GT v Minister for Justice and Another [No.2]

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan
• Judgment Date: 14 March 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 154
• Docket Number: Record No. 2025 264 JR

Between

G.T.

Applicant

and

Minister for Justice and the Commissioner of an Garda Siochána

Respondents

and

The International Protection Appeals Tribunal

Notice Party

[2025] IEHC 154

Record No. 2025 264 JR

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Injunction – Deportation – International protection – Applicant seeking injunctive relief – Whether the existence of a pending appeal under s. 22(8) of the International Protection Act 2015 may ground the grant of an injunction restraining deportation in proceedings where no challenge was maintained to the validity of the deportation order the enforcement of which it was sought to restrain

Facts: The applicant, a Georgian national, applied to the High Court for an injunction pending a determination of an appeal under s. 22(8) of the International Protection Act 2015. He was a failed international protection seeker who sought the consent of the first respondent, the Minister for Justice (the Minister), to make a subsequent application for protection. The key question for determination was whether and in what circumstances the existence of a pending appeal under s. 22(8) may ground the grant of an injunction, as substantive relief, restraining deportation in proceedings where no challenge was maintained to the validity of the deportation order, the enforcement of which it was sought to restrain. As a preliminary issue, the Minister contended that the principal reliefs sought in the proceedings amounted to a collateral attack on the validity and enforcement of the unchallenged deportation order dated 31 May 2023. It was further maintained that, in consequence, any claim for such purported relief was subject to s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. Accordingly, the Minister maintained that the applicant was out of time to bring such a challenge. Separately, it was contended that any appeal against a decision to refuse relief in the proceedings must be subject to a requirement to obtain a certificate in accordance with s. 5(6) of the 2000 Act.

Held by Phelan J that the proceedings should not properly be categorised as a collateral attack on the deportation order made in May 2023, but were instead an application for protective measures pending the outcome of a subsequent international protection application as envisaged under Article 39(3)(b) of Council Directive 2005/85/EC, applying P.N.S. (Cameroon) v Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 11. It seemed to Phelan J as a matter of basic logic that if s. 5(2) of the 2000 Act has no application to an application for injunctive relief while a subsequent application is under consideration on appeal, it should follow that s. 5(6) also has no application. If Phelan J was correct in that view, then the applicant had an unfettered right of appeal against Phelan J’s decision on the application as proceedings for injunctive relief are not specified under s. 5(1) of the 2000 Act. Accordingly, Phelan J held that there was no necessity for a certificate granting leave to appeal on a point of law meeting the prescribed criteria under s. 5(6).

Phelan J held that, having noted that the applicant no longer appeared to maintain a claim of risk arising from criminal elements in Georgian society and no new material was advanced in relation to that element of his initial claim, he had not demonstrated that he was at real or substantial risk of a serious interference with fundamental rights which the State is obligated to protect were he returned to Georgia. As he did not meet the evidential threshold which applies to adequately ground the relief he sought, Phelan J held that the applicant’s application for injunctive relief must fail.

Relief refused.

JUDGMENT (No. 2) (Injunction) of Ms. Justice Siobhán Phelan, delivered on the 14 ^th day of March, 2025.

INTRODUCTION

1 . The matter comes before me on an application for an injunction pending a determination of an appeal under s. 22(8) of the International Protection Act, 2015 (as amended) (hereinafter “the 2015 Act”) in the case of a Georgian national who is a failed international protection seeker and who seeks the consent of the Minister to make a subsequent application for protection. The key question for me on this application is whether and in what circumstances the existence of a pending appeal under s. 22(8) of the 2015 Act may ground the grant of an injunction, as substantive relief, restraining deportation in proceedings where no challenge is maintained to the validity of the deportation order, the enforcement of which it is sought to restrain.

