Harrington v SRF Ltd and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Liam Kennedy
• Judgment Date: 14 May 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 252
• Docket Number: Record No. 2023 3335 P

Between:

John Harrington

Plaintiffs

and

SRF Limited, Richard James Fitzpatrick, Ahyett Rosapa, John J Quinn, Conor Quinn, Pauline Brady, Oliver Barry, John J Quinn & Company Solicitors LLP

Defendants

[2025] IEHC 252

Record No. 2023 3335 P

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

Breach of contract – Abuse of process – Bound to fail – First, second and third defendants seeking to strike out the proceedings – Whether the claim constituted an abuse of process

Facts: The plaintiff, Mr Harrington, was an individual suing in a personal capacity. He was, when the key transaction was entered into, one of two directors/50% shareholders of Autotech Harrington’s & Sons Co. Ltd (Autotech Ireland) and he was also the sole director and shareholder of Autotech Motors Ltd (Autotech NI) and the Secretary. Litigation arose from the supply of an umbilical machine and dribble bar system used for spreading slurry (the System). The plaintiff’s fundamental complaint was that the System was defective, and its suppliers breached their contractual obligations. He also said that those contractual obligations were owed to him personally, not to Autotech Ireland, and by both the first and second defendants, SRF Ltd and Mr Fitzpatrick. The statement of claim alleged, without providing adequate particulars as required by Order 19 rule 5 RSC, that the first and second defendants and the third defendant, Ms Rosapa, acted with mala fides towards him. The first, second and third defendants applied to the High Court seeking an order pursuant to Order 19 rule 28(1)(i),(ii) and (iii) of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction dismissing the claim as frivolous and/or vexatious and/or disclosing no reasonable cause of action and/or on the grounds that it was bound to fail. Similar reliefs were claimed on the basis that the claim constituted an abuse of process as the proceedings were res judicata and breach of the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100.

Held by Kennedy J that there was an appropriate channel for the appropriate party or parties to agitate any legitimate issues in respect of the underlying dispute; whether any such route still remained open was a matter for the District Court, and it would be for that Court to determine whether the first defendant was properly served and whether it should reopen the proceedings. Kennedy J expressed no view either way on that issue which was not before him. As far as these proceedings were concerned, Kennedy J found that the plaintiff's case was largely based on bare assertions and an improbable characterisation and interpretation of routine actions on the part of the second and third defendants in the course of their duties on the first defendant’s behalf. Kennedy J held that the plaintiff’s bare assertions fell far short of the evidence which would be needed to satisfy the Court that the claim was statable. To the contrary, Kennedy J was satisfied that it was an abuse of process being brought for a collateral purpose and it was bound to fail.

Kennedy J struck out the plaintiff’s application.

Proceedings struck out.

APPEARANCES

Mr. John Harrington, litigant-in-person, the plaintiff.

Mr. Andrew King BL, instructed by Tormeys Solicitors LLP, for the defendants.

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Liam Kennedy delivered on 14 May 2025

Introduction

1 . This judgment primarily concerns the first, second and third defendants' (“the Applicants”) motion to strike out the proceedings. The motion was issued on 5 July 2024 but was delayed due to the necessity for the Applicants to seek an order for substituted service on the plaintiff.

2 . I am striking out the plaintiff's counter motion which seeks to strike out the defendants' motion. The counter motion should never have been issued. The plaintiff's objections to the Applicants' motion can and should be made in opposition to that motion. If the Applicants' motion succeeds, the counter motion must fail. However, if the original motion fails there is no need for the counter motion. The counter motion is redundant either way.

3 . For completeness, I note two procedural points. Firstly, the Applicants originally also sought to dismiss the claim for want of prosecution in the absence of a statement of claim. There is a dispute as to when the Statement of Claim was delivered. As it has now been delivered, that issue is moot. Secondly, the fourth to eighth defendants (“the Solicitor Defendants”) represented the first defendant in the District Court proceedings which are referenced below. They have also applied to strike out the claim against them in these proceedings but, due to the plaintiff's pending procedural appeal, the plaintiff objected to their dismissal motion being heard along with the current motion. Accordingly, this judgement focuses on the Plaintiff's claim against the Applicants and I have largely disregarded the Solicitor Defendants' pending notice of motion and associated affidavits and correspondence.

