated his ability to comply with either condition of the original consent order and that, because the petitioner prevented his meeting the conditions, the February 2020 order (which was premised on his breach of those conditions) should not have been made. He said that his plenary proceedings were inextricably linked with the issues before the Court, concerning the same “alleged debt”, upon which both summonses were based.

Held by Kennedy J that he did not consider that it was appropriate to stay the bankruptcy proceedings in circumstances in which the first of two orders giving rise to the debt owed to the petitioner was made on consent; both were made years earlier and neither had been appealed or set aside. Kennedy J held that if the applicant was adjudicated bankrupt then the official assignee could pursue the plenary proceedings if he deemed it appropriate to do so. Kennedy J was not satisfied that the applicant had established a fair question to be tried in the plenary proceedings which, if successful, would disentitle the petitioner to the reliefs sought in these proceedings. Specifically, Kennedy J held that the applicant had not established a fair question on the basis of which either: (a) the 2020 order might be liable to be set aside; or (b) he would have a counterclaim against the petitioner which would extinguish his debt or reduce to below €20,000. Having reviewed the plenary proceedings and the applicant’s affidavits and taken his case at its height, Kennedy J was not satisfied that the applicant had satisfactorily explained his failure to appeal or apply to set aside the two orders five years earlier. Nor was Kennedy J satisfied that the evidence the applicant had put before the Court - which seemed to Kennedy J to consist of mere assertions - established a real and substantial issue to be tried which would impact on the summons or petition.

Kennedy J allowed the bankruptcy petition to proceed and dismissed the application.

Application refused.

APPEARANCES

Ms. Pamela Keegan BL, instructed by PB Cunningham & Co, for the Applicant

Mr. Neal Flynn BL, instructed by Clark Hill LLP, for the Petitioner

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Kennedy delivered on 30 June 2025 .

1 . For the sake of simplicity, throughout this judgment, I will refer to the Applicant as such (rather than as the debtor or as the plaintiff in related proceedings). Likewise, I will refer to the Petitioner as such (although it is also the defendant in the other proceedings).

The Current Application

2 . The Applicant seeks to stay bankruptcy proceedings pending his pursuit of plenary proceedings against the Petitioner. Originally, he also, and perhaps primarily, sought the stay on the basis that the proceedings should await the Court of Appeal's dismissal of his appeal of an earlier ruling, but the delivery of that judgment rendered that ground moot. For the reasons explained below, I do not consider that it is appropriate to stay the bankruptcy proceedings in circumstances in which the first of two orders giving rise to the debt owed to the petitioner was made on consent; both were made years ago and neither have been appealed or set aside. If the Appicant is adjudicated bankrupt then the official assignee can pursue the plenary proceedings if he deems it appropriate to do so. While the petitioner would doubtless have wished to be the decisionmaker in that regard, he should have acted expeditiously if he wished to retain control of his own destiny.

The Original Consent Order

3 . These bankruptcy proceedings are grounded on two orders resolving High Court proceedings commenced by the Applicant against the Petitioner. Firstly, on 6 November 2019, Pilkington J made an order (“the Original Consent Order”) — on consent — based on agreed settlement terms. The following aspects of the Original Consent Order are significant:

No issue has been taken with the validity of either the settlement agreement or the Original Consent Order, or of the conditions and consequences specified therein.

• a. The Applicant was legally represented in the proceedings and in the settlement negotiations. He and his lawyers attended Court on 6 November 2019.

• b. The Original Consent Order required the Applicant to satisfy two conditions; (i) he was required to remove his chattels from the Petitioner's premises; and (ii) he was required to pay €46,000.00 to the Petitioner, within 28 days.

• c. The Original Consent Order also provided that unless the Applicant met both conditions within 28 days, he was required to pay the Petitioner €151,000.00. A default in respect of either condition would trigger the obligation.

Applicant's failure to comply with the Original Consent Order

4 . The Applicant failed to satisfy either limb of the Original Consent Order. He did not collect his chattels. Nor did he pay €46,000.00. He says that the Petitioner prevented him from collecting the chattels and that this also prevented him from making the required payment. The Petitioner disputes these claims.

14 February 2020 Hearing

5 . When the proceedings were next before the Court on 14 February 2020, the Petitioner sought judgment for €151,000 in accordance with the agreement and the Original Consent Order and on the basis of the Applicant's failure to satisfy either requirement of the Original Consent Order. The Debtor's former solicitors informed the Court that they had been unable to contact their client. They were allowed to come off record. While the Applicant was not present, there is no suggestion that he was unaware of the hearing or of the fact that his solicitors would be coming off record or that the Petitioner would be seeking to enter judgment for €151,000 on the basis that the conditions had not been fulfilled. Pilkington J duly entered judgment, requiring the Applicant to pay the Petitioner €151,000 in accordance with the terms of the Original Consent Order. That order, the 14 February 2020 Order, has grounded both bankruptcy summonses.

The Applicant's response to the February 2020 Order

6 . The Applicant's former solicitors informed him of the making of the 14 February 2020 Order that very day. He has never appealed it. Nor has he sought to have it set aside. Nor has he ever applied to Pilkington J for a stay of the order (or of the Original Consent Order). Nor has he satisfactorily explained his inertia. While it is suggested that he hoped that the Petitioner would be content with the abandonment of the proceedings and the Applicant did not expect him to seek to enforce the judgment debt, there is no suggestion of any assurances to that effect.

The Two Bankruptcy Summonses

7 . In July 2022, the Petitioner issued a bankruptcy summons (“the First Summons”) demanding payment of the debt due under the 2020 order. These proceedings are based on another bankruptcy summons (“the Second Summons”), issued 2 years later in respect of the same debt. The Applicant accepts the Petitioner's entitlement to issue the second summons. However, the First Summons generated litigation which is relevant for present purposes.

The Applicant's current response to the Second Summons

8 . The Applicant's submissions accepted that, on the face of it, the current summons

“appears valid as it arises out of an order of the High Court from February 2020 (which itself was based on settlement terms).…”

However, he says that the Original Consent Order provided for his collection of his chattels from the Petitioner, but the latter frustrated his efforts to collect his property. He explains his failure to oppose or to seek to set aside the February 2020 Order on the basis that:

“he took it to be the case that the Respondent's enrichment in keeping his chattels met (in excess of) the sum owed by him under the subsequent court order. It is the Applicant's case that allowing the Respondent to benefit from its non-compliance with the first court order and detinue/conversion in relation to the Applicant's goods constitutes unjust enrichment where the Respondent also seeks to benefit from the court order and recover further sums from the Applicant”.

9 . The Applicant unsuccessfully applied to dismiss the original bankruptcy summons and points raised in those proceedings are relevant to this application. O'Higgins J rejected his application on 18 July 2023 in a comprehensive judgment. The Court of Appeal's judgment, dismissing the appeal, is considered below.

The Second Bankruptcy Summons

10 . The First Summons was overtaken by events. Due to the statutory time...