Dooley v Florentine Properties Ltd and Anor

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Jordan
• Judgment Date: 19 March 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IEHC 170
• Docket Number: Record No. 2013/2559P

Between:

Gabriel Dooley

Plaintiff

and

Florentine Properties Limited

and

Ballymore Ireland Group Limited

Defendants

[2026] IEHC 170

Record No. 2013/2559P

THE HIGH COURT

Breach of contract – Want of prosecution – Inordinate and inexcusable delay – Defendants seeking to strike out plenary proceedings for want of prosecution – Whether there was inordinate and inexcusable delay

Facts: The defendants, Florentine Properties Ltd and Ballymore Ireland Group Ltd, applied to the High Court to strike out plenary proceedings for want of prosecution under O. 122 r. 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay. There were aggregate periods of inactivity of well in excess of 10 years since the proceedings issued. It had been over fifteen years since the alleged breach of contract and over twelve and a half years since the proceedings issued. The only meaningful step which the plaintiff, Mr Dooley, had taken since the proceedings were issued had been the delivery of a statement of claim which he did in the Summer of 2016. The plaintiff disagreed with the defendants’ submissions in the following respects: (a) the defendants argued that none of the plaintiff's circumstances fell within the exceptions established in Kirwan v Connors & Ors. [2025] IESC 21, which might justify the court in exercising its discretion not to strike out the plaintiff's case - the plaintiff submitted that this was a superficial analysis of Kirwan, which sought to ignore all pre-Kirwan case law, despite the fact that Kirwan specifically cited several cases as still representing a correct approach to assessing exceptional circumstances; (b) the defendants insisted that prejudice was irrelevant to the proceedings due to the more expansive nature of Kirwan relative to previous lines of case law - the plaintiff submitted that this was incorrect and said that in circumstances in which exceptional circumstances existed, the issue of prejudice once again became relevant to the court’s balancing exercise; (c) the defendants contended that, even if prejudice was relevant, the defendants had clearly been prejudiced by the efflux of time - the plaintiff did not accept that and contended that the proceedings were of a variety which entailed less temporal prejudice than a typical plenary case would present. The plaintiff argued that the proceedings should not be struck out notwithstanding the fact that, as he conceded, the basic threshold for triggering the court's discretionary powers had been met.

Held by Jordan J that the total unexplained delay was well in excess of five years and there was nothing in the evidence to suggest the sort of exceptional circumstances which would persuade the court not to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution. Jordan J held that there was not in this case any pressing exigency of justice that required that the case be permitted to go to trial. Jordan J held that the balance of justice required the court to find in favour of the defendants.

Jordan J found for the defendants and made an order dismissing the proceedings for want of prosecution.

Application granted.

JUDGEMENT OF Mr. Justice Jordan delivered on the 19 ^th day of March 2026 .

1 . This is an application by the defendants to strike out these plenary proceedings for want of prosecution under O.122 r.11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay.

2 . It is apparent from the affidavits of the plaintiff and that of his wife that they have had a difficult time as a family since the financial crash in 2008. Unfortunately, their financial position deteriorated greatly with knock on effects on the plaintiff's health and the family's quality of life. They were not alone in their predicament.

3 . The proceedings relate to contracts dated as far back as 2005– some 20 years ago. The breach of contract is alleged to have occurred in November 2010 but these plenary proceedings did not issue until March 2013. There was therefore pre-commencement delay. This late start did make it more important that the Plaintiff proceed thereafter with some expedition.

4 . The defendants entered appearances soon after being served– on 22 March 2013 and 25 March 2013 respectively. No statement of claim was delivered until 19 June 2016– and a copy of that statement of claim was not served on the defendant's solicitors Arthur Cox until 17 August 2016. By this time the Plaintiff was a lay litigant in the proceedings as his Solicitors Lavelle Coleman had disbanded and he had no Solicitors on record for him. It appears that the Plaintiff discharged his Solicitors in March 2015 as the firm “had dissolved”. He says that he was unable to instruct a new legal team due to substantial financial difficulties and he recommenced the legal proceedings as a lay litigant and was he says “fundamentally ignorant” of what he needed to do to advance his claim.

