Express Motor Assessors Ltd [(in Liquidation)] v Revenue Commissioners

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Conor Dignam
• Judgment Date: 18 December 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 733
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: Record No. 2020/89R

Between

Express Motor Assessors Limited (In Liquidation)

Appellant

and

Revenue Commissioners

Respondent

[2025] IEHC 733

Record No. 2020/89R

THE HIGH COURT

REVENUE

Case stated – Emoluments – Evidence – Appellant appealing by way of case stated from the Tax Appeals Commission pursuant to s. 949AQ of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 – Whether the Appeal Commissioner erred in failing to identify the records upon which he based his conclusion

Facts: The appellant, Express Motor Assessors Ltd (the company), went into voluntary liquidation on 11 November 2016. Following a Revenue audit in relation to the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016, the respondent, the Revenue Commissioners (the Revenue), raised an assessment for additional liabilities on the company in respect of VAT and PAYE/PRSI/USC for 2015 and 2016. The assessments were appealed by the company. Following a hearing before the Appeal Commissioner, Revenue accepted that there was not an additional liability in respect of VAT. The Appeal Commissioner held in favour of the company in relation to certain items but determined that the net amounts of €5,939 in 2015 and €21,008 in 2016 in relation to mileage paid to the director were emoluments paid to the director and were subject to PAYE/PRSI/USC and to employers PRSI by the company. The company's appeal to the High Court by way of case stated from the Tax Appeals Commission pursuant to s. 949AQ of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 only concerned those amounts. The company’s case was that the Appeal Commissioner erred in his analysis and findings and that he misdirected himself in respect of the evidence. It was also claimed that the Appeal Commissioner’s determination suffered from a number of specific errors, which were mixed questions of fact and law, in respect of the amounts of €5,939 and €21,008 respectively.

Held by Dignam J that the Appeal Commissioner erred in failing to identify the “prime records” upon which he based his conclusion. He held that the company was entitled to know the evidence which the Appeal Commissioner relied on in reaching the conclusion that it had failed to discharge the burden of proof. He held that the Court in being asked for its opinion as to whether the Appeal Commissioner was correct in law must know the evidence upon which the Appeal Commissioner’s conclusion was based; where the conclusion was stated to be based on evidence but that evidence was not identified, it was not possible to conclude that the Appeal Commissioner was correct or incorrect.

Dignam J held that the correct way to address that particular issue was to remit the matter back to the Appeal Commissioner. He noted that s. 949AR of the 1997 Act provides that the Court may, inter alia, reverse, affirm or amend the determination of the Appeal Commissioner or may remit the matter to the Appeal Commissioner with its opinion on the determination.

Matter remitted.

Judgment of Mr. Justice Conor Dignam delivered on the 18 ^th day of December 2025

INTRODUCTION

1 . This is an appeal by way of case stated from the Tax Appeals Commission pursuant to section 949AQ of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.

2 . The question that was stated for the opinion of the Court is:

“Whether or not I [the Appeal Commissioner] was correct in law in:

Determining in Paragraph 85(b) of the determination, having regard in particular to my analysis and findings and particularly those findings set out in paragraphs 29, 32 to 42 and 58 to 65

“ That the net amount of €5,939 in 2015 and €21,008 in 2016 in relation to mileage paid to the director to be emoluments paid to the director, and are subject to PAYE/PRSI/USC and to employers PRSI by the Appellant.””

3 . The background is as follows.

4 . Express Motor Assessors Limited was a motor assessor company specialising in accident damage reporting. I will refer to it as “Express Motors” or “the company”. The company's directors were Mr. Donal G. Daly and Mrs Mary Daly. Mr. Daly was also an employee of the company. So also was Ms. Annette Grayson, Mr. Daly's daughter. The company went into voluntary liquidation on the 11 ^th November 2016. Mr. Stephen Doran is the liquidator. Mr. Doran prosecuted the appeal before the Appeal Commissioner and this appeal by way of case stated.

