Ferndale Films Ltd v Granada Television Ltd
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | BLAYNEY J. |
| Judgment Date | 20 July 1993 |
| Neutral Citation | 1993 WJSC-SC 3520 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
| Docket Number | [S.C. No. 110 of 1993] |
| Date | 20 July 1993 |
1993 WJSC-SC 3520
THE SUPREME COURT
Finlay C.J.
Egan J.
Blayney J.
and
Citations:
BRUSSELS CONVENTION ART 2
JURISDICTION OF COURTS & ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES) ACT 1988 S3(1)
BRUSSELS CONVENTION ART 5
DE BLOOS V BOUYER 1976 ECR 1497
SHENAVAI V KREISCHER 1987 ECR 239
UNIDARE PLC V JAMES SCOTT LTD 1991 2 IR 88
HANBRIDGE SERVICES LTD V AEROSPACE COMMUNICATIONS LTD UNREP SUPREME 10.3.93
BRUSSELS CONVENTION ART 5(1)
BRUSSELS CONVENTION ART 21(6)
Synopsis:
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Contract
Breach - Action - Trial - High Court - Jurisdiction - Test applicable - Obligation upon which claim based - Place of performance of obligation - Distribution and exploitation of cinematograph film by defendants - Failure to collect licence fees - Distribution rights exercisable outside Ireland - Place of performance outside Ireland - Jurisdiction of Courts and Enforcement of Judgments (European Communities) Act, 1988, s. 3; 1st schedule, articles 2, 5 - (110/93 - Supreme Court - 20/7/93)
|Ferndale Films Ltd. v. Granada Television Ltd.|
HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction
Contract - Breach - Action - Defendant - Obligation - Performance - Place - Distribution and exploitation of film outside Ireland - Test of obligation upon which action based - Place of performance of obligation - (110/93 - Supreme Court - 20/7/93) [1993] 3 I.R. 368
|Ferndale Films Ltd. v. Granada Television Ltd.|
CONTRACT
Performance
Place - High Court - Jurisdiction - Defendant - Obligation - Distribution and exploitation of film outside Ireland - Test of obligation upon which action based - Place of performance of obligation - (110/93 - Supreme Court - 20/7/93) - [1993] 3 I.R. 368
|Ferndale Films Ltd. v. Granada Television Ltd.|
JUDGMENT delivered on the 20th day of July 1993by BLAYNEY J. [NEM DISS]
The plaintiff company, which is the respondent in this appeal, (to which I shall refer as Ferndale) is the company which made the very well-known and very successful film "My Left Foot". The film was produced for the first-named appellant (to which I shall refer as Granada) pursuant to a formal written agreement between Granada and Ferndale which is dated the 26th July, 1988.
Granada and the second-named appellant (to which I shallrefer as Granada International) are both companies registered and domiciled in England. In this action Ferndale claims against them a number of different reliefs but it is common case that essentially the claim is one for damages for breach of contract and may be treated assuch.
The appellants entered an appearance to the plenary summons solely to contest the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case and then brought a motion to have the case struck out. That motion was dismissed by Carney J. and the appellants have now appealed against that dismiss.
The appellants contend that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this case as neither of the appellants is domiciled within this jurisdiction. They rely on Art. 2 of the 1968 Brussels Conventionon Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (to which I shall refer as the Convention) which became part of our law by virtue of s. 3 subs. 1 of the Jurisdiction of Courts and Enforcement ofJudgments (European Communities) Act, 1988. Art. 2 of the Convention provides as follows:-
"Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State."
In cases of contract, however, this general rule is subject to the exception contained in Art. 5 sub-Art. 1 of the Convention which provided as follows:-
"Article 5. A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued:
1.in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question;".
The learned trial judge held that Ferndale's proceedings come within this exception and on that ground he dismissed the appellants"motion. The issue on this appeal is whether he was correct in doing so. It is an extremely net issue, the sole question being whether the proceedings issued by Ferndale come within Art. 5 sub-Art. 1 ornot.
There was no dispute between the parties as to how the relevant sub-Article should be construed. Counsel for both sides agreed that the manner in which it should be interpreted was to be found in two decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities DeBloos v. Bouyer 1976 E.C.R. 1497 and Shenavai v. Kreischer 1987 E.C.R. 239.
In the De Bloos case, the Court said in its judgment at p. 1508 (paras. 11 to 14):
2 "11. ... the word "obligation" in the Article refers to the contractual obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings.
12. This interpretation is, moreover, clearly confirmed by the Italian and German versions of the Article.
13. It follows that for the purposes of determining the place of performance within the meaning of Article 5, quoted above, the obligation to be taken into account is that which corresponds to the contractual right on which the plaintiff's action is based.
14. In a case where the plaintiff asserts the right to be paid damages or seeks a dissolution of the contract on the ground of the wrongful conduct of the other party, the obligation referred to in Article 5(1) is still that which arises under the contract and the non-performance of which is relied upon to support suchclaims."
In Shenavai v. Kreischer the Court said in its judgment at p. 256 (paras. 17 to 19):
2 "17. "When no such particularities exist, (i.e. the particularities to be found in contracts of employment) it is neither necessary nor appropriate to identify the obligation which characterises the contract and to centralize at the place of performance thereof jurisdiction, based on place of performance, over disputes concerning all the obligations under the contract. The variety and multiplicity of contracts as a whole are such that the above criterion might in those other cases create uncertainty as to jurisdiction whereas it is precisely such uncertainty which the Convention is designed toreduce.
18. On the other hand no such uncertainty exists for most contracts if regard is had solely to the contractual obligation whose performance is sought in the judicial proceedings. The place in which that obligation is to be performed usually constitutes the closest connecting factor between the dispute and the Court having jurisdiction over it, and it is this connecting factor which explains why, in contractual matters, it is the Court of the place of performance of the obligation which has jurisdiction.
19. Admittedly, the above rule does not afford a solution in the particular case of a dispute concerned with a number of obligations arising under the same contract and forming the basis of the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff. However, in such a case the Court before which the matter is brought will, when determining whether it has jurisdiction, be guided by the maxim accessorium sequitur principale; in other words, where various obligations are at issue, it will be the principal obligation which will determine its jurisdiction."
Counsel for Ferndale also referred to two recent decisions of this Court in which the relevant sub-Article was considered: Unidare Plc v. James Scott Limited 1991 2 I.R. 88 and Hanbridge Services Limited v. Aerospace Communications Limited, an unreported judgment delivered on the 10th...
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