Irish Penal Reform Trust Ltd and Others v Governor of Mountjoy Prison and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Mr. Justice Gilligan
• Judgment Date: 02 September 2005
• Neutral Citation: [2005] IEHC 305
• Court: High Court
• Date: 02 September 2005

[2005] IEHC 305

THE HIGH COURT

[Record No. 2001/16889P]

IRISH PENAL REFORM TRUST LTD & ORS v GOVERNOR OF MOUNTJOY PRISON & MIN FOR JUSTICE

BETWEEN

THE IRISH PENAL REFORM TRUST LIMITED, NOEL LENNON AND SEFTON CARROLL

PLAINTIFFS

AND

THE GOVERNOR OF MOUNTJOY PRISON THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM AND IRELAND

DEFENDANTS

COMPANIES ACTS 1963

COMPANIES ACTS 1999

CAHILL v SUTTON 1980 IR 269

MULCREEVY v MIN FOR ENVIRONMENT & DUN LAOGHAIRE / RATHDOWN CO COUNCIL 2004 1 IR 72 2004 1 ILRM 419

SPUC v COOGAN 1990 ILRM 70 1989 IR 734

WHYTE SOCIAL INCLUSION & THE LEGAL SYSTEM 2001 82

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY FEDERATION v DUBLIN CITY COUNCIL 2005 2 ILRM 256

R v POLLUTION INSPECTORATE EX PARTE GREENPEACE (No2) 1994 4 ALL ER 329

R v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT EX PARTE PRESVAC ENGINEERING LTD 10/7/1991

TLR INLAND REVENUE CMRS v NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SELF EMPLOYED & SMALL BUSINESSES LTD 1981 2 ALL ER 93 1982 AC 617

THORSON v AG OF CANADA 1975 1 SCR 138

MCNEIL v NOVASCOTIA BOARD OF CENSORS 1976 2 SCR 265

BOROWSKI v MIN FOR JUSTICE OF CANADA 1981 2 SCR 575

FINLAY v MIN OF JUSTICE OF CANADA 1986 2 SCR 607

SUPPERSTONE & GOUDIE JUDICIAL REVIEW 1992 335THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1993 VOL 1 PARA 53/1- 14/11

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

locus standi

Personal rights - Treatment of psychiatric prisoners - Prison reform - Whether plaintiff had locus standi - Relaxation of locus standi rules -Whether plaintiff bona fide group - Whether psychiatric prisoners disadvantaged - Cahill v Sutton [1980] IR 269; SPUC v Coogan [1989] IR 734 and R v Inspectorate of Pollution, Ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 considered; Mulcreevey v Minister for Environment [2004] 1 IR 72 applied; CIF v Dublin City Council [2005] IESC 16 [2005] 2 IR 496 distinguished - Plaintiff granted locus standi

Facts: The plaintiffs sued the defendants for various declaratory reliefs upon the basis that the defendants had failed in their constitutional obligation to provide adequate psychiatric treatment and/ or facilities and/or services for prisoners in Mountjoy prison. The defendants filed a full defence and in particular claimed that the first plaintiff had no locus standi to maintain the proceedings and that the second and third plaintiffs' locus standi was limited to certain claims.

Held by Gilligan J. in declining the defendants the relief sought, that the first plaintiff and the second and third plaintiffs had locus standi. If the first plaintiff were denied locus standi, the persons whose interests it represented might not have an effective way of bringing the issues involved in the proceedings before the court.

Reporter. R. W.

1 JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Gilligan delivered on the 2nd day of September, 2005

2 The first named plaintiff in these proceedings is a company limited by guarantee incorporated pursuant to the provisions of the Companies Acts, 1963 to 1999. It was formed in 1994 by individuals who were concerned in common with conditions in the prison system and is a non-governmental organisation and holds charitable status. The first named plaintiff has special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The plaintiff company receives a number of grants including inter alia one from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The second and third named plaintiffs are persons who suffer from psychiatric illness and have both in their time been incarcerated in Mountjoy Men's Prison pursuant to lawful order. It appears that the first named plaintiff had for some time prior to the institution of these proceedings become increasingly concerned about the manner in which prisoners with psychiatric problems were being treated while in custody and in particular the plaintiff was concerned as to what it saw as systematic deficiencies in the manner in which prisoners with psychiatric difficulties were treated in prison against a background where research which has been exhibited before the court shows that 78% of prisoners put into strip cells (also known as padded or isolation cells) in solitary confinement were found to be mentally ill.

