Gaultier v Four Judges of the Court of Appeal and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty
• Judgment Date: 30 May 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 334
• Year: 2025
• Docket Number: [2025 No. 29 IA]

Between

Arnaud Gaultier

Applicant

and

Four Judges of the Court of Appeal, Ireland and The Attorney General

Proposed Respondents

[2025] IEHC 334

[2025 No. 29 IA]

THE HIGH COURT

Judicial review – Quo warranto – Leave – Applicant seeking leave to pursue a judicial review claim for quo warranto – Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the application

Facts: The proposed respondents included four Judges of the Court of Appeal. The applicant, Mr Gaultier, sought the relief of quo warranto against the four Judges. His stated basis for that remedy was that they had infringed, knowingly, his constitutional right to his good name which infringement was incompatible with their oath of office. The applicant submitted that the remedy can be used to ensure that those who breach the oath they took on appointment can be removed from office. The applicant argued that he did not seek to review the decisions of those Judges, but sought to depose them due to their bad faith in respect of an interpretation they took of an email he sent to an opposing party in litigation. He argued that there was no process available to him to challenge their finding and that there was no effective remedy for mala fides in the judiciary. He submitted that the quo warranto remedy was the appropriate remedy to use.

Held by the High Court (Gearty J) that the applicant’s characterisation of the application as an attempt to use the remedy of quo warranto was misleading. Gearty J noted that, after a judgment which criticised the applicant for making repeated, vexatious applications to relitigate matters which had already been decided against him, he had taken a sentence from that judgment and, having been unable to persuade any of the Judges who wrote the judgment to revisit it or rephrase the sentence, he had taken this case, seeking to persuade another judge in another court that he should have been allowed to argue the meaning of the phrase again, not only to change that decision but to remove the relevant Judges from office. Gearty J held that the applicant was not entitled to leave to seek to remove any judge or to review a decision of the Court of Appeal. She held that he was not entitled to make repeated applications in the same case; he was entitled to raise these issues in the Supreme Court by way of appeal and was also entitled to complain about the conduct of any individual judge. Gearty J held that no litigant has an untrammelled and infinite right of access to the courts. She held that the principle of finality in litigation is an important protection of the resources of the courts which allows other litigants to exercise their rights of access to justice. Gearty J held that the applicant had not satisfied her that he had arguable grounds for leave to seek any reliefs, citing G. v D.P.P. [1994] 1 I.R. 374. She saw no prospect of success for him. Gearty J noted that the applicant provided no support for the proposition that the High Court had jurisdiction to grant the reliefs sought. While the applicant used the word misconduct repeatedly, she found that his evidence fell far short of that serious state of affairs but she had no jurisdiction to hear the application in any event.

Gearty J refused leave to pursue a judicial review claim for quo warranto. Similarly, she refused leave to seek any of the other reliefs set out in the pleadings.

Leave refused.

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on the 30 ^th of May, 2025

1. Introduction

1.1 The proposed Respondents include four Judges of the Court of Appeal. The Applicant seeks the relief of Quo Warranto against the four Judges. His stated basis for this remedy is that they have infringed, knowingly, his constitutional right to his good name which infringement is incompatible with their oath of office. Quo Warranto is a very rarely used remedy, which requires an official to show the authority on which she purports to act. The Applicant submits that the remedy can also be used to ensure that those who breach the oath they took on appointment can be removed from office.

1.2 This Court has no authority to remove any judges of the Court of Appeal. The Applicant argues that he does not seek to review the decisions of these Judges, but seeks to depose them due to their bad faith in respect of an interpretation they took of an email he sent to an opposing party in litigation. He argues that there is no process available to him to challenge their finding and that there is no effective remedy for mala fides in the judiciary. He submits that the quo warranto remedy is the appropriate remedy to use.

