Keogh and Ors v an Coimisiún Pleanála and Anor

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Humphreys J.
• Judgment Date: 29 May 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IEHC 339
• Docket Number: [H.JR.2026.0000074]

In the Matter of Section 50, 50A and 50B of the Planning and Development Act 2000

Between

Stephen Keogh, Tom Quirke and Rural Residents Wind Aware and Environmental Group

Applicants

and

An Coimisiún Pleanála

Respondent

and

EDF Renewables Ireland Limited

Notice Party

[2026] IEHC 339

[H.JR.2026.0000074]

THE HIGH COURT

PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT

Planning permission – Judicial review – Onus of proof – Applicants seeking an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent to grant planning permission – Whether the applicants discharged the onus of proof

Facts: The applicants, Mr Keogh, Mr Quirke and Rural Residents Wind Aware and Environmental Group, applied to the High Court seeking inter alia: an order of certiorari by way of application for judicial review quashing the decision of the respondent, An Coimisiún Pleanála (the commission), dated 27 November 2025, granting permission to the notice party, EDF Renewables Ireland Ltd, on appeal from the planning authority first instance decision (Planning Ref. No. 24/60122) for the construction of 7 wind turbines and associated works within Killeshin Hills, in the townland of Ridge, Agharue, Coolnakisha and Seskinrea, County Carlow (ABP-320354-24); and an order pursuant to Order 84 rule 20(8)(b) of the Superior Court Rules staying the development by the notice party, its affiliates, assigns, servants and/or agents of the lands pending conclusion of the proceedings.

Held by Humphreys J that: (i) an applicant must discharge the onus of proof to establish all matters necessary for relief; (ii) the applicants had failed to establish the factual premises of their complaints generally; (iii) there is a presumption (the onus to rebut which falls on a judicial review applicant) that material has been considered if the decision-taker says so; (iv) the applicants had not discharged that onus; (v) judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the correctness of the decision; (vi) the proceedings were in substance a merits-based disagreement with the merits of the commission’s acceptance of the developer’s position as opposed to their objections; (vii) an applicant’s point must be properly pleaded; (viii) the applicants could not maintain a ground that amounted to a collateral challenge to the validity of ministerial guidelines without seeking appropriate relief; (ix) a planning decision-taker is required, where it relevantly arises, to address the text of development plans and enjoys a zone of evaluative judgment in relation to development plan provisions that involve flexibility; (x) the commission did consider the relevant text of the development plan, and such text did confer a space for evaluative judgment especially where different provisions of the plan pointed in different directions; (xi) the standard as to reasons amounts to an obligation to furnish the main reasons on the main issues, with the decision-taker having an evaluative role to determine what issues raised in submissions are main issues; (xii) the applicants had not demonstrated any shortcoming in the reasons articulated; (xiii) judicial review is a discretionary remedy within established doctrinal boundaries; (xiv) even if counterfactually the applicants were otherwise entitled to relief, such relief should be refused particularly having regard to the applicants’ failure to make many of the points in the administrative process and/or by reference to the overriding public interest in renewable energy infrastructure as recognised in national and EU law in order to address the urgent requirements of the climate emergency.

Humphreys J dismissed the proceedings.

Proceedings dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Friday 29 May 2026

1 . The renewable energy development in this case was found acceptable by the inspector and the commission following a consideration of the relevant legal and policy context and submissions by stakeholders. The applicants naturally have a merits-based disagreement with the outcome, but the question for consideration is whether their objections give rise to grounds rendering the decision a nullity.

2 . The way the system is supposed to work is that when questions of principle are decided by appellate courts, the answers are applied in practice to the facts of individual cases by trial courts. In that regard the following are notable:

