F (P) v Bord Uchtála

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: MR JUSTICE DECLANCOSTELLO
• Judgment Date: 13 December 1994
• Neutral Citation: 1995 WJSC-HC 680
• Date: 13 December 1994
• Court: High Court

1995 WJSC-HC 680

THE HIGH COURT

No.185 Sp/1994

F (P) v. BORD UCHTALA

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION ACTS 1952TO 1991

AND IN THE MATTER OF L.C.G. AN INFANT

BETWEEN

P. F. AND V. F.

Applicants

AND

AN BORD UCHTALA

Respondent

AND

L. G. AND J. C.

Notice Parties

Citations:

ADOPTION ACT 1974 S3

C (M) V C (K) 1985 ILRM 302

LEGITIMACY ACT 1931

Synopsis:

ADOPTION

Consent

Absence - Infant - Placement - Mother - Agreement - Change of mind - Marriage of mother and father - Legitimation of child - Best interests of child - Authority of adoption board to dispense with mother's consent - High Court order granted authority - Whether order of High Court in conflict with previous order of Supreme Court - Legitimacy Act, 1931, s. 1 - Adoption Act, 1974, s. 3 - (1994/185 Sp - Costello J. - 13/12/94)- [1994] 3 IR 500

|F. v. An Bord Uchtala|

HIGH COURT

Jurisdiction

Relief - Grant - Conflict - Supreme Court - Decision - Whether sufficient change of circumstances to warrant order of High Court - (1994/185 Sp - Costello J. - 13/12/94)- [1994] 3 IR 500

|F. v. An Bord Uchtala|

TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGMENT

1 DELIVERED BY THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE DECLANCOSTELLOON 13TH DECEMBER 1994

APPEARANCES

For the Applicants:

Gerard Durcan SC

Carmel Stewart BL

Instructed by

Brian Sheridan,

Finglas Law Centre

For the Respondent:

Nastaise Leddy BL

Instructed by

Michael A Buckley

For the Notice Parties:

Maire R. Whelan BL

Instructed by

Cunniffe & Co.

2 These proceedings have taken quite an extraordinary turn in the last week or so. Proceedings taken under the Adoption Acts to dispense with consent are not unusual, but the facts of this case have indicated a most extraordinary development. It came to the notice of the applicants (Mr and Mrs F.) that the notice parties (the father and mother of little L.) were intending to get married and an application was brought to restrain the marriage. I made an order restraining the marriage until after today's hearing on the basis that the court had jurisdiction so to do. I also made an order re-straining the re-registration of the child's birth under the provisions of the Legitimacy Act 1931.

3 The matter was immediately appealed by the notice parties. Having heard submissions and having obtained undertakings under oath from the notice parties that they would not seek an order for custody of the child, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court. That meant, in effect, that the application to prohibit the marriage was refused and that the application not to re-register the birth, should the marriage take place, was also refused.

4 I was asked to hear new evidence today with a view to making another interlocutory order. Having heard counsel, and in the absence of agreement as to the basis of the Supreme Court's decision, I came to the view that I could only construe the order of the Supreme Court as discharging my interlocutory order and that I would not be able to make a further interlocutory order. However, Mr Durcan (for the applicants) has submitted that, having heard all the evidence, the situation would be different. Mr Durcan submits that I would not then be bound by the order of the Supreme Court should the evidence satisfy me that an order by way of an injunction be granted. Andhaving heard very full evidence today, I am quite satisfied as to what is in the best interests of the child.

5 Little L. is only eleven years old. She has not seen her natural parents for over ten years and does not, of course, remember them at all. Various explanations have been given for that fact, explanations which I need not go into now, but the evidence of Dr Cummiskey makes it abundantly clear that it would be most dis-advantageous to the child for an adoption order not to be made.

6 To ensure that the welfare of this child is catered for, I must, I am quite satisfied, act in such a way as to fulfil what is my statutory and constitutional duty. It seems to me, therefore, that Mr Durcan is correct in his submission. If I come to the conclusion now, having heard all the evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child to make an order stopping the re-registration of the birth, I should do so, he submits, and that in making such an order I am not acting contrary to the order of the Supreme Court. He submits that my order can be reversed should there be an appeal and should it transpire that I should not have made the order. I am satisfied, therefore, that I have jurisdiction to make an order by way of injunction if it is in the best interests of the child that I do so and if, of course, I am legally entitled to make such an order.

7 As to the welfare...