DPP Gilliland

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1986
• Date: 01 January 1986
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 72 of 1985]
• Court: Supreme Court

Supreme Court

[S.C. No. 72 of 1985]

The People (A.G.) v. Gilliland

The People (Attorney General)

and

James Hildage Gilliland

Cases mentioned in this report:—

The People (Attorney General) v. O'Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501; (1966) 102 I.L.T.R. 45.

Wright v. Henkel (1902) 190 U.S. 40.

Stack v. Boyle (1951) 342 U.S. 1.

United States v. Rocco Messina (1983) 566 Federal Supplement 740.

Criminal law - Bail - Extradition - Tests applicable - Likelihood of accused absconding - Onus of proof lying on person resisting application - Same test applicable to application for bail in extradition proceedings as in other criminal proceedings - Extradition Act, 1965 (No. 17), s. 29 - Constitution of Ireland, 1937, Article 40.

Appeal from the High Court.

On the 15th December, 1984, James Hildage Gilliland was arrested in Galway. The Government of the United States of America had requested the Minister for Justice to extradite him in order that he might stand trial on sixteen charges of a fraudulent nature. The prisoner was granted bail by the High Court on the 20th December, 1984.

On the 12th February, 1985, following the hearing of the extradition proceedings in the District Court, an order for the prisoner's committal to Mountjoy Prison was made. The prisoner obtained a conditional order of habeas corpus. Pending the determination of the habeas corpus proceedings a fresh application for bail was made. The Attorney General opposed the application. On 1st March, 1985, Barrington J. admitted the prisoner to bail.

The prisoner was committed to prison on foot of an order for his extradition to the United States of America. He obtained a conditional order of habeas corpus and applied for bail pending the final determination of the habeas corpus proceedings. In deciding to grant bail the judge applied the test of whether or not it was probable that the prisoner would abscond and therefore be unavailable for extradition. The decision was appealed on the ground that that particular test should be applied differently in an extradition case, namely, that the court should have adopted a stricter approach than in an ordinary criminal case and that it was for the prisoner to satisfy the court that there was no real or reasonable possibility that if granted bail he would not be available for extradition and furthermore that the obligations of the State under an extradition treaty curtailed the court's power to grant bail.

On appeal by the Attorney General it was

Held by the Supreme Court (Finlay C.J., Henchy, Griffin, Hederman and McCarthy JJ.) in dismissing the appeal, 1, one of the obligations of the State under an extradition treaty is to take all reasonable steps to ensure the prisoner is available for...