Habte v The Minister for Justice and Equality; Habte v The Minister for Justice and Equality No.2

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys
• Judgment Date: 11 February 2019
• Neutral Citation: [2019] IEHC 93
• Date: 11 February 2019
• Court: High Court
• Docket Number: [2017 No. 126 J.R.] [2017 No. 569 J.R.]

[2019] IEHC 93

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Humphreys J.

[2017 No. 126 J.R.]

[2017 No. 569 J.R.]

BETWEEN

MAHELET GETYE HABTE

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

RESPONDENT

AND

BETWEEN

MAHELET GETYE HABTE

APPLICANT

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, IRELAND

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

(No. 2)

Costs – Judicial review – Naturalisation – Applicant seeking costs – Whether there should be an order as to costs

Facts: The High Court (Humphreys J), in Habte v Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 1) [2019] IEHC 47, dealt substantively with two related judicial reviews by granting an order requiring the respondent, the Minister for Justice and Equality, to consider, if appropriate in the light of any report of the committee of inquiry under s. 19 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, whether the certificate of naturalisation of the applicant, Ms Habte, should be amended. Humphreys J then dealt with the question of costs.

Held by Humphreys J that, concerning the costs of the first set of proceedings, the starting point was that costs follow the event and the applicant did obtain substantive relief, albeit not as extensive as that originally sought. Humphreys J held that the first set of proceedings were not so complex and diffuse as to warrant a Veolia Water approach (Veolia Water UK Plc v Fingal County Council (No. 2) [2006] IEHC 240). Humphreys J held that the applicant was entitled to the costs of the first set of proceedings. Humphreys J held that, concerning the costs of the second set of proceedings, the starting point was that costs follow the event, which would favour the respondents; also in favour of the respondents was that certain sweeping allegations were made against the Department but not brought home. Humphreys J noted that the respondent was not particularly facilitative of the proposed amendment to the first judicial review, which would have obviated the necessity for a second set of proceedings at all. Humphreys J also took into account the point that the applicant could have forced the issue but did not. A related point in that regard was that one might ask what order for costs would hypothetically have been made if this had all been one set of proceedings and the applicant had therefore obtained partial relief. Humphreys J did not think there was much reality to the suggestion that the court would have granted no order as to costs; most courts in such a situation would have given an applicant at least some costs. That militated against making an order in the second set of proceedings in favour of the respondents that cancelled out the order in the first set of proceedings in favour of the applicant. A further factor was that, while the applicant did not obtain formal relief, she did obtain a benefit in the second set of proceedings by identifying a series of relevant matters that she could reasonably expect to be taken into account in the decision-making process and that may ultimately assist in resolving the merits of the matter. Humphreys J noted that the evidence in the second set of proceedings as to the process of cancellation and reissue of certificates of naturalisation turned out to be relevant to the mechanics of the process considered in the first set of proceedings regarding the power of amendment, so the second set of proceedings did have a read-across into the point on which the applicant did obtain relief. Balancing each set of factors against the other, Humphreys J held that the appropriate order was that there be no order as to costs.

Humphreys J held that the orders would be: (i) in the first judicial review, an order that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs including reserved costs to be taxed in default of agreement; and (ii) in the second judicial review, that there be no order as to costs.

Costs awarded in part.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Richard Humphreys delivered on the 11th day of February, 2019

1 In Habte v. Minister for Justice and Equality (No. 1)[2019] IEHC 47 (Unreported, High Court, 4th February, 2019) I dealt substantively with these two related judicial reviews by granting an order requiring the respondent Minister to consider, if appropriate in the light of any report of the committee of inquiry under s. 19 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, whether the applicant's certificate of naturalisation should be amended.

2 I now deal with the question of costs and I have received helpful submissions from Mr. Mark Harty S.C. (with Ms. Julie Maher B.L.) for the applicant, and from Ms. Siobhán Stack S.C. (with Mr. Alexander Caffrey B.L.) for the respondents.

Why were there two judicial reviews rather than one?

3 Affidavits were sworn by solicitors on both sides, Mr. Niall Colgan and Mr. Gareth Wells of the CSSO, and they have helpfully illuminated why the No. 1 proceedings were not amended and why a second set of proceedings were initiated. The sequence of events was as follows.

4 On 15th February, 2017, leave was granted for the first judicial review. On 29th May, 2017 the applicant sought the delivery of a statement of opposition. The respondent stated that correspondence would issue in that regard and O'Regan J. directed that the respondent either file a statement of opposition or write to the applicant within four weeks. On 22nd June, 2017 the Minister wrote indicating an intention to revoke the certificate of naturalisation. On 28th June, 2017 the...