Keohane v Cork Circuit Court Judge

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Judgment Date: 01 January 1947
• Date: 01 January 1947
• Court: Supreme Court

The State (Keohane) v. Cork Circuit Court Judge and Cork District Justice.

THE STATE (at the prosecution of CORNELIUS KEOHANE)

and

THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE OF CORK and THE DISTRICT JUSTICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT AREA OF CORK

Respondents.

Supreme Court.

District Court - Summary jurisdiction - Indictable offences - Charges of attempting to obtain money by false pretences - Whether charges within the jurisdiction of District Court - Request by accused's solicitor for summary trial - Decision by District Justice to try the charges summarily - Whether in such circumstances the District Justice must then inquire of the accused if he objects to be tried summarily - Conviction on summary trial - Appeal against conviction - Appeal withdrawn - Order of District Justice affirmed by Circuit Court Judge - Certiorari to quash orders of District Justice and Circuit Court Judge - Whether order of District Justice bad on its face - Courts of Justice Act, 1924, s. 77 B. - District Court Rules, rr. 49, 50 and 51.

The accused was charged in the District Court on two counts of attempting to obtain money by false pretences and on a third count of having obtained money by false pretences. Through his solicitor he requested a summary trial of the charges. That course was followed and the accused was convicted and sentenced on each count. The District Justice had not first formally inquired of the accused if he objected to summary trial in respect of each count. The accused appealed to the Circuit Court but withdrew his appeal. and the Circuit Court Judge affirmed the convictions and sentences.

The accused obtained a conditional order of certiorari to quash the orders on the grounds that s. 77 B of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, does not give the District Court summary jurisdiction in cases of attempting to obtain money by false pretences, and that under the section the District Justice should have first heard the evidence before deciding that the case was fit to be tried summarily, and that before entering on the summary trial he should have inquired of the accused in respect of each count if he objected to being tried summarily. He also contended that the orders were invalid by reason of their ambiguity.

Held by Maguire P. that the District Justice had jurisdiction to try summarily attempts to obtain money by false pretences, and that the orders were not invalid for ambiguity, and that the accused could not rely on his other grounds of objection as the summary trial was at his own request. The conditional order must therefore be discharged.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held by the Supreme Court, reversing Maguire P., that the District Justice had no jurisdiction under s. 77 B of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, to try summarily the charges of attempting to obtain money by false pretences, and accordingly the conditional order must be made absolute in respect of these two charges.

But held further, as regards the charge of obtaining money by false pretences, the conditions laid down by s. 77 B were satisfied, and, as the question whether a conviction was good on its face depended upon the entry in the Minute Book, and as the three charges in this cage were set out in separate entries in the Minute Book under distinct numbers, these entries clearly showed that there was a separate conviction and sentence in respect of each offence charged and there was no ambiguity and accordingly the conditional order must be discharged.

Certiorari.

The facts have been summarised in the head note and are sufficiently set out, for the purpose of this report, in the judgment of Maguire P.

Maguire P. :—

The prosecutor in this case came before the District Court at Cork on 15th September, 1944, to answer a summons which charged him with three separate offences, two of them were for having attempted to obtain money by false pretences, and the third was for having obtained money by false pretences.

The District Justice convicted an all three charges. The prosecutor appealed to the Circuit Court against the convictions, but on 16th January, 1945, he withdrew his appeal, and the Circuit Court Judge affirmed the convictions and sentences of the District Justice.

On 19th February, 1945, the prosecutor was granted a conditional order of certiorari to bring up the convictions and order of the Circuit Court Judge for the purpose of having them quashed. The prosecutor now applies to have this conditional order made absolute, notwithstanding cause shown.

The main ground relied on in support of the application is that the District Justice had no jurisdiction to try summarily a charge of attempting to obtain money by false pretences.

It is conceded that the District Court has no jurisdiction other than that conferred on it by statute, and that we must look at s. 77 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, to discover what that jurisdiction is. The relevant part of the section is 77 B, which defines the jurisdiction of the District Court in criminal cases. The wording of that part of the section has been subjected to acute analysis and criticism by Mr. O'Driscoll, and it cannot be denied that the wording is not as clear as it might be. Sect. 77 provides that the District Court shall have the jurisdiction in civil cases set out under head A, and that it shall have the jurisdiction in criminal cases set out under head B. This heading opens with the words "in any of the following cases." These words are followed by the qualification that the jurisdiction is only exercisable if the District Justice "shall be of opinion that the facts proved against the accused constitute a minor offence fit to be tried summarily and the accused (inquiry having been made of him by the Justice) does not object to being so tried." I shall have to refer to this part of the section later, when dealing with the second point raised by the prosecutor.

The first sub-paragraph which follows the opening paragraph is: "in larceny, receiving, embezzlement or false pretences. . . ." In this case we are concerned with "false...