Joyce v National Transport Authority

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judge: Ms Justice Hyland,Mr. Justice Charles Meenan
• Judgment Date: 22 December 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IECA 290
• Court: Court of Appeal (Ireland)
• Docket Number: Court of Appeal Record No.: 2025/102

Between

Ciaran Joyce

Plaintiff/Appellant

and

National Transport Authority

Respondent/Respondent

[2025] IECA 290

Faherty J.

Meenan J.

Hyland J.

Court of Appeal Record No.: 2025/102

High Court Record No.: 2024/1605 JR

THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Judicial review – Application of leave – De minimis non curat lex – Appellant challenging a refusal to grant leave to seek judicial review – Whether the doctrine of de minimis should prevent leave being granted

Facts: The appellant, Mr Joyce, appealed to the Court of Appeal challenging a refusal by the trial judge (Bolger J, 7 April 2025) to grant leave to seek judicial review of a decision to impose a clamping charge of €125 both on the basis of the principle of de minimis non curat lex applied and because of the wholly technical nature of the complaints. Amongst other reliefs, the appellant sought an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent, the National Transport Authority, made on 25 September 2024 refusing to allow his appeal concerning the clamping of his car. The appellant’s first ground of challenge was that the immobilisation notice fixed to the vehicle stated that the alleged offence of parking opposite a continuous white line was in contravention of s. 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1994. By his second ground, he argued that the immobilisation notice did not comply with s. 20 of the Vehicle Clamping Act 2015. His third ground was that s. 101B(4)(b)(ii) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 was breached. His fourth ground was that because the notice was signed by a person, and because the signature was not legible, the notice was not fully legible. The fifth ground was that there was a lack of evidence to support evidence of unlawful parking in contravention of reg. 10 of the Vehicle Clamping and Signage Regulations 2017. His sixth ground was that the decision to tow him within less than an hour of being clamped was in breach of the Clamping Code of Conduct.

Held by Hyland J that she would refuse leave on five of the six grounds advanced on the basis that they were not arguable and/or the appellant lacked standing to advance them. She considered that the first ground - that the applicable law was not identified in the immobilisation notice - met the arguability and standing requirements, and that the doctrine of de minimis should not prevent leave being granted. She held that it may be that at the substantive hearing of the matter, the respondent would persuade the High Court that the matter was indeed de minimis. However, her detailed review of the case law on this area (a luxury not afforded to the trial judge given the weekly volume of cases where leave is sought to apply for judicial review) persuaded her that the appellant ought not to be refused leave for his only arguable ground solely on the doctrine of de minimis.

Hyland J granted leave on the first ground only and refused leave on all other grounds.

Appeal allowed in part.

NO REDACTION NEEDED

JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Hyland delivered on the 22 ^nd day of December, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1 This is a challenge to a refusal by the trial judge (Bolger J., 7 April 2025) to grant leave to seek judicial review of a decision to impose a clamping charge of €125 both on the basis of the principle of de minimis non curat lex applied — that the law does not concern itself with trifling matters — and because of the wholly technical nature of the complaints. The application was made ex parte in the usual way, and therefore Mr. Joyce (the “ Appellant”) is the only party to this appeal. He is not legally represented. Amongst other reliefs, he seeks an order of Certiorari quashing the decision of the National Transport Authority (the “ Respondent”) made on 25 September 2024 refusing to allow his appeal concerning the clamping of his car.

2 The Appellant's vehicle was clamped on 13 July 2024 at Beach Road in Dublin 4. In his Statement of Grounds, the Appellant accepts that the vehicle was parked on Beach Road, which was marked with a single white line, at 10:00am on 13 July 2024, and notes the vehicle was not parked on double yellow lines, was not obstructing any traffic, and there was no signage indicating the prohibition of parking in the relevant space. He asserts that at 10:20am, the Dublin Street Parking Services (“ DSPS”), acting on the authority of Dublin City Council, affixed an immobilisation notice to his vehicle, and less than five minutes later, it was loaded on a tow truck and transported from the location. He arrived at the scene as the tow truck was leaving the vicinity and asked that the tow truck pull in. It did so, he paid the immobilisation fee of €125, and the clamp was removed after the vehicle was taken off the tow truck.