5 . Following a Revenue audit in relation to the calendar years 2014, 2015 and 2016, the respondent (“the Revenue”) raised an assessment for additional liabilities on the company in respect of VAT and PAYE/PRSI/USC for 2015 and 2016. The assessments were appealed by the company. Following the hearing before the Appeal Commissioner, the Revenue Commissioners accepted that there was not an additional liability in respect of VAT. Thus, the Appeal Commissioner only had to deal with the liability in respect of PAYE/PRSI/USC. The Appeal Commissioner held in favour of the company in relation to certain items but determined that the net amounts of €5,939 in 2015 and €21,008 in 2016 in relation to mileage paid to the director were emoluments paid to the director and are subject to PAYE/PRSI/USC and to employers PRSI by the company. This case stated only concerns those amounts.

APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

6 . There was no dispute about the meaning of emoluments or whether such emoluments are chargeable to tax. Nor was there any real dispute between the parties as to the applicable principles.

7 . The burden of proof in a tax appeal before the Tax Appeals Commission is on the taxpayer. In Menolly Homes v Appeal Commissioners [2010] IEHC 49, Charleton J said:

“…the burden of proof “that the amount due is excessive” rests on the taxpayer. This reversal of the burden of proof onto the taxpayer is common to all forms of taxation appeals in Ireland. Powers are given to the inspector to be present, to produce evidence and to give reasons in support of the assessment. The Appeal Commissioners, if the taxpayer proves over-charging, must abate or reduce the assessment accordingly, but otherwise an order must be made that the assessment shall stand…

… The burden of proof in this appeal process is, as in all taxation appeals, on the taxpayer. This is not a plenary civil hearing. It is an enquiry by the Appeal Commissioners as to whether the taxpayer has shown that the relevant tax is not payable. The absence of mutuality in this form of appeal procedure is illustrated by the decision of Gilligan J. in T.J. v. Criminal Assets Bureau, [2008] IEHC 168. While the appeal in question there concerned income tax, the observations made in the course of the judgment as to the nature of a tax appeal are germane to deciding this issue. The applicant in that case was assessed for income tax by a tax inspector assigned to the Criminal Assets Bureau. He was assessed to tax on a large amount of income from apparently mysterious sources. Invoking his statutory right of appeal in those circumstances, the applicant sought disclosure of all information on which the assessment was made. Referring to the Revenue Customer Service Charter, the court noted that there was a self-imposed obligation on the Revenue Commissioners to give all relevant information whereby the taxpayer would understand his tax obligations. This did not extend, it was held by Gilligan J., to making an order for discovery. In taking the appeal, the taxpayer was undertaking the burden of appeal within the relevant formula as to the relief which he might be granted if successful. At para. 50 Gilligan J. stated:-

“The whole basis of the Irish taxation system is developed on the premise of self assessment. In this case, as in any case, the applicant is entitled to professional advice, which he has availed of, and he is the person who is best placed to prepare a computation required for self assessment on the basis of any income and/or gains that arose within the relevant tax period. In effect, the applicant is seeking discovery of all relevant information available to the respondents against a background where he has, by way of self assessment, set out what he knows or ought to know, is the income and gains made by him in the relevant period.””

8 . The principles applying to this Court's jurisdiction on a case stated on a question of law are also well-established.

9 . In Mara (Inspector of Taxes) v Hummingbird Limited [1982] ILRM 421, at 426, Kenny J said:

“The line between questions of law and those of fact can rarely be drawn firmly so as to separate one from the other.

A Case Stated consists in part of findings on questions of primary fact, e.g. with what intention did the taxpayers purchase the Baggot Street premises. These findings on primary facts should not be set aside by the Courts unless there was no evidence whatever to support them. The Commissioner then goes on in the Case Stated to give his conclusions or inferences from these primary facts. These are mixed questions of fact and law and the Court should approach these in a different way. If they are based on the interpretation of documents, the Court should reverse them if they are incorrect for it is in as good a position to determine the meaning of documents as is the Commissioner. If the conclusions from the primary facts are ones which no reasonable Commissioner could draw, the Court should set aside his findings on the ground that he must be assumed to have misdirected himself as to the law or made a mistake in reasoning. Finally, if his conclusions show that he has adopted a wrong view of the law, they should be set aside. If however they are not based on a mistaken view of the law or a wrong interpretation of documents, they should not be set aside unless the inferences which he made from the primary facts were ones that no reasonable Commissioner could draw.”

10 . In DA MacCarthaigh, Inspector of Taxes v Cablelink Limited [2003] 4 IR 510, the Supreme Court cited this passage and the summary of relevant principles set out by Blayney J in Ó Culacháin...