DPP v Adach
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Court | Court of Criminal Appeal |
| Judge | Mr. Justice William M. McKechnie. |
| Judgment Date | 30 March 2012 |
| Neutral Citation | [2012] IECCA 94 |
| Docket Number | [C.C.A. No. 22/110] |
| Date | 30 March 2012 |
And
[2012] IECCA 94
McKechnie J.
Moriarty J.
O'Keeffe J.
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
Criminal law – Rape - Appeal against conviction - Direction to jury - Improper pressure to reach verdict - Extraneous considerations - Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990
Facts: The appellant was charged and convicted of a single count of rape, contrary to s. 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He subsequently sought leave to appeal against the conviction on a number of grounds, the foremost of which was the contention that the direction to the jury had been flawed. Specifically, it was said that when the trial judge was informing the jury of their right to disagree, he used language that could objectively be said to have improperly pressured the jury members in their deliberations, such as to render the ultimate verdict unsatisfactory. The circumstances of the case were that on the 29th September 2007, the complainant had been celebrating a friend”s birthday in a number of licensed premises over many hours, during which time a large quantity of alcohol was consumed. The appellant was said to have met the complainant in one of these licensed premises during the course of the night after being introduced by a mutual friend. Ultimately, the appellant, the complainant and the third party went back to the appellant”s house. The third party left shortly after, leaving the complainant sleeping in the appellant”s bed. The complainant alleged that she awoke to find the appellant's hand over her mouth and nose, saying that unless she had oral sex with him he would rape her. The complainant then said she complied as she feared the appellant would carry out his threats. The appellant argued that this act had been consensual.
The appellant averred that the trial judge”s language was objectionable and improper, and that he introduced irrelevant and extraneous factors into its deliberations. A transcript of the direction was available and the appellant highlighted comments that stated or inferred that a verdict of disagreement was highly undesirable, that if agreement couldn”t be reached ‘another jury would have the burden of hearing the case all over again’, and that such a verdict had obvious implications regarding resources, costs and stress for both the complainant and the accused. The prosecutor/respondent argued that the direction was fair and balanced, and that the trial judge noted on several occasions that a verdict of disagreement was available.
Held by McKechnie J. (with Moriarty J. and O”Keeffe J. concurring) that in directing a jury, the trial judge was obliged to ensure that no improper pressure was applied that could affect consideration of its verdict. It was said that reference to matters that would cause a jury member to abandon his/her honestly held view were to be avoided; these included comments that referred to how a verdict of disagreement would cause inconvenience or increased expense. Applying these principles to the instant case, it was determined that the Court had to determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that the trial judge”s direction interfered with the jury”s duty to consider the evidence of the case in complete freedom from extraneous pressures, or caused a juror to abandon his/her honestly held view were.
It was noted that after the direction had been made, the jury had deliberated for another two hours and ten minutes, approximately, before reaching a majority verdict of guilty. This was in contrast to similar appeals, brought on the basis of a judge”s direction to a jury, where the judge”s direction was quickly followed by a guilty verdict. Nevertheless, the time interval between the direction and verdict was said to be only one of several matters of relevance that needed to be considered to decide whether there was a reasonable possibility that the trial judge”s direction improperly pressured the jury. It was held with it was clear that matters such as resources, cost of trials, inconvenience, or hardship on a complainant or accused could never be relevant to a jury. These had all been mentioned or referred to by the trial judge. It was also said that, depending on the circumstances, these matters could have had the potential to improperly pressure the jury. In particular, it was held that there was a reasonable possibility that the jury was influenced by the reference to further ‘resources and costings within the public domain’ being used if a verdict of disagreement was reached, especially in the context of the well-documented condition of public finances at the time when the trial was being heard.
For these reasons, leave to appeal against conviction was allowed and the verdict was set aside
CRIMINAL LAW (RAPE)(AMDT) ACT 1990 S4
R v G (RM) 1996 3 SCR 362
DPP v MULHALL 2009 3 IR 151
DPP v KELLY 2006 4 IR 273
R v MCKENNA 1960 1 QB 411
R v WALHEIN 1952 36 CR APP R 167
R v WATSON & ORS 1988 QB 690
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1967 S13
R v RADFORD UNREP CCA 11.2.1992 (UK)
O'MALLEY THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 2009 PARA 20.41
The appellant in this case, is charged with a single count of rape contrary to s. 4 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act1990, it being alleged that on the 29th September, 2007, at a certain address in Co. Wicklow, he did sexually assault the complainant, a female, in circumstances which included the penetration of her mouth by his penis. Having pleaded not guilty, his trial commenced on the 2nd June, 2010. After a six day hearing the jury, by a majority of eleven to one, returned a verdict of
guilty. On the 23rd July, 2010 he was sentenced to a term of seven years imprisonment to commence as and from the 11th September, 2008.