3 The Appellant appealed the decision by submitting an appeal to DSPS via their website together with submissions (the date of his appeal is not given and nor is the letter of appeal provided). On 30 July 2024, the Appellant received an email informing him he had been unsuccessful and was told that a further appeal lay with the Respondent (required to be made within 30 days). He submitted an appeal to the Respondent on 7 August 2024. On 25 September 2024, the Respondent sent a detailed email rejecting his appeal and giving reasons for same. The Appellant seeks to challenge that decision by way of judicial review.

4 I refuse leave on five of the six grounds advanced by the Appellant on the basis they are not arguable and/or he lacks standing to advance them. I consider the first ground — that the applicable law was not identified in the immobilisation notice — meets the arguability and standing requirements, and that the doctrine of de minimis should not prevent leave being granted. It may well be that at the substantive hearing of this matter, the Respondent will persuade the High Court that the matter is indeed de minimis. However, my detailed review of the case law on this area outlined below (a luxury not afforded to the trial judge given the weekly volume of cases where leave is sought to apply for judicial review) persuades me that the Appellant ought not to be refused leave for his only arguable ground solely on the doctrine of de minimis.

5 I should add I have carefully read the dissenting judgment by my colleague Meenan J. and acknowledge the force of his reasoning, in particular his point that the Appellant must be presumed to know that parking is prohibited on a continuous white line on a roadway of less than three lanes and therefore it is not necessary that the immobilisation notice identifies the legal provisions breached (here, reg. 36(2)(d) of the Road Traffic (Traffic and Parking) Regulations 1997 (the “ 1997 Regulations”). This is undoubtedly a substantive point that may ultimately be decided against the Appellant. But all I am doing at this point is deciding if the Appellant has raised an arguable case. He does not have to show he has a strong case, or that he is likely to succeed at the ultimate hearing. The leave application is simply a filter, designed to weed out the very weakest cases. For that reason, I respectfully differ from my colleague in this respect.

DECISION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE/NOTICE OF APPEAL

6 In her ex tempore judgment, the trial judge gave two grounds for her refusal to grant leave. She focused upon the fact that the points raised were entirely technical and did not reach the de minimis standard. She observed that in his two appeals, the Appellant had never challenged the location of the car, and that in those circumstances, the technical points that he had raised were not sufficient to satisfy her that this was a matter that should take up a place in the High Court judicial review list, having regard to the level at which the charge was set. She emphasised that it was not solely the level of the charge that influenced her, but also the nature of the grounds and the fact that the Appellant did not contest the fact that he was parked on a road where there was a continuous white line.

7 The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 23 April 2025, where he identified three grounds of appeal. The first was that the trial judge erred in finding the case did not meet the de minimis threshold of the High Court. He argued that the case was a legitimate use of the Court's time and resources and that to hold otherwise would provide the Respondent with no judicial oversight of its role as a regulator of clamping and towing activities conducted by private and public bodies within the State. He argued that not only he, but also many other motorists, were impacted by the impugned decision.

8 Second, he argued that the trial judge misconceived the relevance of whether there needed to be an admission by him as to where he had parked, that this was a matter for the hearing of the judicial review proceedings and was beside the point in the circumstances where he was challenging the process by which the decision was made.

9 Finally, he argued that the trial judge did not give due consideration to his application for judicial review.

GROUNDS RAISED BY THE APPELLANT

10 I will return to the de minimis point raised by the trial judge after addressing the detail of his six grounds of challenge. The Appellant's first ground is that the immobilisation notice (attached as Annex 1 to this judgment to assist the reader in understanding the points made by the Appellant in this respect) fixed to the vehicle stated that the alleged offence of parking opposite a continuous white line was in contravention of s. 35 of the Road Traffic Act 1994. He notes that s. 35 does not contain the offence of parking opposite a continuous white line but rather gives the Minister power to make regulations. He contends that the offence which ought to have been cited is reg. 36(2)(d) of the 1997 Regulations and that the immobilisation notice failed entirely to reference that offence. He argues that the failure to...