DPP v Aigars Vajeuskis
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Court | High Court |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE MICHAEL PEART |
| Judgment Date | 23 May 2014 |
| Neutral Citation | [2014] IEHC 265 |
| Docket Number | Record Number: No. 1762 SS/2013 |
| Date | 23 May 2014 |
[2014] IEHC 265
THE HIGH COURT
BETWEEN:
AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2006 S99(1)
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2006 S99
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2006 S99(10)
DPP v HOGAN UNREP CCA 4.3.2002 [TRANSCRIPT NOT AVAILABLE]
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2006 S99(9)
COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961 S52(1)
COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT 1961 S52
AG v SIMPSON (NO 2) 1959 IR 335
CLEARY v DPP 2012 1 ILRM 449 2011 IESC 43
DPP v STEWART UNREP CCA 12.1.2004 2003/20/4573
DPP (GARDA MADDEN & GARDA HYNES) v CARTER UNREP O'MALLEY 21.3.2014 2014 IEHC 179
O'MALLEY SENTENCING LAW & PRACTICE 1ED 2000
MCILHAGGA, IN RE UNREP SUPREME 29.7.1971
O'BRIEN v GOVERNOR OF LIMERICK PRISON 1997 2 ILRM 349 1997/5/1877
LAW REFORM CMSN REPORT ON SENTENCING (LRC 53-1996)
Criminal Law - Conviction for road traffic offences - Offences committed during suspension -Jurisdiction of District Court to suspend sentence - Section 99 Criminal Justice Act 2006 - Maximum length of suspension - Lawfulness of sentence
Facts: Following conviction for road traffic offences, according to the Case Stated Judge Seamus Hughes decided the defendant was a candidate for imprisonment but that he should be allowed an opportunity to demonstrate his remorse and to mark the seriousness of the offences. Fines were imposed, a contribution to the Court was ordered and the case was adjourned. The defendant paid the fines and was disqualified from driving for six years, sentenced to 4 months imprisonment and suspended for two years by Judge Denis McLoughlin. According to the Case Stated the defendant was convicted of further offences committed during the period of his suspension. The case was adjourned and the defendant was remanded back to Athlone District Court so that Judge Hughes could consider whether the suspended sentence should be activated. The matter came back before Judge Hughes and Counsel for the defendant raised an issue as to whether the District Court had jurisdiction to suspend a sentence of four months for two years. Judge Hughes sought the opinion of the Court as to whether the jurisdiction of the District Court to suspend a sentence was limited to its” maximum sentencing jurisdiction bearing in mind the sentencing jurisdiction of the District Court was limited to one year, or two years on two offences where the sentence was consecutive and charges arose from separate events; whether the jurisdiction extended to the suspension of a sentence for the period greater than two years and whether the sentence should be suspended for a longer period than the length of the imposed sentence. Mr Justice Michael Peart referred to sub-sections (1), (9) and (10) of section 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006. Counsel for Prosecution Mr Dwyer submitted Judge Hughes should not have stated a case for determination by the Court, since the judge was functus officio as regards the sentence and could not revisit it, unless by judicial review or appeal and referred to the case of Cleary v DPP [2012]. Micheál P. O”Higgins SC for the defendant submitted regarding the application to revoke the suspension that the District Judge was not functus officio. Mr O”Higgins stated where a sentence of four months was imposed but suspended for two years, the sentence hangs over the defendant for six times the length of the sentence and was unjust. Mr O”Higgins stated the issue regarding the length of suspension of a four month sentence was not restricted to whether the District Judge was entitled to suspend a sentence for longer than the length of the sentence but concerned the jurisdiction relating to the revocation application and further that the lawfulness of the suspended sentence related to the jurisdiction of the District Court to consider revocation of the suspension. Mr Justice Michael Peart pointed out there was no provision within section 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 which provided for a maximum length of sentence which may be suspended. Mr Justice Michael Peart agreed with Mr Dwyer”s submission that it was not open to the District Judge in relation to a revocation application who previously imposed the suspended sentence to then enter upon the question of whether the imposed sentence was lawful.
Held by Mr Justice Michael Peart that Judge Hughes was not restricted as to the length of time for which he could suspend the four month sentence and that the law was silent as to whether a sentence may not be suspended for a period longer than the sentence itself and as to the maximum length of such suspension.
No restriction as to length of time for suspension of sentence
This is a Consultative Case Stated dated 2nd October 2013 by Judge Seamus Hughes of the District Court arising out of a prosecution of the defendant for certain offences under the Road Traffic Acts, and in respect of which the defendant was convicted by him on 27th June 2012 at Athlone District Court.
According to the Case Stated submitted, Judge Hughes decided, following conviction, that the defendant was a suitable candidate for imprisonment, but that he should be allowed an opportunity to demonstrate his remorse and to mark the seriousness of the offences. Accordingly, on 27th June 2012 he imposed fines amounting to the sum of €1500, directed also a contribution to the court poor box in a further sum of €1500. and adjourned the case until 25 July 2012 to enable the defendant to do so.
The matter came back before the District Court on 25th July 2012, and on that date the defendant made the payments as ordered. Judge Hughes proceeded to disqualify the defendant from driving for a period of six years, and sentenced him also to 4 months imprisonment, but suspending that sentence for a period of two years pursuant to the provisions of section 99 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.
According to the Case Stated, on 25th May 2013 the defendant was convicted of further offences committed during the period of this suspension, those matters coming before a different District Judge, namely Judge Denis McLoughlin, at Galway District Court.
Given the existence of the suspended sentence already imposed, Judge McLoughlin adjourned the case before him, and, as provided in section 99, remanded the defendant back to Athlone District Court so that Judge Hughes could consider whether the suspended sentence should be activated pursuant to the provisions of section 99 (10) of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006.
The matter came back before Judge Hughes for that purpose on 5th June 2013 when Counsel for the defendant raised an issue as to whether the District Court has jurisdiction to suspend a sentence of four months for a period of two years, i.e. to suspend the sentence for a period longer than the sentence itself.
Judge Hughes seeks the opinion of this Court on the following questions:
Is the jurisdiction of the District Court to suspend a sentence, limited to its maximum sentencing jurisdiction in a given case?
Cognisant that the sentencing jurisdiction of the District Court is limited to one year, or two years on two offences where the sentence is made consecutive and the charges arise from separate events, does that jurisdiction extend to the suspension of a sentence for the period greater than two years?
In the absence of special circumstances, am I correct in law to suspend a sentence for a period longer than the length of the sentence that is actually imposed?
In reference to the existing jurisprudence, particularly the judgment of Chief Justice Keane in the People (DPP) v. Hogan (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 March 2002) what constitutes "special circumstances", and am I correct in law in finding that a third conviction constitutes a special circumstance?
Before addressing the submissions of the parties, and reaching any conclusions, I should set forth the relevant provisions of Section 99, subsections (1), (9) and (10) of the Act of 2006:
(1) where a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment (other than a mandatory term of imprisonment) by a court in respect of an offence, that court may make an order suspending the execution of the sentence in whole or in part, subject to the person entering into a recognizance to comply with (he conditions of or imposed in relation to, the order.
(9) where a person to whom an order under subsection (1) applies is, during the period of suspension of the sentence concerned,...
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