Farrell v Attorney General

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1998
• Date: 01 January 1998
• Docket Number: [1995 No. 10 J.R. and S.C. Nos. 95 and 187 of 1997]
• Court: Supreme Court

High Court

Supreme Court

[1995 No. 10 J.R. and S.C. Nos. 95 and 187 of 1997]

Farrell v. Attorney General

Brian Farrell

Applicant

and

The Attorney General

Respondent

Cases mentioned in this report:-

Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission[1968] 2 Q.B. 862; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 382; [1967] 2 All E.R. 986.

Davitt v. Minister for Justice(Unreported, High Court, Barron J., 8th February, 1989).

Greene v. MacLoughlin(Unreported, Supreme Court, 26th January, 1995).

Minister for Industry and Commerce v. Hales[1967] I.R. 50.

O'Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39.

R. v. Carter (1876) 45 L.J.Q.B. 711.

R. v. South London Coroner, ex parte Thompson(1982) 126 S.J. 625.

Reg. v. Federal Steam Navigation[1974] 1 W.L.R. 505; [1974] 2 All E.R. 97.

The State (Costello) v. Bofin[1980] I.L.R.M. 233.

The State (Holland) v. Kennedy [1977] I.R. 193.

Judicial review - Certiorari - Power of Attorney General to direct that fresh inquest be held - Circumstances where such direction may be given - Whether such direction ultra vires and unreasonable in law - Whether irrelevant considerations taken into account - Unfair procedures - Coroners Act, 1962 (No. 9), s. 17, s. 24 (1), s. 30.

Coroners Court - Inquest - Power of Attorney General to direct that fresh inquest be held - Exercise of power - Coroners Act, 1962 (No. 9), s. 24 (1).

Judicial review.

The facts have been summarised in the headnote and are fully set out in the judgments of Smyth and Keane JJ., infra.

The High Court (Geoghegan J.) granted the applicant leave to apply for relief by way of judicial review on the 16th January, 1995. In the statement grounding the application, the applicant sought,inter alia, an order of certiorariand a declaration by way of judicial review that s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962, was invalid, void and ineffective.

Following the filing of a statement of opposition by the respondent on the 27th February, 1995, the application was heard by the High Court (Murphy J.) on the 11th July, 1995. The High Court granted an order of certiorariand an order for the costs of the application on the grounds that s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962 did not empower the respondent to hold an inquest as long as an inquest and a verdict given by the existing city coroner remained valid and unimpeached. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the hearing was unsatisfactory by reason of the addition by the learned trial judge of his own volition of a new ground to the application without giving the respondent an opportunity to respond thereto and that the trial judge did not deal in his judgment with the original grounds of the application. The applicant cross-appealed and by an order of the Supreme Court (Hamilton C.J., O'Flaherty, Blayney, Barrington and Keane JJ.), dated the 30th July, 1996, the order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for a new hearing. By the consent of the parties the applicant's grounds of application were amended to include an additional ground that s. 24 (1) of the Coroners Act, 1962, does not confer upon the respondent authority to direct any coroner to hold an inquest in relation to the death of any person into whose death an inquest has already been held.

The application was heard by the High Court (Smyth J.) on the 14th November, 1996.

By way of notice of appeal dated the 14th March, 1997, the respondent appealed to the Supreme Court. A cross-appeal was filed on the 9th June, 1997.

The appeal and cross-appeal were heard by the Supreme Court (Hamilton C.J., Barrington and Keane JJ.) on the 24th October, 1997.

Section 24 (1) of the Coroners Act, 1962, provides as follows:-

"Where the Attorney General has reason to believe that a person has died in circumstances which in his opinion make the holding of an inquest advisable he may direct any coroner (whether or not he is the coroner who would ordinarily hold the inquest) to hold an inquest in relation to the death of that person and that coroner shall proceed to hold an inquest in accordance with the provisions of this Act (and as if, not being the coroner who would ordinarily hold the inquest, he were such coroner) whether or not he or any other coroner has viewed the body, made any inquiry, held any inquest in relation to or done any other act in connection with the death."

Section 30 of the same Act provides:-

"Questions of civil or criminal liability shall not be considered or investigated at an inquest and accordingly every inquest shall be confined to ascertaining the identity of the person in relation to whose death the inquest is being held and how, when, and where the death occurred."