4 . The Applicants seek an Order pursuant to Order 19 rule 28(1)(i), (ii) & (iii) of the Rules of the Superior Courts (“RSC”) and/or the Court's inherent jurisdiction dismissing the claim as frivolous and /or vexatious and /or disclosing no reasonable cause of action and / or on the grounds that it is bound to fail. Similar reliefs were claimed on the basis that the claim constitutes an abuse of process as the proceedings are res judicata and breach the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100.

The Parties and the Dispute

5 . The litigation arises from the supply of an umbilical machine and dribble bar system used for spreading slurry (“the System”). Issues include: (i) the identity of the contracting parties; (ii) whether the System was defective; (iii) monies claimed in respect of the System and related goods or services; (iv) the plaintiff's entitlement to ventilate such issues in these or other proceedings. The legal characterisation of the parties' respective roles is also disputed.

6 . The first defendant issued District Court proceedings ( SRF Limited v Autotech Harrington and Sons Co. Limited, District Court Area of Nenagh 2023/10004) against Autotech Harrington & Son Co Limited in respect of monies allegedly outstanding on two invoices (in default of an appearance by the latter), and, as I have noted, was represented by the Solicitor Defendants. The District Court, having satisfied itself that Autotech Harrington's & Sons Co. Limited (“Autotech Ireland”) had been duly served, gave judgment by default against it and in favour of the first defendant in the sum of €6,360.00, plus €560 costs. The defendants say that these proceedings are an abuse of process because the plaintiff has issued them (against all defendants) to obstruct and delay the enforcement of the judgment rather than taking avenues available to challenge or set aside that judgment if appropriate.

7 . The plaintiff is an individual, suing in a personal capacity. He lives in Galway and is associated with two companies, Autotech Ireland, which has a registered office at Tyone, Nenagh, Co Tipperary and Autotech Motors Ltd., which trades from 88 Main Street, Moira, Northern Ireland (“Autotech NI”). He is (or was when the key transaction was entered into) one of two director/50% shareholders of Autotech Ireland and he is also the sole director and shareholder of Autotech NI and the Secretary. He says that he personally contracted with the first and second defendants to buy the System in his own right, rather than for Autotech Ireland, as the Applicants contend. In other words, he maintains that he (and the second defendant) both contracted in a personal capacity not as company representatives.

8 . The first defendant is a Northern Irish company based in Downpatrick, County Down. It sells and supplies umbilical systems under the trade name “SlurryQuip”. It admits supplying the System but says that the contract was between it and Autotech Ireland (and that the plaintiff and the second defendants were representatives not contracting parties).

9 . The second defendant is the first defendant's director. He dealt with the plaintiff when the latter visited its premises to enquire about buying the System and he provided an estimate to the plaintiff. He says that the contracting parties on the sale of the System were the first defendant as supplier and Autotech Ireland as the customer.

10 . The third defendant is the first defendant's part time employee. She deals with clerical and accounts administration. She prepared invoices exhibited in the District Court proceedings.

11 . The plaintiff says that the Solicitor Defendants acted negligently or with mala fides, breached duties of care to him and/or failed to undertake proper due diligence before prosecuting the District Court claim against Autotech Ireland.

Contractual Dealings

12 . The affidavits only refer to one meeting between the parties and its focus was probably pricing, rather than the identity of the contracting parties. There is no evidence before me referencing any explicit discussion of the latter issue. However, it is instructive to note the evolving understanding of the arrangements as appearing from contemporaneous documents. Undisputed evidence confirms that:

• a. The first defendant trades under the name SlurryQuip and produces the SlurryQuip range of products. On or about 15 December 2020, the plaintiff visited the first defendant's Downpatrick premises to enquire about buying the System and the second defendant gave him a price. The costing was handwritten by the third defendant on the first defendant's letterhead and there is a dispute as to whether the second defendant provided it on the first defendant's behalf (as he contends) or also on his own behalf (as the plaintiff contends).

• b. The sale of the System was agreed, and a £2,000 deposit was paid. The second defendant furnished a receipt on the first...