DPP v Flynn

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeClarke C.J.,Irvine J.
Judgment Date12 November 2019
Neutral Citation[2019] IESCDET 263
Docket NumberS:AP:IE:2019:000182 2015 No. 240
Date12 November 2019
CourtSupreme Court

[2019] IESCDET 263

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

Clarke C.J.

Dunne J.

Irvine J.

S:AP:IE:2019:000182

2015 No. 240

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
AND
THOMAS FLYNN
APPLICANT
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:

ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED

COURT: Court of Appeal
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 5 thMay, 2017
DATE OF ORDER: 5 thMay, 2017
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDER: 21 stAugust, 2019
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 4 thSeptember, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME.
General Considerations
1

The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33 rdAmendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions (2017) IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

2

Furthermore the application for leave filed and the respondent's notice is published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the position of the parties.

3

In that context it should be noted that the respondent does oppose the grant of leave.

Decision
4

This case concerns an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal handed down by Birmingham J. (as he then was) on 5 May 2017. The applicant herein (along with a number of other appellants) appealed to the Court of Appeal against the severity of sentences imposed on them by the Circuit Court in Clonmel on 1 October 2015 in respect of aggravated burglary. The applicant received a sentence of 12 years imprisonment with the final 3 years suspended (to commence on the expiry of a sentence that he was already serving for a firearms offence). The Court of Appeal reduced the sentences of two of the applicant's co-appellants but concluded that the sentence imposed upon the applicant was appropriate and the Court saw no basis for interfering with it.

5

It is the applicant's contention that the Court of Appeal erred in its approach by upholding a sentence which is “disproportionate and excessive” in the circumstances where the trial judge made remarks about remission at the sentencing stage which...

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