John Molloy v Albert Reid

JurisdictionIreland
JudgeMr. Justice Clarke
Judgment Date29 January 2014
Neutral Citation[2014] IESC 4
CourtSupreme Court
Docket Number[Appeal No: 56/2013],[S.C. No. 56 of 2013]
Date29 January 2014
Molloy v Reid
Between/
JOHN MOLLOY
Plaintiff/Respondent

and

ALBERT REID
Defendant/Appellant

[2014] IESC 4

[Appeal No: 56/2013]

THE SUPREME COURT

High Court - Litigation - Civil procedure – Personal injury - Personal Injury Assessment Board - Date of authorisation - Limitation period - Receipt - Delivery - Statutory interpretation - Service - Issue of a notice or document - Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 - Interpretation Act 1937

Facts: These proceedings concerned an appeal of a determination of the High Court that the plaintiff/respondent"s personal injury action was not statute barred. Pursuant to the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 ('the 2003 Act'), the Personal Injury Assessment Board ('PIAB') was established for personal injury claims to be assessed. As a result of this Act, a claimant was not entitled to bring court proceedings unless and until their claim has been through the PIAB system and the PIAB had given leave for the case to be brought to court because it had not resolved through the system. Section 50 of the 2003 Act had the effect of extending the period within which personal injury litigation could be commenced because the period between the making of an application to the PIAB and six months from 'the date of issue of an authorisation' by the PIAB was to be disregarded for the purposes of calculating the relevant limitation period.

The key issue to be determined in this case was how 'the date of issue of an authorisation' was to be interpreted. It was the defendant/appellant"s argument that the ordinary meaning of 'the date of issue of an authorisation' was the day on which the relevant authorisation was sent out to the intended recipient. The plaintiff/respondent argued that the phrase should be read as meaning the day on which the intended recipient either received or was likely to have received or was deemed by law to have received the relevant authorisation. It was agreed between the parties that if the defendant/appellant"s interpretation was correct, the personal injury action was statute barred. Likewise, it was undisputed that the action was brought within the period of limitation if the plaintiff/respondent"s interpretation was held to be true. Ultimately, the High Court agreed with the plaintiff/respondent"s analysis.

Held by Clarke J. (with Denham C.J. and Murray J. concurring) that the High Court"s determination was correct and the appeal would be dismissed. It was said that it was clear that the 2003 Act had no express provision as to whether 'the date of issue of an authorisation' was the date when the document containing the authorisation was sent or when it would be received in the normal course of registered post. As a result, the High Court judge had relied upon s. 18 of the Interpretation Act 1937 ('the 1937 Act'), which states that where an Act of the Oireachtas authorises or requires a document to be served by post, service is deemed to be effected at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.

This interpretation was held to be correct. Section 79(1) of the PIAB Act outlined how the 'issue' of any notice or document by the PIAB could be completed by delivering it to the recipient personally, leaving it at the recipient"s residence (or at an address that has been agreed for service), or by sending it by post in a prepaid registered letter to the recipient"s residence (or at an address that has been agreed for service). It was said that the first two of these three methods required actual delivery into the control of the recipient. It was, therefore, concluded that the Oireachtas must also have intended the 'issue' of any notice or document that was served by way of post to be the point when it was delivered into the control of the recipient. It was further held that because the right of access to court could be interfered with because of non-compliance with a time limit, the Court was hesitant to rule that time begins to run at a point when the claimant is not aware of that fact. Finally, it was said that although the ordinary meaning of 'issue' might imply that the defendant/appellant"s interpretation was correct, the 2003 Act as a whole supported the plaintiff/respondent"s argument because s. 79(1) used that term interchangeably with the terms 'serviced on' and 'given'. As a result, it was ruled that s. 50 of the 2003 Act used the term 'date of issue of an authorisation' to mean the date when someone actually received an authorisation, or had it left at a specified address, or was deemed to have received it if sent by post. The plaintiff/respondent"s action was, therefore, not statute barred.

Appeal dismissed.