BACKGROUND

2 . The Applicant first claimed protection in the State on the 14 ^th of November, 2022. A preliminary interview was carried out under s. 13(2) of the 2015 Act on that date. The record of this interview exhibited in grounding these proceedings is signed by an authorised officer but not by the Applicant and not by an interpreter. Thus, while the authorised officer signs to confirm witnessing the Applicant's signature in the section confirming receipt of information leaflets including a Free Legal Aid Information Leaflet, somewhat curiously the Applicant's signature does not appear on the copy exhibited to ground the relief claimed in these proceedings. This anomaly has not been addressed in Opposition papers subsequently filed.

3 . In a questionnaire completed in English on the 14 ^th of November, 2022, by the Applicant himself, the Applicant claimed protection due to his stated fears arising, inter alia, from his opposition political opinion, being a member/supporter of the Girchi party and threats from a named criminal in Georgia. He also claimed to have lost his passport.

4 . A personal interview was conducted with the Applicant on the 29 ^th of November, 2022, during which he was assisted by a Georgian language interpreter. He was asked questions about Girchi during interview and was unable to confirm when the party was established, identify more than one founding member, describe the party's symbol, identify the previous political party of the party founder he had named nor provide details of a major rally held by Girchi claiming a state of emergency during 2020. When pressed about his lack of knowledge he said (Q. 46) “ I don't have a deep understanding of their politics.” The Applicant further confirmed that he did not report concerns to police because there was “ no point”.

5 . The Applicant was issued with a first instance refusal of his application by the International Protection Office (hereinafter “the IPO”) by way of letter dated the 13 ^th of February, 2023. This first instance refusal was accompanied by a s. 39 Report dated the 2 ^nd of February, 2023, in which his claim was given detailed consideration on behalf of the Minister.

6 . It is clear from the s.39 report that the credibility of the Applicant's claim was not accepted by the IPO, specifically his asserted involvement with the Girchi party. This was because he showed a lack of knowledge of the political party he claimed to belong to and a lack of knowledge of a significant nationwide protest organised by this party. Furthermore, the threats he claimed to face as a member of Girchi were not in terms of physical harm, as he described them, but rather of not being able to get work, a claim which itself was not accepted by the IPO to be credible and was found to run contrary to available COI. Similarly, his claims to fear threats from a named criminal were found to be lacking in specificity and credibility.

7 . Thereafter, the Applicant appealed to the IPAT, or at least so he instructs his current solicitors, with the assistance of a person who claimed to be a “ consultant”. On the face of the notice of appeal itself, however, the Applicant confirmed that he did not have a legal representative and he signed the appeal himself. The notice of appeal dated the 21 ^st of February, 2023, submitted grounds of appeal which the Applicant maintains in these proceedings included claims related to the Orthodox Church and COVID vaccination policies in Georgia as distinct from the reasons previously given for fearing return to Georgia.

8 . Although the Notice of Appeal is sparse in its terms it is clear from the face of the notice that the Applicant continued to rely on his membership of Girchi and he references a letter confirming membership in the notice. I note that no reference to Covid policies appears on the face of the said notice of appeal and only passing reference to religion is made without specifically referring to the Orthodox Church at all.

9 . Submissions which accompanied the Notice of Appeal have been exhibited in the Opposition papers filed in these proceedings and it appears that several additional documents were submitted as signed by the Applicant himself in support of his appeal before the IPAT. In these submissions he continued to rely on political unrest in Georgia referring to the position of other minority groups in Georgia (of which he has not claimed to be a member) as well as issues of religious persecution, referring to anti-vaccine attitudes which were reported as strong in Georgia, influenced by the Georgian Orthodox Church and interference with his religious freedoms in Georgia.

10 . The application was refused by IPAT in or about March, 2023, following an accelerated appeal procedure and in the absence of an oral hearing by reason of the safe country of origin finding contained in the s. 39 report. The IPAT decision was not available to the Applicant's new solicitors in issuing these proceedings but is now in evidence before me.

11 . In its decision the IPAT addressed the fact that the Applicant was not legally represented, referring to the “ very professional submissions” which accompanied his appeal. It was noted in the decision that when acknowledging his appeal on the 24 ^th of February, 2023, he had been provided with a Legal Aid Board Notice. It was further noted that on...