DPP v MacCarthaigh

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Sheehan
Judgment Date03 November 2015
Neutral Citation[2015] IECA 234
CourtCourt of Appeal (Ireland)
Date03 November 2015

[2015] IECA 234

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Birmingham J.

Sheehan J.

Mahon J.

6/14
DPP v MacCarthaigh
The People at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
v
Criostóir MacCarthaigh
Appellant

Conviction – Murder – Errors in law and in fact – Appellant seeking to appeal against conviction – Whether trial judge erred in law and in fact

Facts: The appellant, Mr MacCarthaigh, was said to have encountered the deceased, Mr White, when Mr White was walking home alone from a pub in Phibsboro. There, the appellant was said to have stabbed him before bringing him across the city in his van to a wasteland area in Mill Lane, Palmerstown, whereupon he stabbed him again repeatedly, causing his death. It was alleged that the appellant and the deceased had met prior to this incident in a pub some weeks earlier. It was also alleged that throughout the incident, the appellant was accompanied by one Mr Griffin. It was the appellant”s defence at trial that it was in fact Mr Griffin who had killed the deceased and that he had fabricated an account implicating the appellant. Mr Griffin gave evidence at trial which was central to the prosecution case. The prosecution also relied on the evidence of a Mr Walsh and a Mr Ennis, who were both acquaintances of the appellant and Mr Griffin. In December, 2013, following a ten day trial in the Central Criminal Court, the appellant was convicted of the murder of the deceased and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge erred in law and in fact in: 1) ruling that it was open to the jury to draw inferences arising from the content of statutory interviews with the accused; 2) admitting into evidence the content of interviews with the accused which had been obtained following upon statutory warnings as to the consequences of failing to give answers to certain questions; 3) directing the jury as to the manner in which they should consider the contents of interviews obtained following statutory warnings; 4) allowing evidence from Mr Ennis that the appellant had a knife on his person on the evening of the alleged offence when no notice had been given of that proposed evidence; 5) permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of the opinion of Mr Ennis regarding the accused”s disposition and demeanour at a time prior to the alleged offence; 6) permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of the appellant”s previous criminal convictions; 7) failing to charge the jury correctly, or at all, in relation to the significance of the evidence of the appellant”s prior convictions and the manner in which they should address that evidence; 8) refusing to discharge the jury subsequent to the giving of evidence by Mr Walsh regarding a purported admission of guilt by the appellant which evidence the appellant was not on notice of; 9) permitting the prosecution to adduce the evidence of Mr Walsh; 10) admitting into evidence the fact of the taking of forensic samples from the appellant and in admitting evidence dependent on the aforesaid samples. The respondent, the DPP, submitted that powers to take samples as they pertain to a Criminal Justice Act 1984 s. 4 detainee were not excluded by the legislature in accommodating the s. 4 application to a Criminal Justice Act 1999 s. 42 arrested person.

Held by Sheehan J that the trial judge was correct in ruling that it was open to the jury to draw inferences and that his charge on those matters was satisfactory. Sheehan J held that the trial judge correctly applied the relevant test when considering the evidence of Mr Ennis and was correct in admitting it; it was a matter for the jury to assess its credibility and decide whether or not it was corroborative. The Court was satisfied that the trial judge properly directed the jury in concluding his direction by saying that a previous conviction could have a bearing on a witness”s credibility. Sheehan J held that the trial judge was correct in his decision in refusing to discharge the jury and accordingly the evidence of Mr Walsh was properly admitted. The Court held that the trial judge was correct in his rulings effectively holding that the phrase ‘dealt with as though’ means being in the same position as a s. 4 detained person.

Sheehan J held that the appeal against conviction be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

1

1. On the 19 th December, 2013, following a ten day trial in the Central Criminal Court, the appellant was convicted of the murder of David White and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

2

2. The appellant now challenges his conviction on the following grounds:

1

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in ruling that it was open to the jury to draw inferences arising from the content of statutory interviews with the accused.

2

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in admitting into evidence the content of interviews with the accused which had been obtained following upon statutory warnings as to the consequences of failing to give answers to certain questions.

3

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in directing the jury as to the manner in which they should consider the contents of interviews obtained following statutory warnings.

