Grian n an Aileach Interpretative Centre Company Ltd v Donegal County Council (No. 2)
 IESC 43
THE SUPREME COURT
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S3
GOUGH V NEARY
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S2
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S2(1)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S2(1)(C)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S2(1)(B)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S2(2)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (AMDT) ACT 1991 S2(3)
20th day of July 2004 byMcGuinness J.
I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Fennelly J. and I agree with his reasoning and the conclusion reached by him. I wish to add a few brief comments.
The factual background to the proceedings has been fully set out by Fennelly J. in his judgment. The plaintiff in her evidence in the High Court swore that she was unaware that the removal of her ovary by the first named defendant in 1991 had been unnecessary until she received the report of her independent medical expert, Dr. Porter, in April 2001. In the High Court Ó Caoimh J. held that the plaintiff's claim was not barred by the provisions of section 3 of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act, 1991. In so holding the learned High Court judge relied on the decision of this court in Gough v Neary.
In Gough v Neary it was held that the plaintiff in that case did not know that the hysterectomy performed on her by the defendant was unnecessary until late 1998. It was only when she discovered that the operation was unnecessary that time started to run for the purposes of the Statute. The relevant knowledge in that case included knowledge that the operation was unnecessary and that that knowledge did not exist more than three years before the commencement of the action. In his judgment Geoghegan J. stated (at page 65):-
"The plaintiff did not know that contrary to the false information given to her the hysterectomy was unnecessary until late 1998 or, indeed, some time after that when as a consequence of media coverage in relation to Dr. Neary and hysterectomies which he had carried out on a number of patients in connection with birth deliveries, she acquired the knowledge that the operation was unnecessary. That being so and in the absence of authorities, I would be of opinion that the plea of statute bar must fail."
In the present appeal senior counsel for the plaintiff relied heavily on the above passage in Gough v Neary.
In his judgment, in that case, however, Geoghegan J. went on to:-
"While it may not be necessary for the purposes of starting the statute to run to know enough detail to draft a statement of claim, a plaintiff in my opinion must know enough facts as would be capable of at least upon further elaboration of establishing a cause of action even if the plaintiff has no idea that those facts of which he has knowledge do in fact constitute a cause of action as that particular knowledge is irrelevant under the Act."
It is in this context that one must, in my view, consider and compare the facts of the two cases. It is accepted that in or about December 1998 there were widespread reports in the media in regard to unnecessary gynaecological operations which had been carried out by Dr. Neary. At the time of their respective operations both the plaintiff in Gough v Neary and the plaintiff in the present case had been assured on medical authority that the operations were necessary and they seem to have accepted that this was so. In Gough v Neary in seems clear that the plaintiff's "knowledge" that her operation was unnecessary derived solely from the December 1998 reports in the media. This was the fact that was "capable at least upon further elaboration of establishing a cause of action". There is no indication that she had an expert medical report available to her before she initiated proceedings against the defendant. Knowledge based on media reports rather than full medical knowledge was the "knowledge that her hysterectomy was unnecessary" which was held by this court to mark the point at which the Statute started to run.
In the present case also the plaintiff became aware of the media reports in or about December 1998. Even prior to that date, however, she had reason at least to question the necessity for the removal of her ovary. She had at an early stage queried the need for the operation and received no very satisfactory answer. In October 1998, when she underwent a hysterectomy in the Coombe Hospital, Dublin, her then gynaecologist raised critical queries about the scarring which had resulted from her previous operation carried out by the defendant and, as pointed out by Fennelly J. in his judgment, she was encouraged by a nurse to complain to the Medical Council about her general treatment by the defendant. It is significant that she wrote her letter of complaint to the Medical Council not in October1998, when she had her conversation with the nurse, but in December 1998 at the time of the media reports of which she was aware. In her letter she refers to the experiences of "many other women" and she also refers in her affidavit to her knowledge of these media reports.
Under cross examination in the High Court the plaintiff said that the reason she had not initiated proceedings in December 1998 was that she "had nothing to go on". While it is, of course, true that she had no definitive medical report indicating that the removal of her ovary was not necessary she had if anything rather more information available to her in December 1998 than had Mrs Gough. She had, in the words of Geoghegan J., "enough facts as would be capable at least upon further elaboration of establishing a cause of actionrdquo;. Nevertheless she did not consult her solicitor until May 2000.
It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that she as an ordinary lay person did not have the required medical knowledge to take immediate action in December 1998. It is perhaps understandable in the circumstances that she may have been hesitant about taking the step of consulting her solicitor. However, once she had done so she not only had the information already available to her but also had the benefit of legal advice. It must be presumed that this legal advice included knowledge of the operation of the Statute. In May 2000 proceedings initiated by the plaintiff would have been within the statutory limit.
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