GT v International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Marguerite Bolger
• Judgment Date: 28 March 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 220
• Docket Number: [Record No. 2025/ HJR/ 367]

Between

G.T.

Applicant

and

The International Protection Appeals Tribunal, The Chief International Protection Officer, The Minister for Justice and The Commissioner of An Garda Síochána

Respondents

[2025] IEHC 220

[Record No. 2025/ HJR/ 367]

THE HIGH COURT

Deportation – Injunction – International protection – Applicant seeking an injunction restraining his deportation – Whether the balance of convenience lay with the applicant being permitted to remain in the State while the proceedings were determined

Facts: The International Protection Office (IPO), by decision of 10 May 2023, refused the applicant’s application for international protection. By decision dated 27 March 2023, the first respondent, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT), refused the applicant’s appeal. A deportation order was made by the third respondent, the Minister for Justice (the Minister), on 31 May 2023. The applicant sought an injunction restraining the Minister and/or the fourth respondent, the Commissioner of An Garda Síochána, from taking any steps to deport him from the State, pending the determination of his judicial review proceedings. He relied on the following grounds: (i) the applicant’s application under s. 22 of the International Protection Act 2015 had automatic suspensive effect restraining deportation, pending the finalisation of the first instance stage of the s. 22 procedure - as the applicant challenged the IPO s. 22 decision in the proceedings, the first instance stage would not be finalised until the proceedings were determined, and accordingly the applicant had a right to remain in the State pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2005/85/EC; (ii) further or in the alternative, should the applicant be deported from the State prior to the determination of the proceedings, he would be at real risk of persecution and/or serious harm and/or refoulment, and otherwise not be able to take up any remedies pursuant to national and/or EU Law (and in particular the right to an effective remedy pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC); (iii) without prejudice to the foregoing, the balance of convenience lay with the applicant being permitted to remain in the State while the proceedings were determined; and (iv) as regards the interlocutory injunction, and bail as sought, it was submitted that damages would not be an adequate remedy and the balance of convenience lay in granting such interim and interlocutory relief as may be necessary.

Held by Bolger J that, in determining that the balance of convenience and least risk of injustice favoured refusing the applicant’s application for an injunction to restrain his deportation, she took account of the following: (1) the absence of evidence of a real risk of a breach to the applicant’s fundamental rights if he was returned to Georgia due to his particular circumstances, in relation to which Bolger J followed the decision of Phelan J (G.T. v Minister for Justice & ors (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 154); (2) the absence of any suspensive effect of a judicial review of the IPO or IPAT decisions; and (3) the possibility of the applicant’s return to the frontiers of the State from where he could process any subsequent application for international protection that he may be permitted to make in the event of a successful judicial review of the decisions of the IPO and IPAT impugned in the proceedings, and a successful outcome to any remittal of his s. 22 application to the IPO and/or IPAT.

Bolger J, therefore, refused the applicant’s application for an injunctive relief.

Application refused.

Counsel for the Applicant: Anthony Hanrahan SC, Siobhan Clabby BL

Counsel for the Respondents: David Conlon Smyth SC, Sarah Cooney BL

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Marguerite Bolger delivered on 28 ^th March 2025

1 . This judgment records my reasons for refusing the applicant's injunction application restraining his deportation order relating to a deportation order of 31 May 2023 which was scheduled to take place at 9.00am on 19 March 2023. The application was heard urgently, on notice, on the afternoon of 18 March.

2 . In his proceedings, the applicant also sought leave to judicial review both the decision of the IPO of 18 February 2025 refusing his application pursuant to s. 22 of the International Protection Act 2015 for the Minister's consent to make a subsequent application for international protection, and the decision of IPAT of 13 March 2025, refusing his appeal. This judgment only deals with the applicant's application for injunctive relief. His application for leave has been adjourned to the asylum list to be assessed at a later stage. Therefore, some of the applicant's submissions which relate to his challenge to the IPO and IPAT decisions are not addressed herein and remain to be considered in his application for leave.