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S50

MOLLOY v REID UNREP RYAN 18.1.2013 2013 IEHC 77

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S11

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S14

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S79(1)

INTERPRETATION ACT 1937 S18

KNIGHT v NICHOLLS & ANOR 2004 1 WLR 1653 2004 LGR 524 2004 EWCA CIV 68

REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT 1983 S36(1)

LOCAL ELECTIONS (PRINCIPAL AREA) RULES 1986 RULE 19 (UK)

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S79

FOGARTY v MCKEOGH BROTHERS (BALLINA) LTD 2010 4 IR 374 2010/19/4782 2010 IEHC 274

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S50

LOCAL GOVT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT ACT 1963 S26(4)

LOCAL GOVT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT ACT 1963 S7

MURPHY, STATE v DUBLIN CO COUNCIL 1970 IR 253

FREENEY v BRAY URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL 1982 ILRM 29 1982/5/904

FLYNN & O'FLAHERTY PROPERTIES LTD v DUBLIN CORP 1997 2 IR 558 1997/3/1001 1996 IEHC 47

T O SUPPLIES (LONDON) LTD v JERRY CREIGHTON LTD 1951 2 AER 992 1952 1 KB 42 1951 2 TLR 993

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S79(1)(A)

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S79(1)(B)

PERSONAL INJURIES ASSESSMENT BOARD ACT 2003 S79(1)(C)

1

Judgment of Mr. Justice Clarke delivered on 29th January, 2014.

2

Judgment delivered by Clarke J [Nem diss]

1. Introduction
3

2 1.1. Time, it is said, waits for no man. Time can be important in many aspects of the law. In private law, parties frequently agree that their obligations are to be met within a certain timeframe. Sometimes, because those parties agree that time is essential to their agreement, even a minor failure to comply in time will be considered a breach which may lead to significant consequences. On other occasions, time may not be so vital and some leeway may be allowable. Likewise, time is important in the bringing and conduct of litigation. Old cases run their own risk of injustice. For that reason there have always been limitations on the ability of parties to commence litigation at too great a remove from the events which give rise to the claim. Again, sometimes there is a formal statutory limitation period which precludes (except in exceptional circumstances such as fraud) the bringing of a case outside the period specified by the Oireachtas. In other types of cases (such as claims involving equitable relief), the court is given a broad discretion to decide whether the case has been taken in a timely fashion without there being any fixed period specified. There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages between the adoption of a fixed period and the conferring of a discretion on the court. In some circumstances it might be considered that flexibility is an advantage so that the court can take into account all relevant circumstances. On the other hand, certainty brings its own advantages. When there is a fixed period, a party knows where it stands. A claim is either in or out of time. In such cases a party does not have to wait, ordinarily, until a judge decides on the basis of a range of potential factors whether they could be said to have delayed too much.

4

3 1.2. This case involves the limitation period for personal injury actions. Given that the whole point of a limitation period is that there should be certainty, it is unfortunate that there can be legitimate debate about whether this claim is in or out of time. However, the particular context of the issue which arises in this case concerns the changes which were brought about in relation to the limitation period for personal injury actions by virtue of the introduction of the Personal Injury Assessment Board ("PIAB"). The role of PIAB is well known and well rehearsed. Personal injury claims go to PIAB for assessment. A claimant is not entitled to bring court proceedings unless and until their claim has been through the PIAB system and the claimant has been authorised to bring a case to court because the case has not resolved through the PIAB system.

5

4 1.3. Given that regime, it was not surprising that the Oireachtas included in the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 ("the PIAB Act") provisions extending the period within which personal injury litigation could be commenced which, in substance, have the effect of stopping time running while a case is in the PIAB system and for a period of six months thereafter. Section 50 of the PIAB Act requires that the period between the making of an application to PIAB and six months from "the date of issue of an authorisation" under the PIAB Act is to be disregarded for the purposes of calculating the relevant limitation period. This case turns solely on the question of when it can be said that there has been an "issue of an authorisation" for those purposes. Both parties agree, correctly in my view, that if that phrase is properly interpreted as meaning the day on which the relevant authorisation is sent out to the intended recipient then the injuries claim brought by the plaintiff/respondent ("Mr. Molloy") in these proceedings is statute barred. On the other hand, it is also common case that, if the proper date on which it can be said that an...

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