DPP v Trebacz

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMcKechnie J.,O'Donnell J.
Judgment Date20 December 2019
Neutral Citation[2019] IESCDET 301
Date20 December 2019
CourtSupreme Court
Docket NumberSupreme Court record no: S:AP:IE:2019:000092 Court of Appeal record no: 2014 No. 63 High Court record no: Bill No CCDP 0016/2013

[2019] IESCDET 301

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

O'Donnell J.

McKechnie J.

Dunne J.

Supreme Court record no: S:AP:IE:2019:000092

Court of Appeal record no: 2014 No. 63

High Court record no: Bill No CCDP 0016/2013

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
AND
PRZEMYSLAW TREBACZ
APPLICANT
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.3° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES

RESULT: The Court does not grant leave to the Applicant to appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal

REASONS GIVEN:
ORDER SOUGHT TO BE APPEALED
COURT: Court of Appeal
DATE OF JUDGMENT OR RULING: 21st February, 2019
DATE OF ORDER: 21st February, 2019
DATE OF PERFECTION OF ORDERS: 15th May, 2019
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WAS MADE ON 17th May, 2019 AND WAS IN TIME.
1

This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by McCarthy J. (Birmingham P. and Edwards J. concurring) on the 21st February, 2019 and the resulting order of the same day, which was perfected on the 15th May, 2019. It was an appeal against the applicant's murder conviction, imposed upon him in the Central Criminal Court on the 18th December, 2013. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment on the 17th February, 2014.

General Considerations
2

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution. As is clear from the terms of Article 34.5.3° of the Constitution, it is necessary, in order for this Court to grant leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal, that the Court is satisfied that there are circumstances which have the presence of either or both of the following factors: i) that the decision sought to be appealed involves a matter of general public importance, or ii) the interests of justice.

3

The general principles applied by this Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal having regard to the criteria incorporated into the Constitution as a result of the 33rd Amendment have now been considered in a large number of determinations and are fully addressed in both a determination issued by a panel consisting of all of the members of this Court in B.S. v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134 and in a unanimous judgment of a full Court delivered by O'Donnell J. in Price Waterhouse Coopers (A Firm) v Quinn Insurance Ltd. (Under Administration) [2017] IESC 73. The additional criteria required to be met in order that a so-called ‘leapfrog appeal’ direct from the High Court to this Court can be permitted were addressed by a full panel of the Court in Wansboro v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 115. It follows that it is unnecessary to revisit the new constitutional architecture for the purposes of this determination.

4

It should be noted that any ruling in a determination is between the parties. It is final and conclusive as far as the parties are concerned, and is a decision in relation to that application only. The issue determined on the application for leave is whether the facts and legal issues meet the constitutional criteria to enable this Court to hear an appeal. It will not, save in the rarest of circumstances, be appropriate to rely on a refusal of leave as having a precedential value in relation to the substantive issues in the context of a different case. Where leave is granted, any issue canvassed in the application will in due course be disposed of in the substantive decision of the Court.

5

Furthermore, the application for leave filed and the respondent's notice are published along with this determination (subject only to any redaction required by law) and it is therefore unnecessary to fully set out the position of the parties.

6

In that context it should be noted that the respondent does oppose the grant of leave. Neither party has requested that a preliminary reference be made to the Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU nor has either party requested an extension of time.

Background and Procedural History
7

On the 18th December, 2013 in the Central Criminal Court before White J., the applicant was convicted on a charge of murder contrary to common law and as provided for by s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964. The trial began on the 28th November, 2018 and continued for 14 days: after deliberating, the jury delivered a majority guilty verdict.

8

Briefly, the events which led to the applicant's conviction can be described as such: on the night of the 13th October, 2012, the applicant got in a taxi with two other men, to 2 Connolly Court, Connolly Street, Cavan with the intention of availing of the services of a prostitute. He entered the building with just one of the men, already inside the apartment was the deceased, Mr. Catalin Cretu and two women, Ms. Florentina Sotir, who gave evidence at trial, and another named “Stropp”, who was never found by Gardaí.

9

The taxi driver, a Mr. Gary Malone gave evidence of the applicant and his friend discussing a “Soviet attack” while in the taxi, a term which was explained by the applicant during his interviews with Gardaí as being one used by Polish people when they want to fight and be aggressive. Mr. Malone also gave evidence that the men were discussing an allegation against the deceased that he had sexually abused children and that the applicant had a long object concealed in a sock in his left hand. Mr. Malone said the men got out of the taxi and he saw the applicant bang on the front door of the apartment...

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