1.3 The Applicant has not established any legal basis on which this Court can review a decision of the Court of Appeal on its facts or depose judges due to their decisions or their conduct, which is what this Court is invited to do, albeit characterised as a quo warranto application. The Applicant is not entitled to be granted leave to judicially review the proposed Respondents. Impeachment of a judge is a matter for the Oireachtas and complaints in respect of judicial conduct may be made to the Judicial Council. There is no evidence of fraud which would justify any kind of enquiry into the case.

2. Quo Warranto

2.1 Quo warranto literally means “by what authority?” and is a challenge to the appointment of the judge rather than an argument in respect of a decision made by that judge. The remedy of quo warranto is described by Collins and O'Reilly, in their text Civil Proceedings and the State, as a civil proceeding lying against a person who claims or usurps any office or privilege of a public nature, directing them to show by what authority they support their claim to that position (see the 3 ^rd edition, 2019, at paragraph 5.65).

2.2 In R. (Moore) v Moriarty [1915] 2 IR the court considered quo warranto to be an appropriate procedure to use in cases where the ground of challenge was the lack of qualification for office of the person appointed, but the remedy has been rarely invoked, as set out by Browne in The Law of Local Government (2 ^nd ed, 2020) at paragraph 6–546.

2.3 The Law Reform Commission's 1979 Working Paper (‘The Problem of Remedies’) recommended that the remedy of quo warranto be abolished and reiterated that view in its 2004 Report on Judicial Review Procedure, writing at paragraph 5.14:

“ The Commission is satisfied that the remedy of quo warranto no longer serves any purpose and should any cases arise in future which would formerly have been dealt with by way of quo warranto, the extant remedies of declaration and injunction would be sufficient to remedy the complaint. The Commission therefore reiterates the recommendation in its 1979 Working Paper on Judicial Review that the remedy of quo warranto be abolished.”

2.4 In Glynn v Roscommon County Council (1959) 93 ILTR 149, many years earlier, commenting on a rate collector who did not have the required educational qualifications for one in his position, the Court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to seek declarations to that effect, which was more convenient than proceeding by quo warranto.

2.5 The Applicant did not direct my attention to any law or case relevant to the process other than the Quo Warranto Act of 1798, in which a particular defence to such a challenge was described: in short, when a challenge is made by way of quo warranto against an office holder, it is a defence if he was appointed more than 6 years before the challenge.

2.6 It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that, in this case, the Judges in question were publicly appointed by the Government, which appointments were published in Iris Oifigiúil, they have each taken an oath in public and they perform their functions in public. There has been no evidence to suggest that these judges were not appointed in accordance with law. The Applicant in oral submissions accepted that he was not seeking proof of the appointment of the Judges but was submitting that because of their conduct in the Court of Appeal, they have infringed his rights and thereby, to use his words, vacated their office. I take this to mean that the Applicant submits not only that I have lawful authority to remove another judge from office but that even in the absence of my deciding to do so, they have already vacated their office even without an order to that effect. No authority is cited to support this proposition, nor does the Applicant explain how this could be consistent with the Constitution.

2.7 While the remedy of quo warranto may still exist, as the Applicant submits, it is neither useful nor relevant in this context. Rather than waste time on what is, essentially, an obsolete remedy, and one on which the Applicant expressly does not rely insofar as quo warranto relates only to the manner of appointment, the remainder of this judgment deals with the core claim. That claim is that the High Court may intervene in a case where it is claimed that judges have acted mala fides and a related challenge to the Judicial Council Act 2019 on the basis that there is no effective process whereby a judge can be removed.

3. Challenging the Validity of a Judicial Tribunal: EU Law

3.1 The Applicant asked me to consider the recently delivered opinion of Advocate General Spielman, delivered on 10 April 2025 in Case C-225/22 ‘R’ S.A. v AW ‘T’. There, the Applicant argued that, due to irregularities in connection with their appointment as judges in the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, a Polish court did not constitute a tribunal established by law within the meaning of EU law. The case involves consideration of the legal status of the decisions of courts which are irregularly constituted and the possibility of reviewing the decisions of such courts. The Advocate General's opinion confirms that the validity of judicial appointments is a matter of EU concern and a justiciable issue. At para 52, he...