Gritto & Ors -v- Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform,  IEHC 75 (2005)
|Docket Number:||2003 795 JR|
|Party Name:||Gritto & Ors, Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform|
Neutral Citation No.  IEHC 75
THE HIGH COURT
2003 795 JR
OVIDIU ERNO GRITTO, ANDREEA DANIELA MICU
AND DENISA GRITTO (A MINOR SUIING BY HER
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ANDREEA DANIELA MICU)
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
Judgment of Miss Justice Laffoy delivered 16th March, 2005.
In a judgment delivered on 27th May, 2004 I dealt with the applicants' application for leave to apply by way of judicial review for certain reliefs relating to deportation orders made by the respondent pursuant to s. 3(1) of the Immigration Act, 1999 (the Act of 1999),deporting the first and second named applicants. I refused the application. In this judgment I deal with an application by the applicants for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to s. 5(3)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000 (the Act of 2000), the application having been heard on 20th July, 2004. On that occasion, I had the benefit of written submissions on behalf of the applicants and oral submissions made by their counsel and also by counsel for the respondent.
By virtue of s. 5(3)(a) the determination of the court on the applicants' application for leave is final and no appeal lies therefrom to the Supreme Court except with the leave of this court. Section 5(3)(a) provides that - " leave shall only be granted where the High Court certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court." As was submitted on behalf of the applicants, the principles applicable to a consideration of whether a certificate should be granted are outlined in the judgment of this court in the case of Raiu v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal (Finlay Geoghegan J., 26th February, 2003, unreported). In particular, counsel for the applicants pointed to the conclusion in that case that the court must consider the point of law involved in its decision rather than its determination of that point of law. I agree that that is the correct approach. I also agree that -
(a) the requirement that the decision involve "a point of law of exceptional public importance" imposes a higher threshold than if the requirement merely related to "a point of law of public importance", and
(b) that that requirement and the additional requirement that the taking of the appeal should be "desirable in the public interest"...
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