DPP v Haugh

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Diarmuid B. O'Donovan,Carney J.,Ms. Justice Laffoy
• Judgment Date: 12 May 2000
• Neutral Citation: [2000] IEHC 178
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2000 No. 59 J.R.]
• Date: 12 May 2000

[2000] IEHC 178

THE HIGH COURT

Record No. 59 JR/2000

DPP v. HAUGH & HAUGHEY

JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

APPLICANT

AND

JUDGE KEVIN HAUGH

RESPONDENT

AND

CHARLES J. HAUGHEY & THE ATTORNEYGENERAL

NOTICE PARTIES

Citations:

D V DPP 1994 1 ILRM 435

JURIES ACT 1976 S6

JURIES ACT 1927 S58(5)

DE BURCA V AG 1976 IR 38

CONSTITUTION ART 50

JURIES ACT 1976 S9

JURIES ACT 1976 S11

JURIES ACT 1976 S12

JURIES ACT 1976 S15(1)

JURIES ACT 1976 S15(3)

JURIES ACT 1976 S36

AG, PEOPLE V LEHMAN (NO 2) 1947 IR 137

ARCHBOLD CRIMINAL LAW 29ED 193 & 371

R V STEWART 1 COX 174

R V DOWLING 7 ST (NS) 381

R V EDMONDS 1 ST (NS) 785

HUBAND ON JURIES 666-9

R V MARTIN 6 ST (NS) 925

DPP V SPECIAL CRIMINAL COURT & WARD 1999 1 IR 60

CONSTITUTION ART 38.1

CONSTITUTION ART 40.3.1

CONSTITUTION ART 38.5

CONSTITUTION ART 38.2

CONSTITUTION ART 38.3

CONSTITUTION ART 38.4

JURIES ACT 1976 S15

JURIES ACT 1976 S24

JURIES ACT 1976 S11

JURIES ACT 1976 S13

JURIES ACT 1976 S14

AG, PEOPLE V SINGER 1975 IR 408

TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY (EVIDENCE) ACT 1921

JURIES ACT 1976 PART II

JURIES ACT 1976 S5(4)

JURIES ACT 1976 S7

JURIES ACT 1976 SCHED 1 PART I

JURIES ACT 1976 S8

JURIES ACT 1976 PART III

JURIES ACT 1976 S11

JURIES ACT 1976 S12(1)

JURIES ACT 1976 S9

JURIES ACT 1976 S16

JURIES ACT 1976 S16(4)

JURIES ACT 1976 S17(4)

JURIES ACT 1976 S20

JURIES ACT 1976 S21

JURIES ACT 1976 S20(2)

JURIES ACT 1976 S21(2)

JURIES ACT 1976 S21(3)

JURIES ACT 1976 S21(4)

JURIES ACT 1976 S24

JURIES ACT 1976 PART IV

JURIES ACT 1976 S35(1)

JURIES ACT 1976 S35(2)

JURIES ACT 1976 S35(3)

JURIES ACT 1976 S9(1)

JURIES ACT 1976 S35

JURIES ACT 1976 S12(2)

Z V DPP 1994 2 ILRM 481

Synopsis

Administrative Law

Administrative; judicial review; delay; prejudice; respondent had refused adjournment on the ground that there was not a real or serious risk that due to the impact of publicity, the first named notice party would not receive an fair trial; respondent had proposed to send out to potential jurors a letter and questionnaire; whether the respondent had jurisdiction to frame and send to potential jurors the letter and questionnaire; s.15(3), Juries Act, 1976.

Held: Order of certiorari granted quashing order of respondent; declaration made that Juries Act 1976 and the common law do not permit the questioning of potential jurors in the manner contemplated.

D.P.P. v. Judge Haugh - High Court; Carney J., O'Donovan J., Laffoy J. - 12/05/2000 - [2000] 1 IR 184

The application concerned the prosecution of Mr. Haughey on charges of obstructing a tribunal of inquiry. As part of the process of ensuring a fair trial the trial judge proposed sending a questionnaire to each member of the jury panel. The applicant brought the present proceedings seeking an order of certiorari in respect of the decision to issue the questionnaire. In a divisional court of the High Court all three judges delivered separate judgments. Laffoy J held that the Juries Act, 1976 did not authorise the steps proposed by the trial judge. The order of certiorari sought would be granted. Both Mr. Justice O'Donovan and Mr. Justice Carney delivered similar judgments.

1 Judgment of Mr. Justice Diarmuid B. O'Donovandelivered on the 12th day of May2000.

2 The issue in this case is whether or not the determination by the Respondent by his Order dated the 14th day of February, 2000 made in proceedings entitled The Circuit Criminal Court. Dublin Circuit. County of the City of Dublin, The Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Charles J. Haughey, Bill No. 711/99, that a letter and questionnaire annexed thereto be sent to each member of the jury panel in respect of the charges brought against the First named Notice Party is valid in point of law.