5 . It did recently come to light through a recently sworn supplemental affidavit of the Plaintiff that he had consulted other Solicitors as an Opinion of Senior Counsel was obtained in August 2015 through the Solicitors now on record for him.

6 . The statement of claim arrived over three years after the proceedings issued. No notice to proceed was filed in the intervening three year plus period—even though more than two years had elapsed since the proceedings had issued.

7 . A notice for particulars issued on behalf of the defendants– during the long vacation on 19 August 2016. This notice for particulars was acknowledged but not actually replied to by the plaintiff—even though a reminder was sent by the defendant's solicitors on 21 October 2016.

8 . The plaintiff took no steps after the delivery of the statement of claim [on 19 June of 2016 or 17 August 2016] until a notice of intention to proceed issued on 16 May 2022. At that time, there had been a further period of inactivity of nearly six years.

9 . No further step was taken by the plaintiff until a second notice of intention to proceed was issued by him on 8 August 2023. At this stage, there had been a period of inactivity of some seven years since the statement of claim was delivered. On the following day– 9 August 2023– a different statement of claim was delivered even though no application to amend the original statement of claim had been made. Then a further year elapsed and on 27 August 2024 another [third] statement of claim was delivered– again without any application to amend the original statement of claim having been made.

10 . Thus, there are aggregate periods of inactivity of well in excess of 10 years since the proceedings issued. It is over fifteen years since the alleged breach of contract and over twelve and a half years since the proceedings issued. The only meaningful step which the plaintiff has taken since the proceedings were issued has been the delivery of a statement of claim which he did in the Summer of 2016– over nine years ago.

11 . The Supreme Court recently clarified the law in relation to the jurisdiction of the court to strike out proceedings on the grounds of delay and clarified the principles which should be applied when dealing with such applications– in Kirwan v Connors & Ors. [2025] IESC 21 (‘ Kirwan’).

12 . The court has the benefit of legal submissions of the defendants filed on 14 November 2025 and legal submissions of the plaintiff filed on 18 December 2025. In addition, the court has had the benefit of oral submissions by both sides at the hearing of the motion on 23 January 2026.

13 . The plaintiff has sensibly conceded a number of issues. In the written submissions the plaintiff accepts that the procedural history of the proceedings leaves much to be desired from the perspective of the plaintiff– i.e.;

• (a) the proceedings were issued on 12 March 2013;

• (b) appearances were entered later in the same month;

• (c) a statement of claim was delivered on 19 June 2016;

• (d) while it is stated that “a further statement of claim was delivered without leave having been sought on 17 August 2016” this is a reference to the copy statement of claim being served on Arthur Cox.

• (e) further statements of claim were delivered in August 2023 and August 2024, without leave of the court having been sought;

• (f) a Notice for Particulars was issued on foot of the original [June 2016] Statement of Claim on 19 August 2016 and no replies to particulars ever issued;

• (g) the plaintiff issued notices of intention to proceed on 16 May 2022 and 9 August 2023;

• (h) no activity other than that set out above emanated from the plaintiff from 19 June 2016 onwards; and

• (i) this fact pattern prompted the defendant's motion to strike out.

14 . The plaintiff also acknowledges that the defendants in their written submissions dated 14 November 2025;–

• (a) correctly summarise the basis of the court's jurisdiction to strike out cases;

• (b) correctly identify the Supreme Court judgment in Kirwan as representing the most up-to-date understanding of the court's practices with respect to striking out claims that have been prosecuted in a dilatory manner;

• (c) correctly state that the Kirwan judgment dispenses with prejudice as a cardinal requirement for the striking out of an egregiously delayed claim; and

• (d) correctly summarises the Supreme Court's views in relation to the level of scrutiny to be applied to inactivity levels of two, four and five years or more.

15 . The plaintiff in his written submissions also accepts that the following points must be conceded;–

• (a) his inactivity in the proceedings since the Summer of 2016 is of a variety which would, in the ordinary course of events, be regarded as egregious and unacceptable;

• (b) whereas prior to Kirwan, the...