In his notice of appeal dated the 6th August, 2010, the appellant seeks leave from this Court to challenge his conviction on a number of grounds. These include in ground no. 1 the assertion that when giving a direction to the jury regarding the availability of a majority verdict, and when at the same time informing them of their right to disagree, the learned trial judge, by virtue of the choice of language used, brought to bear improper pressure on its deliberations, such as to render the ultimate verdict unsatisfactory. It is this issue which will be first determined by the Court and which is the subject-matter of this judgment.
The factual matrix giving rise to the incident complained of is not overly complicated and may shortly be summarised as follows. On Friday evening, the 29th September, 2007, the complainant, Ms J.G., with others, went out socialising in the Leinster area, to celebrate the 18th birthday of a friend of theirs. In the process they visited a number of licensed premises over many hours, and consumed a large quantity of alcohol.
At about midnight or shortly thereafter on the evening in question, Mr. Adach, together with a work friend of his, Mr. C.B., went to a late night premises at which they met the complainant, whom the third party, had known for a number of years. In fact, for a very short period about three years previously, they had been girlfriend and boyfriend, when she was aged seventeen. Over the next two and a half hours or thereabouts, their paths crossed from time to time. On one such occasion, Mr. C.B. invited Ms J.G. back to the appellant's house, where at a later stage it was intended to have some type of party.
The precise circumstances in which Ms J.G. left that licensed premises are unclear, but it seems to be accepted that, having become separated from her girlfriends with whom she had spent the evening, she picked up a taxi some miles away, at about 3.45 a.m.. In the meantime the appellant and his friend, having left the public house between 2.30 a.m. and 3.00 a.m., also got a taxi to take them back to where Mr. C.B. was living, so as to collect some alcohol with the intention of then going on to the appellant's house which was a short distance away. Some phone contact took place between Ms. J.G. and Mr. C.B. at or about this time, during which they informed each other as to their respective whereabouts. This call she explained as being in furtherance of their pre-arranged agreement to meet up later. In any event, Mr. C.B. called a local taxi for both himself and the appellant to go to the house party. On entering the taxi, they discovered that Ms J.G. was already in it. All three ended up at the appellant's house some time after 4.00 a.m. on the morning in question. They were the only persons in the house at all relevant times.
Within a short period of having entered the house, the complainant and Mr. C.B. went upstairs, whether initially to go to the bathroom or otherwise, is irrelevant. They went into a bedroom and lay on the bed, where they had some minor physical contact with each other; Mr. C.B. then returned downstairs, soon to be followed by the complainant. After a further brief period in which it became clear that the complainant was clearly feeling the ill effects of the night, Mr. C.B. brought her back upstairs and put her into a bed, which happened to be in the appellant's bedroom. It is not suggested that anything improper took place, or that Mr. C.B. was doing anything other than looking after his friend. He returned downstairs where he and Mr. Adach had some more drinks. Eventually, at about 5.30 a.m. he decided to call a taxi to go home. He went back upstairs to where the complainant was, found her asleep or half asleep and told her of his intention to go home: he asked if she wanted to share a taxi and return to her...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeUnlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial
Transform your legal research with vLex
-
Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform
-
Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues
-
Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options
-
Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions
-
Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms
-
Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations
Start Your 7-day Trial
-
Director of Public Prosecutions v Brady
...or three days, up to ten days, until finalisation as opposed to three or four months as in the present case. 43 Reliance is placed on People (DPP) v. Adach [2012] IECCA 94 as follows: “ [O]ne may add what is quite evidently implied, namely that a jury must be free to consider its verdict u......
-
DPP v C.Q.
...in terms of their verdict and that had 2 of the jury disagreed, the result would have been a disagreement. 23 The People (DPP) v Adach [2012] IECCA 94 is cited wherein it was argued that the trial judge, by virtue of the choice of language used, brought to bear improper pressure on the jury......