3 At the outset, I think it relevant to note that, in the course of his judgment delivered in the proceedings aforesaid on the 17th day of December, 1999, the Respondentdeclared "I believe it to be a fact that the Accused'S (the First named Notice Party has been reputation and standing in the public mind has been significantly damaged" and again he declared "that the standing and reputation of the Accused (the First named Notice Party has been seriously injured across a broad front and he has been exposed to, in the traditional wording of the defamation suit, hatred, ridicule and contempt". Nevertheless, the Respondent concluded that he was not satisfied that there exists at present a real or serious risk that the First named Notice Party the reinafter referred to as Mr. Haughey) would receive an unfair trial. In that regard, the Respondent expressed the belief "that persons empanelled to serve on a jury take their oath seriously and conscientiously??? go about their deliberations in a manner directed by a trial Judge's charge" and he accepted that the offences with which Mr. Haughey stands charged concern narrow and clearly identifiable issues which he believed should be considered and determined by a jury as he put it "not irremediably prejudiced by the publicity given to much wider and in my opinion more serious allegations." Nevertheless, notwithstanding those conclusions and, apparently, in the light of his assessment of Mr. Haumhey's standing in the public mind: an assessment with which, incidentally. I would not take issue, the Respondent clearly had reservations about the likelihood that Mr. Haughey would obtain a fair trial from a jury of his peers: a fair trial being, as the Respondent correctly pointed out in his judgment, paramount or superior in the hierarchy of the constitutional rights of an accused person. Accordingly, he speculated that the prosecution of Mr. Haughey might be in appropriate case in which to consider what additional safeguards or procedures, over and above the norm, might be adopted in the matter of selecting persons to serve on a jury to try the charges preferred against Mr. Haughey. In this regard, I have no doubt at all but that the Respondent was motivated, simply and solely, by a desire to secure a fair trial tor Mr. Haughey and in particular, insofar as it was possible, to obtain a jury to try his case who would, in the words of Henchy J in the course of the judgment which he delivered in the caseof De Burca -v- The Attorney General, (1976) IR at page 88) be "competent, impartial and representative". Accordingy, having heard submissions from the parties and to that end, the Respondent ordained that a letter be written to each member of the jury panel advising them (inter alia) that among the trials listed for hearing during the period of their jury service is the case of DPP -v- Charles J. Haughey, a former Taoiseach, that persons selected to serve as jury members in criminal trials are required to reach their verdicts solely in accordance with the evidence adduced in the course of a trial but because he Mr. Haughey is such a well-known public figure and because he has been the subject of considerable media interest arising from the McCracken Tribunal and the Moriarty Tribunal, the Court has ruled that special or extraordinary measures should be taken in the selection of the jury empanelled for his trial so a- to ensure that persons who may not feel able to try the case in a dispassionate and unbiased manner, or persons whose circumstances might make it appear undesirable that they should serve on such a jury, should be identifiable to the parties so that, if selected on ballot, they may be challenged, or they may be excused from service. To that end, in that letter, each member of the jury panel was advised that the Court had directed that a standard questionnaire be furnished to each of them so as to illicit information relevant towards such challenges or towards such persons being excused from service in the jury selected for the trial of Mr. Haughey and such a questionnaire was annexed to the letter and each member of the panel was requested to complete it with due diligence, frankness and fairness. This procedure is challenged by the Applicant and, indeed, by the Second named Notice Party on the following grounds, namely:-

4 (a) That the Respondent lacked express or implied jurisdiction to make the said Order of the 14th day of February, 2000.

5 (b) That even in the event that the Respondent did have jurisdiction to make the said Order, it would be unconstitutional, in that, it would deprive the jury selected in pursuance of it of the representative character which the Constitution requires a jury to have.

6 (c) That the jurisdiction of the Respondent to ensure that Mr. Haughey got a fair trial did not extend to adopting a method of jury selection which could have been but which had not been adopted by theOireachtas.

7 (d) That the Respondent erred in law in regarding himself at liberty to direct that jurors might first be questioned with a view to ascertaining cause for challenging their fitness to serve as jurors, whether on the ground of interest or partiality given that, the case of The People (A.G.) -v- Lehman, ( 1947 IR at page 1371,the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that the questioning of prospective jurors with a view to challenging them is impermissible.

8 (e) That provisions of the Juries Act (No. 4), 1976 provides a complete scheme governing the qualifications, challenging of, empanelling and composition of a jury and has inherent safeguards built into it for the purpose of ensuring that an accused person gets a fair trial but, nevertheless, does not allow scope for a questionnaire such as suggested by the Respondent.

9 For his part. Mr. Haughey contends that jurisdiction to make the impugned Order exists and that the suggested manner of exercise thereof is consistent with the spirit and operation of the Juries Act 1976. Moreover, in the light of the Respondent's conclusion that it is appropriate that additional safeguards or procedures, over and above the norm, might be adopted in the matter of selecting persons to serve on a jury to try Mr. Haughey, it...