Hall, Re; Hall v Hall

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Judgment Date: 11 January 1944
• Date: 11 January 1944

In re Hall. Hall v. Hall.

In the Matter of the Estate of JAMES HALL,Deceased; FREDERICK JAMES HALL, An infant, by EMMA JANE HALL, his mother and next friend

Plaintiff

and

FRANCES HALL

Defendant.

Will - Construction - Absolute gift or estate for life - "In the case of my wife's decease" - Extrinsic evidence - Non-admissibility - Evidence of state of facts existing at date of will.

By his will testator gave to his wife F. H. "all my property at Ashfield, Enaugh, Doocarrick and Cornaglare, with all the stock, implements and accessories, etc." The will continued as follows:—"In the case of my wife's decease the same is to go to my son F. C. H. Following my son's decease all is to go to my grandson F. J. H. After my decease, any stock bought or sold, the proceeds to go to the good of the estate."

Held that the words "in the case of my wife's decease" meant "in the event of my wife's decease during my lifetime" and that the subsequent gifts to the son and grandson were dependent upon the happening of that event.

Accordingly, the wife, having survived the testator, was entitled to the property absolutely.

Nowlan v. Neligan, 1 Br. C. C. 488; Billings v. Sandom, 1 Br. C. C. 393; and Douglas v. Chalmer, 2 Ves. Jun. 501, distinguished.

Held also that extrinsic evidence of the state of facts existing at the date of the will, such as the condition of the testator's health, which might suggest the improbability of his having contemplated his being predeceased by his wife, was not admissible.

Circuit Appeal.

James Hall died on the 29th October, 1940, having made his will, dated the 25th September, 1940. The will was as follows:—

"This is the last will and testament of me James Hall of Cornaglare, Drum, Newbliss, Co. Monaghan, made this 25th day of September in the year of our Lord, 1940. I hereby revoke all wills heretofore made by me. I appoint of in the County of and of in the County of to be executors of this my will. I give, devise and bequeath unto Frances Hall, wife of the above, all my property at Ashfield, Enaugh, Doocarrick and Cornaglare, with all the stock. implements and accessories, etc. In the case of my wife's decease the same is to go to my son Frederick Carson Hall. Following my son's decease all is to go to my grandson Frederick James Hall. After my decease, any stock bought or sold, the proceeds to go to the good of the estate. To my daughter Violet Corbett I bequeath the sum of five pounds."

Letters of administration with the will annexed were granted to the testator's widow, Frances Hall, on the 12th May, 1942.

Frederick Carson Hall survived the testator but died on 11th November, 1941.

Frederick James Hall, an infant, by Emma Jane Hall, his mother and next friend, issued a Civil Bill against Frances Hall, the widow and administratrix of the testator, claiming:

"1. A declaration that on the true construction of the will and in the events which have happened the defendant is tenant-for-life of the said lands and stock, implements and accessories etc., with remainder to the plaintiff.

2. Alternatively, a declaration that on the death of the said Frederick Carson Hall the plaintiff became absolutely entitled to the said property."

The Circuit Court Judge (Judge Sheehy) held that the defendant, Frances Hall, was entitled to an estate for life in the property and that on her death the plaintiff, Frederick James Hall, was entitled absolutely.

From this decision the defendant appealed to the High Court.

Cur. adv. vult.

Black J. :—

At the end of the able arguments in this case I formed an opinion about it. In the recess I examined many authorities bearing upon the problem and tested it from various angles. I am of the same opinion still.

The vital provision is "in case of my wife's decease, the same is to go to my son." The rule is that such words are deemed in law to mean "decease in the testator's lifetime."This has been called "the first rule in Edwards v. Edwards(1)."The fourth rule in that case was set aside by the House of Lords in O'Mahoney v. Burdett(2), but not the first rule. It has been established by an unbroken series of decisions. Its great strength was shown in Trotter v. Williams(3)where the words "then living" were used in a context which would have taxed the rule severely but for its strength.

Words such as "in case of an event" usually indicate that the event may or may not happen. They mean "if it happens." He who uses them normally provides for a contingency. If he uses them in relation to death he is deemed not to mean death at any time, for death at some time would be a certainty, not a contingency. Therefore it is supposed that he must mean "death within some definite period," and, if no such period is indicated by the will, the Courts seize upon the period of the testator's lifetime as the only period to which the contingency can be referred. As Fitzgibbon L. J. said in In re Neary's Estate(4),"It is a corollary, ex necessitate rei forced upon the Court,"and in Montgomery v. Montgomery(5) it was lard down that this rule of interpretation will never be applied except ex necessitate rei. If there is another period than the lifetime of the testator indicated by the will to which the contingency can be referred, that other period will be adopted. InMontgomery's Case(5) the Court was able to hold that there was another period, namely, the minority of the first donees. In the case before me I can find no other period indicated by the will to which the contingency can be referred except the testator's lifetime.

Mr. McGonigal who never tries to ignore a stone wall, did not dispute the rule in question. But he saw no objection to getting over it. He indicated either, or both, of two ways of doing this. The first was to hear evidence of the state of facts existing at the date of the will, such as the condition of the testator's health and the like, which might suggest

the improbability of his having contemplated being predeceased by his wife. I thought such evidence inadmissible. It would be admissible to remove ambiguity, not alone, as was once thought, where it was latent, but even if it was patent. It has often been received where the doubt was in the words themselves, and a fortiori where the words themselves are clear, the doubt being created by extraneous circumstances, such as there happening to be two subjects or two objects, either of which the words would reasonably fit, with the result that there exists what is technically called an equivocation. Indeed, in this last case, evidence might be received, not merely of existing facts, but even of declarations of intention. There is no question of equivocation in the present will. Neither do I think that the words "in case of my wife's decease the same is to go to my son" can be said to be ambiguous; for the rule to which I have referred lays it down that these words, so far from being ambiguous, are to be deemed to have a defined meaning, namely, "in case of my wife's decease in my lifetime, the same is to go to my son." There are later provisions which I must analyse: but I do not think they can have the retroactive effect of making the earlier words ambiguous, since the rule imposes on those earlier words a clear meaning. The later provisions merely make the earlier words...