• (i) In A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2, [2011] 1 I.R. 729, [2011] 2 I.L.R.M. 100, [2011] 1 JIC 2501; Khashaba v. Medical Council [2016] IESC 10, [2016] 3 JIC 0701, 2016 WJSC-SC 12280 per O'Malley J. (Denham C.J. and Clarke J. concurring) at para. 56; Casey v. Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government & Ors. [2021] IESC 42, [2021] 7 JIC 1606 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Baker J., 16 July 2021) (Clarke C.J., O'Donnell, MacMenamin and Dunne JJ. concurring) at §§29 and 31; Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2024] IESC 28, ( [2024] 7 JIC 0402 Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024) per Murray J. at paras. 39 et seq. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court emphasised that applicants are confined to their pleadings. In Concerned Residents of Treascon and Clondoolusk v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 28, ( [2024] 7 JIC 0402 Unreported, Supreme Court, 4 July 2024), per Murray J. (O'Donnell C.J., Woulfe, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court emphasised that complex EU law arguments need to be articulated on the pleadings with particular clarity. In Hellfire Massy Residents Association v. An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 38, [2024] 1 I.R. 386, [2022] 10 JIC 2402 per O'Donnell C.J. at para. 22 (Dunne, Woulfe, Hogan and Murray JJ. concurring), and per MacMenamin J. (Fennelly and Clarke JJ. concurring) in Babington v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform & Ors. ( [2012] IESC 65 Unreported, Supreme Court, 18 December 2012) at para. 7, the Supreme Court emphasised that scattergun pleadings are inappropriate.

• (ii) In ( [2026] IESC 22 Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2026) at para. 1 per Donnelly J. (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Finlay C.J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642 at p. 654 (Hamilton P. concurring); per Denham J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701 at p. 743; ( [2014] IESC 50 Sweeney v. Fahy Unreported, Supreme Court, 31 July 2014) per Clarke J. (Dunne J. concurring) at paras. 3.8–3.15), the Supreme Court emphasised that judicial review is concerned with the legality rather than the merits of the decision.

• (iii) In ( [2026] IESC 22 Amariei v. Chief Appeals Officer Unreported, Supreme Court, 25 March 2026) at para. 96 per Donnelly J. (O'Donnell C.J., Charleton and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Denham J. (Murray C.J. and Fennelly J. concurring) in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3, [2010] 2 I.R. 701 at p. 743; O'Doherty and Waters v. Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 421 per O'Donnell C.J. (Irvine P., MacMenamin, O'Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring) at para. 116), the Supreme Court emphasised that an applicant must have discharged the onus of proof to establish all facts necessary for relief. In An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J. at para. 124 (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring), the Supreme Court took the approach that in the context of a challenge to an environmental assessment, the onus of proof to show a defect generally lies on the applicant.

• (iv) In G.K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418, [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 401, the Supreme Court decided that there is a presumption (the onus to rebut which falls on a judicial review applicant) that material has been considered if the decision-taker says so (see also An Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors. [2022] IESC 8, [2022] 2 I.R. 173, [2022] 1 I.L.R.M. 281 per Hogan J. (O'Donnell C.J., Dunne, Charleton and Woulfe JJ. concurring) at para. 137; Rana v. Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O'Malley J., 18 October 2024), para. 91 (Dunne, Hogan, Collins and Donnelly JJ. concurring)).

• (v) In Sherwin v. An Bord Pleanála [2024] IESC 13 (Unreported, Supreme Court, Woulfe J., 11 April 2024) (Charleton, O'Malley, Baker and Murray JJ. concurring) (see also per Keane C.J. (Denham, Murphy and McGuinness JJ. concurring) in Baby O v. Minister for Justice [2002] IESC 44, [2002] 2 I.R. 169, [2003] 1 I.L.R.M. 24), the Supreme Court decided that evaluative judgements involving a significant degree of planning judgement and not tainted by other procedural, legal or factual errors are reviewable on an irrationality standard.

• (vi) In Coolglass Wind Farm Ltd v. An Coimisiún Pleanála [2026] IESC 5 (Unreported, Supreme Court, O'Donnell C.J., 4 February 2026) para. 118(xiv), the Supreme Court emphasised the relevance of the extent to which submissions on a given point were made to the decision-taker, which decision is consistent with the general principle that, apart from autonomous-type obligations, material capable of sustaining the point must have been properly before the decision-taker at the relevant time such as to give rise to a duty to consider it.

• (vii) In Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IESC 25, [2008] 3 I.R. 795, per Denham J. (Murray C.J., Fennelly, Kearns and Finnegan JJ. concurring); per Clarke J. (Fennelly and MacMenamin JJ. concurring) in ( [2012] IESC 26 Rawson v. Minister for Defence Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 May 2012) at para. 6.9, the Supreme Court approached the question of reasons on the basis that there is no obligation to...