DPP v Daniels

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Dunne
• Judgment Date: 04 November 2014
• Neutral Citation: [2014] IESC 64
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 289 of 2007],[Appeal No. 289/2007]
• Date: 04 November 2014

[2014] IESC 64

THE SUPREME COURT

Denham C.J., Murray J., O"Donnell J., MacMenamin J., Dunne J.

[Appeal No. 289/2007]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 29 OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT 1924 (AS AMENDED)

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

RESPONDENT

AND

ERIC DANIELS

APPLICANT

Attempted Murder of a Child – Appeal – Evidence – Preventative Detention – Mitigating Factors

Facts: In the case at hand, the applicant (then aged eighteen) had attempted to murder a ten year old girl to see what it would be like to kill someone. The applicant following his arrest was charged. On the third day of his trial, the applicant was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty to the attempted murder charge. A nolle prosequi was entered in respect of three other counts on the indictment. In the course of the sentence hearing evidence was given by Sergeant Tom O"Dwyer who described a number of admissions made by the applicant in the course of his interviews with the Gardaí following his arrest. Amongst other things he said: 'I was just trying to inflict pain. I just wanted to see what it was like' and 'I got the lace around her neck. When I did this it was my intention to choke her. I wanted to see what it would be like to kill somebody.' Reflecting the gravity of the offence, the learned trial judge imposed a term of life imprisonment on the applicant. The applicant then applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal. The two principal grounds of appeal canvassed before the Court of Criminal Appeal were that the imposition of a life sentence necessarily meant that no weight was given to mitigating factors put forward on behalf of the applicant and that the imposition of the life sentence was therefore inappropriate and secondly, that the judgment of the learned trial judge in which the reasons for imposing a life sentence was set out could only lead to the conclusion that the sentence imposed was a sentence of preventative detention. Thus it was argued that on each of these grounds there was an error in principle in the sentence imposed on the applicant. The arguments on behalf of the applicant were rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Subsequently an application was made to the Court of Criminal Appeal for a certificate under s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 (as substituted by s. 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006) and that application was granted. The Court of Criminal Appeal certified that its decision involved points of law of exceptional public importance namely: (1) was it lawful to give an accused person the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence with which he was charged under statute even where there are significant mitigating factors in play such as, a plea, a first offence or age; and (2) Did the sentence imposed constitute a sentence of preventative detention and if so was such a sentence a proper one in Irish law?

Held by Justice Dunne that it was lawful to give an accused person the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence with which he was charged under statute even where there were significant mitigating factors in. It was decided that it was not necessary to consider that issue further. In respects of the Preventative Detention arguments, Justice Dunne in light of the applicable case-law stated that the substantive argument made on behalf of the applicant was to the effect that preventative detention was not constitutionally permissible in Ireland. Justice Dunne was of the opinion that all sentences of imprisonment involve an element of preventative detention in the sense that when an offender is in prison, they are not at liberty to commit other offences and in this way, a sentence of imprisonment offers protection to society from the possible commission of other offences by that individual. However, it was stated that the sentence imposed should not be longer than was necessary to punish the offender for the offence or offences concerned. In light of the court transcripts and the admission of the applicant that he wanted to kill, Justice Dunne determined that the sentence imposed by the learned trial judge did not constitute a sentence of preventative detention but on the contrary was a sentence appropriately imposed having regard to the very grave circumstances of the offence committed by the applicant. It was reasoned that there was nothing in the sentence imposed to suggest that an element of the sentence was for the purpose of preventative detention. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was deemed to be proper under Irish Law.

Ms. Justice Dunne

Judgment of Ms. Justice Dunne delivered on the 4th day of November 2014

1 Introduction

2 1. What could be more disturbing than the idea of a young person setting out to try and kill a child to see what it would be like to kill somebody? That is precisely what happened in this case. The applicant herein when aged eighteen years of age attempted to murder a young girl aged approximately ten years of age. She was a neighbour of the applicant and he lured her to a field near their homes on the pretext of looking for some puppies that he said he had seen earlier on in the field. While they were engaged in the search for the puppies, the applicant took a lace out of his pocket, put it around the girl"s neck and tried to strangle her. She tried to scream and he pushed her down on the grass. The lace was around her neck and she pretended that she was dead. The applicant took the lace off her neck and shortly afterwards, she was able to make her escape and ran home. There, she alerted a babysitter. The applicant was subsequently arrested and then charged. On the third day of his trial for attempted murder, inter alia, the applicant was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted murder. A nolle prosequi was entered in respect of three other counts on the indictment.

3 2. In the course of the sentence hearing evidence was given by Sergeant Tom O"Dwyer who described a number of admissions made by the applicant in the course of his interviews with the Gardaí following his arrest. Amongst other things he said: 'I was just trying to inflict pain. I just wanted to see what it was like' and 'I got the lace around her neck. When I did this it was my intention to choke her. I wanted to see what it would be like to kill somebody.'

4 3. Reflecting the undeniable gravity of the offence, the learned trial judge imposed a term of life imprisonment on the applicant.

5 The Appeal

6 4. The applicant then applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal. The two principal grounds of appeal canvassed before the Court of Criminal Appeal were that the imposition of a life sentence necessarily meant that no weight was given to mitigating factors put forward on behalf of the applicant and that the imposition of the life sentence was therefore inappropriate and secondly, that the judgment of the learned trial judge in which the reasons for imposing a life sentence was set out could only lead to the conclusion that the sentence imposed was a sentence of preventative detention. Thus it was argued that on each of these grounds there was an error in principle in the sentence imposed on the applicant. The arguments on behalf of the applicant were rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Subsequently an application was made to the Court of Criminal Appeal for a certificate under s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 (as substituted by s. 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006) and that application was granted. The Court of Criminal Appeal certified that its decision involved points of law of exceptional public importance namely:

(1) Is it lawful to give an accused person the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence with which he is charged under statute even where there are significant mitigating factors in play such as –

(a) a plea;

(b) a first offence;

(c) age.

(2) Does the sentence imposed constitute a sentence of preventative detention and if so is such a sentence a proper one in Irish law?

7 5. When the matter came on for hearing before this Court it was quite properly conceded on behalf of the applicant that the answer to the first question as certified by the Court of Criminal Appeal was yes and thus it is not necessary to consider that issue any further.

8 Preventative detention

9 6. The seminal decision on the question of preventative detention is The People (Attorney General) v. O"Callaghan [1966] I.R. 501. That was, of course, a case concerned with the entitlement of a person awaiting trial to bail. The argument made in that case was that an individual should be refused bail because of the likelihood that he would commit further offences if admitted to bail. The offences for which the applicant was seeking bail were alleged to have been committed in circumstances where the applicant was already on bail for other offences at the time of the alleged offences for which he subsequently sought bail. It was submitted on behalf of the Attorney General that this was something which should be taken into account by the Court when considering an application for bail. Ó Dálaigh C.J. in that case commented (at page 508):

'The reasoning underlying this submission is, in my opinion, a denial of the whole basis of our system of law. It transcends respect for the requirement that a man shall be considered innocent until he is found guilty and seeks to punish him in respect of offences neither completed nor attempted. I say "punish," for deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon.'

10 7. In the same case Walsh J. at page 516 of the judgment stated:

'Ground number 4 of the learned Judge, that is to say, the likelihood of the commission of...