3 . For the reasons set out below, I refused the application for an injunction restraining the applicant's deportation from taking place.

Background

4 . The applicant has made a number of applications pursuant to the 2015 Act since 2023, the details of which are set out in the very recent decision of Phelan J. of 14 March last between the same parties ( G.T. v. Minister for Justice & ors (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 154). In this judgment, I refer only to the main elements of that history. By decision of 10 May 2023, the IPO refused the applicant's application for international protection. By decision dated 27 March 2023, IPAT refused the applicant's appeal. A deportation order was made by the Minister on 31 May 2023, which remained extant as of the date of the within hearing. None of those decisions were challenged by the applicant.

5 . On 28 June 2023, the applicant made an application pursuant to s. 3(11) of the 2015 Act, on which a decision was made by the Minister on 12 March 2025. On 28 January 2025, the applicant was arrested and detained for the purpose of effecting the deportation order. On 12 February 2025, the applicant, through his current solicitors, made an application pursuant to s. 22 for consent to make a subsequent application for international protection, claiming, inter alia, that he had not been furnished with all the documents relevant to his application for international protection. The IPO refused this application on 18 February 2025 and the applicant appealed to IPAT on 19 February 2025 and sought an undertaking that he would not be deported pending his appeal. The Minister refused to give that undertaking and the applicant sought an injunction to restrain his deportation pending the appeal. An interlocutory injunction was granted by Simons J. on 27 February 2025. The full hearing of the injunction took place before Phelan J. on 11 March 2025, and judgment was delivered electronically on the morning of 14 March 2025. Injunctive relief was refused on the basis that s. 22 did not have suspensive effect pending the outcome of an appeal to IPAT. The evening before the delivery of that judgment, IPAT issued its decision on 13 March 2025 refusing the applicant's s. 22 appeal.

6 . The applicant's within application for leave seeks to challenge the IPO refusal of his s. 22 application and IPAT's refusal of his appeal therefrom, relying on what he says was a breach of his fair procedure rights arising from a failure to furnish all relevant documents to him, as a result of which he says he was unable to make full representations before the IPO and IPAT. He also contends that his complaints in relation to his previous representative in his 2023 application for international protection, who was a non-professionally qualified legal consultant, were not properly addressed by the IPO and IPAT. He criticises both decisions for failing to provide substantive reasons and failing to consider all his particular circumstances. Those submissions are primarily a matter for the applicant's substantive application for leave, and I reference them here to provide context to his injunction application that was moved before me.

The applicant's grounds for injunctive relief

7 . The applicant sought an injunction restraining the third and/or fourth respondents from taking any steps to deport him from the State, pending the determination of his judicial review proceedings. The grounds on which he relies are set out at paragraphs (i)(7)-(10) of the statement of grounds:-

“7. The Applicant's application under s.22 of the International Protection Act 2015 had automatic suspensive effect restraining deportation, pending the finalisation of the first instance stage of the s.22 procedure. As the Applicant challenges the IPO s.22 decision in the proceedings herein, the first instance stage will not be finalised until these proceedings are determined, and accordingly the Applicant has a right to remain in the State pursuant to Article 7 of Directive 2005/85/EC).

8. Further or in the alternative, should the Applicant be deported from the State prior to the determination of these proceedings, he would be at real risk of persecution and/or serious harm and/or refoulment, and otherwise not be able to take up any remedies pursuant to national and/or EU Law (and in particular the right to an effective remedy pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC).

9. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the balance of convenience lies with the Applicant being permitted to remain in the State while the proceedings herein are determined. The Applicant had presented cogent evidence of a risk of harm in Georgia should he be deported, and was not able to comment on material matters utilised in the decisions under challenge. If the Applicant were deported and at a later stage were to be successful in his challenge before this Honourable Court and subsequent s.22 application/appeal, this would not result in his readmission to the State, and he would remain at risk in Georgia. The Applicant has real fears of refoulment, persecution...