DPP v Gill

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1980
• Docket Number: [S.C. No. 64 of 1978]
• Date: 01 January 1980

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Gill

The Director of Public Prosecutions

Complainant

and

Ronald Gill

Defendant

[S.C. No. 64 of 1978]

Supreme Court

Criminal law - Complaint - Time limit - Summary jurisdiction - Summons issued after expiration of time limit - Complainant not appearing on return day - Procedure - Adjournment - Rules of the District Court, 1948 (S.R. & O. No. 431 of 1948), rr. 64, 83 - Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 93) s. 10, para. 4.

Section 10, para. 4, of the Act of 1851 states that in all cases of summary jurisdiction the complaint shall be made "within six months from the time when the cause of complaint shall have arisen, but not otherwise." On the 7th June, 1977, the defendant appeared in the District Court pursuant to a summons which commanded him to so appear and to answer a complaint that on the 26th November, 1976, he had committed a certain offence which was triable summarily. That summons was issued on the 29th March, 1977. Although the defendant appeared in the District Court on the 7th June, 1977, the complainant failed to appear on that occasion. An application by the defendant to have the complaint dismissed was refused by the District Justice, but he did not make any order.

The complainant caused a second summons to be issued and it commanded the defendant to appear in the District Court on the 5th July, 1977, to answer a complaint that he had committed an offence described in the summons, being the offence which had been described in the first summons. At the hearing of the complaint on the 5th July, 1977, the District Justice held that both summonses referred to the same complaint and that it had been made within the period allowed by s. 10 of the Act of 1851, but he stated a Case for the determination by the High Court of certain questions. The High Court held that there had been a hearing of a complaint on the 7th June, 1977, and that the defendant should not have been brought before the District Court again to answer the same charge pursuant to a new complaint which was statute barred. On appeal by the complainant it was

Held by the Supreme Court (Henchy, Griffin and Kenny JJ.), in allowing the appeal, 1, that the District Justice was correct in holding that both summonses referred to the same complaint.

2. That it was clear that the complaint had been made within the period allowed by s. 10, para. 4, of the Act of 1851.

3. That there was no evidence to support the view that there had been a hearing of the complaint by the District Court on the first occasion and that, the first summons being spent, it was lawful for the defendant to be brought before the District Court on the second occasion by means of the second summons to answer the complaint.

Cases mentioned in this report:—

¹ R. (McDonnell) v. Justices of Tyrone [1912] 2 I.R. 44.

² In re Singer (No. 2) (1960) 98 I.L.T.R. 112.

³ Minister for Supplies v. Connor [1945] I.R. 231.

⁴ Attorney General (McDonnell) v. Higgins [1964] I.R. 374.

⁵ The State (O'Callaghan) v. O hUadhaigh [1977] I.R. 42.

Appeal from the High Court

The facts have been summarised in the head-note and they appear in the judgment of Henchy J., infra. On the 20th September, 1977, District Justice James J. O'Sullivan stated a Case pursuant to s. 52 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961, in which he sought the determination by the High Court of certain questions of law arising at the summary trial...