The applicant carried out an inquest with a jury into the death of one T.D., which occurred in St. Vincent's Hospital, Dublin. The verdict of the jury was recorded, but dissatisfaction was expressed by the wife of the deceased in subsequent correspondence with the respondent. By letter the respondent informed her that he did not consider a further inquest was necessary, having carefully reviewed all the relevant materials.

Following further representations on behalf of the wife of the deceased, a second inquest was ordered by the respondent pursuant to s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962. The stated reason for ordering the second inquest was the failure of the applicant to disclose evidence to the jury concerning the nature of the deceased's allergy to penicillin. The applicant sought to have the decision of the respondent quashed.

It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962 purported to confer on a non-judicial personage a judicial power and therefore violated Article 34.1 of the Constitution. It was further submitted that the exercise of the respondent's statutory powers under s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962 was unreasonable in law andultra viresin that there were no circumstances in which the respondent could have concluded that the holding of a fresh inquest was necessary, as evidence of the nature of the deceased's allergy to penicillin had been expressly disclosed to the jury.

Held by Smyth J., in directing that the decision to hold a second inquest be quashed, 1, that s. 24 did not confer upon the respondent authority to direct any coroner to hold an inquest in relation to the death of any person into whose death an inquest had already been held so long as the inquest and the verdict therefrom remained unimpeached by the appropriate legal process.

2. That the inquest conducted by the applicant had been conducted in accordance with law and the provisions of the Coroners Act, 1962.

3. That the decision of the respondent to direct that a new inquest be held pursuant to s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962 was unreasonable and ultra viresin that there were no reasons advanced by the respondent that would objectively justify the necessity to hold a second inquest.

4. That the reason advanced by the respondent for directing that a second inquest be held, namely that certain evidence had not been disclosed to the jury, was an irrelevant consideration as that evidence had been expressly disclosed to the jury.

5. That the allegation that the respondent had not followed fair procedures was not sustainable as the respondent had transmitted sufficient information to the applicant to enable him to respond appropriately.

6. That it was unnecessary to decide the question of the constitutionality of the Act of 1962.

Held by the Supreme Court (Hamilton C.J., Barrington and Keane JJ.), in dismissing the appeal, 1, that there was no requirement that the verdict of the first inquest be quashed before the respondent could order a second inquest under s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962. The second verdict would supersede the first.

2. That there was no material before the respondent which justified him in reversing his earlier decision not to direct the holding of a fresh inquest. The decision of the respondent to direct a fresh inquest was unreasonable and ultra vireshis powers under s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962.

Per curiam: The power of the respondent to direct the holding of a fresh inquest under s. 24 (1) of the Act of 1962 was not intended to be conditional on the assent or dissent of any other person.

3. That where it was alleged that a decision-making body had acted so unreasonably as to justify the court quashing the decision on grounds of unreasonableness, it was clear it must be established that the decision-making authority had before it no relevant material which would support its decision.

O'Keeffe v. An Bord Pleanála [1993] 1 I.R. 39 approved.

4. That there was no breach of fair procedures in that the respondent had fully communicated to the applicant all the matters that were causing him concern in relation to the holding by him of the second inquest.

Cur. adv. vult.

Smyth J. 30th January, 1997

This case concerns the extent of the powers of the respondent under the provisions of s. 24 (1) of the Coroners Act, 1962. That section reads as follows:-

"(1) Where the Attorney General has reason to believe that a person has died in circumstances which in his opinion make the holding of an inquest advisable he may direct any coroner (whether or not he is the coroner who would ordinarily hold the inquest) to hold an inquest in relation to the death of that person, and that coroner shall proceed to hold an inquest in accordance with the provisions of this Act (and as if, not being the coroner who would ordinarily hold the inquest, he were such coroner) whether or not he or any other coroner has viewed the body, made any inquiry, held any inquest in relation to or done any other act in connection with the death."

The applicant sought and obtained leave to bring these proceedings by way of judicial review for both certiorariand declaration.

In December, 1992, the applicant conducted an inquest with a jury into the death of one Thomas Doherty under the provisions...