3 The plaintiffs' case is only concerned with the treatment of prisoners who suffer from psychiatric illness. Dr. Val Bresnihan, a social and human rights researcher, avers in her affidavit as sworn on 7th August, 2004 that it is the belief and indeed the experience of the first named plaintiff that such persons are not in a position to assert adequately or in time their constitutional rights especially as regards systematic deficiency. The case is made on the first named plaintiff's behalf that a great deal of work and effort has been expended in the bringing of these proceedings including the retention of international experts. The plaintiff brings the proceedings in a sincere and bona fides manner and has nothing to gain itself by their institution or prosecution.

4 The first named plaintiff believes that the conditions in which prisoners are held and particularly those vulnerable prisoners suffering from psychiatric illness is a matter of relevant concern and importance to the wider community. The first named plaintiff believes that the important issues raised by these proceedings, in particular the first named plaintiff's strong belief that the conditions in Mountjoy prison have not complied with basic standards of human rights, are matters which will never be adequately addressed in litigation and might not be addressed at all unless the present proceedings can be determined.

5 The plaintiffs sue the defendants for various declaratory reliefs upon the basis that the defendants have failed in their constitutional obligation to provide adequate psychiatric treatment and/or facilities and/or services for prisoners in Mountjoy Men's Prison and Mountjoy Women's Prison and further a declaration that the treatment of the first and second named plaintiffs in Mountjoy Prison was a breach of their constitutional rights.

6 The defendants have filed a full defence claiming that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs claimed and in particular they claim that the first named plaintiff does not as an entity have legal capacity to maintain these proceedings and that further and in the alternative the first named plaintiff does not have locus standi to maintain the claims as made in these proceedings. Further the defendants claim that the locus standi of the second and third named plaintiffs to maintain the claims made in these proceedings is confined to the claims advanced at paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Statement of Claim and paras. (r) (s) (t) and (w) of the claim for reliefs section in the statement of claim. They claim that the second and third named plaintiffs do not have locus standi where the remainder of the claims advanced in the statement of claim are concerned.

Issues for determination

7 The issues that come before this court for determination are:

8 1. As to whether or not the first named plaintiff has locus standi to maintain these proceedings.

9 2. As to whether or not the locus standi of the second and third named plaintiffs to maintain the claims made by them in these proceedings is confined or limited in the manner pleaded at paras. 23 and 24 of the statement of claim and paras. (r) (s) (t) and (w) of the claim for relief in the statement of claim and further as to whether or not the second and third named plaintiffs have locus standi in relation to the remainder of the claims advanced in the statement of claim.

Position of second and third named plaintiffs

10 I propose to deal firstly with the position of the second and third named plaintiffs.

11 Insofar as any of the particulars invoked by the plaintiffs are referable to the factual situation of the second and third named plaintiffs (assuming that the facts alleged by those plaintiffs are true), the defendants accept the entitlement of those plaintiffs to rely on the said particulars. In the case of the second named plaintiff the defendants say it appears that the complaint has been made of his being placed in a strip cell, his lack of access to outdoor activity or proper sanitary facilities as well as a possible failure to assess him upon entry and in respect of these matters the plaintiff may proceed with his complaints. However, the defendants contend that insofar as the particulars have no relation to the actual factual circumstances of the second named plaintiff, as for example a failure to employ any or any sufficiently qualified psychiatric nurses at the respective prisons, the second named plaintiff has no standing to advance such a complaint. The defendants adopt a similar position in relation to the third named plaintiff.

General principles of locus standi

12 The general principle of locus standi in constitutional matters has been laid down by Henchy J. in Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269 (at 283) as follows:

"The primary rule as to standing in constitutional matters is that the person challenging the constitutionality of the Statute, or some other person for whom he is deemed by the Court to be entitled to speak, must be able to assert that, because of the alleged unconstitutionality, his or the other person's interests have been adversely affected, or stand in real or imminent danger of being adversely affected by the operation of the Statute."

13 The raison d'etre for personal standing rules has also been identified by Henchy J. as follows:

"While a cogent theoretical argument may be made for allowing any citizen, regardless of personal interest or injury, to bring proceedings to have a particular statutory provision declared unconstitutional, there are contravening considerations which make such an approach generally undesirable in the public interest. To allow one litigant to present and...