4

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in allowing evidence from Mr Ivan Ennis that the appellant had a knife on his person on the evening of the alleged offence when no notice had been given of that proposed evidence.

5

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of the opinion of Mr Ivan Ennis regarding the accused's disposition and demeanour at a time prior to the alleged offence.

6

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of the appellant's previous criminal convictions.

7

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in failing to charge the jury correctly, or at all, in relation to the significance of the evidence of the appellant's prior convictions and the manner in which they should address that evidence.

8

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in refusing to discharge the jury subsequent to the giving of evidence by Mr Gary Walsh regarding a purported admission of guilt by the appellant which evidence the appellant was not on notice of.

9

The learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in permitting the prosecution to adduce the evidence of Mr Gary Walsh.

10

The learned trial judge erred in fact and in law in admitting into evidence the fact of the taking of forensic samples from the Appellant and in admitting evidence dependent on the aforesaid samples.

3

3. In order to consider these grounds of appeal it is first necessary to set out the background to the offence.

Background
4

4. On the night in question, the deceased was said to have been walking home alone from a pub in Phibsboro when he encountered the appellant. There, the appellant is said to have stabbed him before bringing him across the city in his van to a wasteland area in Mill Lane, Palmerstown, whereupon he stabbed him again repeatedly, causing his death.

5

5. It was alleged that the appellant and the deceased had met prior to this incident in a pub some weeks earlier. It was also alleged that throughout the incident, the appellant was accompanied by one Simon Griffin. Indeed, Mr Griffin and the appellant had been socialising earlier at the appellant's apartment before the said incident occurred while they were on their way into town.

6

6. It was the appellant's defence at trial that it was in fact Mr Griffin who had killed the deceased and that he had fabricated an account implicating the appellant.

7

7. Mr. Griffin gave evidence at trial which was central to the prosecution case. The prosecution also relied on the evidence of Gary Walsh and Ivan Ennis, who were both acquaintances of the appellant and Mr Griffin.

Submissions
8

8. In broad terms, the submissions in this appeal can be grouped as follows: Grounds 1, 2 and 3 are related and can be dealt with together as can Grounds 4 and 5, Grounds 6 and 7, Grounds 8 and 9, and finally Ground 10 must be dealt with on its own.

Grounds 1, 2 and 3
9

9. The prosecution at trial made an application to admit inferences from interviews with the appellant under s.18 (accounting for marks on one's person), s.19 (accounting for presence at a particular place) and s. 19A (matters which call for comment) of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (as substituted by the Criminal Justice Act 2007). The application was refused in respect of S.19A but was permitted in respect of the other two sections. The appellant thus submits that the learned trial judge erred in allowing for inferences on the facts and also in the manner in which he directed the jury as to the use of this evidence.

10

10. In this regard, it is first submitted by the appellant that, in the case of any positive responses which were elicited after the statutory caution, these responses lack the essential precondition of voluntariness for any purported admission. The appellant submits that these responses were given under the compulsion of the provision and in order to diffuse the threat that adverse inferences would otherwise be drawn. The appellant relies on the Supreme Court decision of Re National Irish Bank [1999] 3 I.R. 145 in submitting that, as the section itself is silent as to how positive responses are to be received in evidence, if at all, this point must be determined by reference to common law principles. which outline that answers which are coerced are not to be admissible as against the accused. The appellant further notes that in this context it may also be relevant that he had been given the usual general...

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2 cases
  • DPP v Gavin Sheehan
    • Ireland
    • Court of Appeal (Ireland)
    • 25 May 2020
    ...reasoning may properly be applied. In fact, in A McD the then leading authority on the provisions of s. 18 which was DPP v. MacCarthaigh [2015] IECA 234 was approved and relied upon when the court was dealing with s.19; that decision of the Supreme Court post-dated the trial. We think that ......
  • The People (At the Suit of the DPP) v Gavin Sheehan
    • Ireland
    • Supreme Court
    • 29 July 2021
    ...did not apply where an account “of any kind” had been given. Counsel for the prosecution relied upon People (DPP) v. MacCarthaigh [2015] IECA 234, where it was held that the inferences could be drawn if the answers given by the accused did not engage with the question in a meaningful way an......

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