IELCA 3 - Salman -v- Minister for Justice Equality & Defence Ruling No.2

• Year: 2014
• Decision Date: 29 May 2014

[2014] IELCA 3

THE HIGH COURT 2011 425 JR

DANA SALMAN APPLICANT / PLAINTIFF

AND

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND DEFENCE

RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT

RULING NO. 2

Following delivery of my ruling dated 22 July 2013 the Applicant carried in Objections dated 2

August 2013, followed by written submissions dated 14 November 2013. The Respondent’s

replying submissions are dated 4 February 2014.

The Objections concern the following:

a) Item 115: Junior Counsel’s brief fee in the sum of €16,667 which

was disallowed by me.

b) Item 118: Senior Counsel’s brief fee which was reduced from

€25,000 to €10,000.

c) The instructions fee which was reduced from €34,750 to €20,750.

The background to the Judicial Review proceedings is set out in the Applicant’s bill of costs and

the respective parties’ submissions and I do not consider it necessary to repeat same for the

purpose of this ruling.

The extent of the legal issues arising in the case and the reasons underlying my decisions in

relation to the items in issue are set forth in some detail in my said ruling and I will refer to

same, as necessary, during the course of this ruling.

The law relating to the assessment of costs as between party and party is cited in both parties’

submissions and I do not consider it necessary to provide any further discourse in relation

thereto save, where necessary, for the purpose of addressing specific matters in issue.

Junior Counsel’s Brief Fee

It is common case that Junior Counsel was not present for the hearing of the Application

although briefed by his instructing Solicitor to so attend.

The Applicant objects to the disallowance of this disbursement in full as between party and

party on the basis that a partial allowance should have been made given that Counsel had

prepared himself fully for the purpose of representing the Applicant in Court but ultimately was

unable to do so. The situation is distinguished from that referred to in my ruling in HSE v Umar

in which the brief fee marked by Senior Counsel was disallowed in full arising out of Senior

Counsel’s inability to attend Court for the hearing of that case.