Greaney v The Director of Public Prosecutions and Ors

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr Justice Cian Ferriter
• Judgment Date: 18 December 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 731
• Docket Number: Record No. 2024/1122/JR

Between:

Conor Greaney

Applicant

and

The Director of Public Prosecutions the Minister for Justice Ireland

and

The Attorney General

Respondents

[2025] IEHC 731

Record No. 2024/1122/JR

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial review – Mitigation – Constitutionality – Applicant seeking an order quashing a decision refusing to consent to the applicant being sent forward from the District Court to the Circuit Criminal Court – Whether s. 13(2A) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 was unconstitutional

Facts: The applicant, Mr Creaney, applied to the High Court seeking an order quashing a decision of the first respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP), refusing to consent to the applicant being sent forward from the District Court to the Circuit Criminal Court in respect of a charge under s. 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 on a signed plea of guilty. The applicant's case was that he was being arbitrarily deprived of the opportunity of benefiting from a one-third reduction of sentence by the DPP's refusal to consent to him going forward to the Circuit Criminal Court on a signed plea. The foundation for that case was the contention that the Court of Appeal in DPP v Cambridge [2019] IECA 133 confirmed that an accused upon entering a signed plea is entitled to the benefit of mitigation of a third reduction in sentence. He pleaded that he had been denied access to the benefit of that mitigation by refusal of the DPP to consent to a proffered signed plea which he maintained would lead him to being confined to lesser mitigation on entering a guilty plea in the Circuit Court. He contended that the DPP's refusal to accept the applicant’s offer of a signed plea was an interference in the administration of justice and the function of the judiciary. He contended, in the alternative, that s. 13(2A) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 was unconstitutional insofar as it operated to deprive him of the opportunity of benefiting from mitigation of up to one-third reduction in sentence, in violation of his right to have a fair trial in due course of law.

Held by the Court that the applicant had not demonstrated any sustainable basis for apprehending that he would not be tried in accordance with law, including at sentencing stage. The Court held that there was no basis in law to presume that the absence of a signed plea of guilty at District Court stage was going to disadvantage him at sentencing stage when he had indicated at the earliest stage in the District Court proceedings a firm intention to plead guilty to the s. 3 charge. The Court proceeded on the basis that the remainder of the applicant’s criminal proceedings would be conducted in accordance with law; no exceptional circumstances for intervening in those proceedings had been made out. The Court noted that the applicant accepted that he could not press his constitutional case in light of Galvin v DPP [2025] IESC 35. The Court thought that was an appropriate stance given that the applicant would inevitably fall foul of the prematurity concerns which led the Supreme Court to dismiss the applicant's case in Galvin.

The Court refused the applicant the relief he sought.

Application refused.

Judgment of Mr Justice Cian Ferriter delivered on 18 December 2025

Introduction

1 In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant seeks an order quashing a decision of the DPP refusing to consent to the applicant being sent forward from the District Court to the Circuit Criminal Court in respect of a charge under s.3 Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 on a signed plea of guilty.

Background

2 The material background to the matter is as follows. On 8 March 2024, the applicant was arrested and charged with assault contrary to s.3 Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 (“the s.3 charge”) in respect of an assault alleged to have occurred in Cork City Centre on the previous day. The statements gathered by the prosecutor suggested that the assault had been an unprovoked and serious one resulting in the victim sustaining a fractured ankle. On 9 March 2024, the applicant appeared before a special sitting of Cork District Court and was refused bail. He was remanded in custody from time to time over the course of the next number of months. He indicated to his solicitor on 13 March 2024 that he wished to enter a guilty plea in respect of the s.3 charge. The matter was listed in the Cork District Court on 27 March 2024 and was adjourned on that date, and a number of subsequent dates, pending the DPP's directions.

