J.N.E. v Minister for Justice and Equality

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeDenham C.J.,Clarke J.,Dunne J.
Judgment Date25 July 2017
Neutral Citation[2017] IESCDET 86
CourtSupreme Court
Date25 July 2017

[2017] IESCDET 86

THE SUPREME COURT

DETERMINATION

Denham C.J.

Clarke J.

Dunne J.

BETWEEN
J.N.E.
Applicant
AND
The Minister for Justice and Equality, The Refugees Applications Commissioner, Ireland

and

the Attorney General
Respondents
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO WHICH ARTICLE 34.5.4° OF THE CONSTITUTION APPLIES I.E., AN APPLICATION TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT FROM THE HIGH COURT.
RESULT: The Court refuses the applicant leave to appeal directly from the High Court to this Court.
REASONS GIVEN:
1

This determination relates to an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from an judgment of the High Court, made on the 14th November, 2016, the judgment refusing certificate to appeal delivered on the 20th February, 2017, and the order perfected on the 29th March, 2017.

2

J.N.E., the applicant, referred to as ‘the applicant’, seeks leave to appeal to this Court from the said judgments of the High Court.

3

The Minister for Justice and Equality, The Refugees Applications Commissioner, Ireland and the Attorney General, the respondents, are referred to collectively as ‘the respondents’.

Jurisdiction
4

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals is set out in the Constitution.

5

Article 34 of the Constitution provides for the public administration of justice; describes the courts established by the Constitution, and those which may be established by law; provides for the full and original jurisdiction of the High Court; establishes the Court of Appeal under Article 34.2.

6

Article 34.5.3° provides as follows:-

‘The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decision of the Court of Appeal, if the Supreme Court is satisfied that:

(i) the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or

(ii) in the interests of justice it is necessary that there be an appeal to the Supreme Court.’

7

Article 34.5.4°, on the other hand, provides:

‘Notwithstanding section 4.1 hereof, the Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the High Court, if the Supreme Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances warranting a direct appeal to it, and a precondition for the Supreme Court being so satisfied is the presence of either or both of the following factors:

(i) the decision involves a matter of general public importance, or

(ii) the interests of justice.’

8

It is not necessary for present purposes to enter into a detailed consideration of the proper interpretation of the criteria specified for an ‘ordinary’ appeal from the Court of Appeal to this Court save to note that the relevant decision of the Court of Appeal must either involve a matter of ‘general public importance’ or there must be some other reason requiring that the interests of justice be met by an appeal.

9

The criteria, under Article 34.5.4°, for a leapfrog appeal, include, but are not confined to, both of those matters, for it is specified that it is a pre-condition for this Court to grant leapfrog leave either that the relevant decision of the High Court involves a matter of general public importance or that the interests of justice require such an appeal.

10

In order for this Court to grant leave to bring a leapfrog appeal, it must be the case that the issues raised are such that they would justify granting leave for a second appeal from the Court of Appeal to this Court, had the course of action of an appeal to the Court of Appeal been adopted by the appellant. Therefore, the basic constitutional threshold of general public importance or the interests of justice, which must be met in respect of an application to bring an ordinary appeal from the Court of Appeal to this Court, must also be met in the context of a leapfrog appeal.

11

The additional requirement which must be present, in order that leapfrog leave be given, is, in accordance with the words of Article 34.5.4° ‘that there are exceptional circumstances warranting a direct appeal to’...

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3 cases
  • Seredych v The Minister for Justice and Equality
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 16 December 2019
    ...both by me in the first instance and by the Supreme Court on leapfrog applications: see J.N.E. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESCDET 86, Igbosonu v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IESCDET 51, V.D. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESCDET 41, A.M.C. v. The ......
  • N.E. (Georgia) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 18 November 2019
    ...both by me in the first instance and by the Supreme Court on leapfrog application: see J.N.E. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESCDET 86, Igbosonu v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IESCDET 51, V.D. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESCDET 41, A.M.C. v. Inter......
  • Gayle v Governor of the Dóchas Centre
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 7 December 2017
    ...v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IESCDET 128, Ó Grianna v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IESCDET 101, J.N.E. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2017] IESCDET 86, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Poleliunas [2017] IESCDET 70, Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2016] IESCDET 133. A variety of reasons h......

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