3 On 2 July 2024, the DPP directed that the matter proceed on indictment. The applicant's solicitor indicated to the District Court on that date that the applicant wished to proceed by way of a signed plea of guilty. The DPP refused to give consent to the applicant going forward to the Circuit Criminal Court on a signed plea. The applicant's solicitor submitted that the applicant was being refused access to the benefit of mitigation usually available to a party going forward on a signed plea. It appears that a book of evidence was subsequently served and the applicant was sent forward for trial from the District Court to Cork Circuit Criminal Court on 7 August 2024 with a return date in October 2024.

4 In early September 2024, the applicant obtained leave from the High Court to apply for judicial review of the DPP's decision to refuse to consent to sending him forward for trial in the Circuit Criminal Court on a signed guilty plea. The applicant's case before the Circuit Criminal Court has been adjourned from time to time pending the outcome of these judicial review proceedings.

Relevant statutory provisions

5 Iti is necessary to set out some statutory provisions of relevance to this case.

6 Section 4A Criminal Procedure At 1967 provides that:

• (1) Where an accused person is before the District Court charged with an indictable offence, the Court shall send the accused forward for trial to the court before which he is to stand trial (the trial court) unless—

  • (a) the case is being tried summarily,

  • (b) the case is being dealt with under section 13, or

• (2) The accused shall not be sent forward for trial under subsection (1) without the consent of the prosecutor.

• (3) Where the prosecutor refuses to give a consent required under subsection (2) in relation to an indictable offence, the District Court shall strike out the proceedings against the accused in relation to that offence.[…]

7 Section 13(2) and (2A) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967, as amended, provide that an accused shall not be sent forward for sentence on a signed guilty plea without the consent of the prosecutor. The material provisions of s.13 are as follows:

13. (2) If at any time the District Court ascertains that a person charged with an offence to which this section applies wishes to plead guilty and the court is satisfied that he understands the nature of the offence and the facts alleged, the Court—

• (a) may, with the consent of the prosecutor, deal with the offence summarily, in which case the accused shall be liable to the penalties provided for in subsection (3), or

• (b) if the accused signs a plea of guilty, may, subject to subsection (2A), send him forward for sentence with that plea to that court to which, but for that plea, he would have been sent forward for trial.

(2A) The accused shall not be sent forward for sentence under this section without the consent of the prosecutor. […]

8 Section 29 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1999 provides as follows:

“In determining what sentence to pass on a person who has pleaded guilty to an offence, other than an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law, a court, if it considers it appropriate to do so, shall take into account: (a) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the person indicated an intention to plead guilty, and (b) the circumstances in which this indication was given.”

The applicant's case

9 The applicant seeks an order of certiorari quashing the DPP's decision of 2 July 2024 refusing consent to the applicant being sent forward to the Circuit Criminal Court with the benefit of a signed plea of guilty and a related declaration that the DPP acted in breach of the applicant's constitutional right to a fair hearing and trial in due course of law. He also pleads in the alternative that he is entitled to a declaration that the DPP was obliged to provide reasons for the refusal to give consent to the signed plea going forward. He seeks an order remitting the matter to the District Court with a direction, in substance, to accept the applicant's signed plea or an order directing the Circuit Court to give effect to the applicant's signed plea.

10 The nub of the applicant's case, as set out in his statement of grounds, is that he is being arbitrarily deprived of the opportunity of benefiting from a one-third reduction of sentence by the DPP's refusal to consent to him going forward to the Circuit Criminal Court on a signed plea. The foundation for that case is the contention in his statement of grounds that the Court of Appeal in DPP v Cambridge [2019] IECA 133 (“ Cambridge”) “confirmed that an accused upon entering a signed plea is entitled to the benefit of mitigation of a third reduction in sentence.” He pleads that he has been denied access to the benefit of this mitigation by refusal of the DPP to consent to a proffered signed plea which he maintains will lead him to being confined to lesser mitigation on entering a guilty plea in the Circuit Court.

11 In Cambridge, McCarthy J for the Court of Appeal noted (in the context of a sentencing appeal for a conviction under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 as amended), that “ we again take this opportunity of emphasising the special weight which should be attached to signed pleas whatever the state of the evidence. We think in the circumstances that...