L.A. v The Chief Appeals Officer and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: Supreme Court
• Judge: Ms. Justice Donnelly,Mr. Justice Woulfe
• Judgment Date: 25 March 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IESC 22
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Record No.: S:AP:IE:2025:000080 High Court Record No.: 2023/216 JR

Between/

Lacramioara Amariei

Appellant

and

The Chief Appeals Officer, The Social Welfare Appeals Office and The Minister for Social Protection

Respondents

[2026] IESC 22

O'Donnell CJ.

Charleton J.

Woulfe J.

Murray J.

Donnelly J.

Supreme Court Record No.: S:AP:IE:2025:000080

Court of Appeal Record No.: A:AP:IE:2024:000236

High Court Record No.: 2023/216 JR

AN CHÚIRT UACHTARACH

THE SUPREME COURT

Disability allowance – Judicial review – Alternative remedy – Appellant seeking judicial review – Whether the appellant had available to her an adequate alternative remedy

Facts: The appellant applied for disability allowance. On 14 June 2022, she was notified that the deciding officer had refused her application of 6 April 2022 on the basis that she did not satisfy the medical criteria. The appellant appealed that decision, and it was referred to an appeals officer under s. 311 of the Social Welfare Consolidation Act 2005. On 22 September 2022, the appeal was disallowed by an appeals officer on two grounds: (1) she did not satisfy the medical criteria; and (2) her means were in excess of the qualifying amount. The appellant sought a review of that decision. The appeals officer carried out that review pursuant to s. 317 of the 2005 Act. By letter dated 21 December 2022, the appellant was informed that the appeals officer upheld his decision. On 15 May 2023, the High Court (Meenan J) granted the appellant leave to apply by way of an application for judicial review. On 28 March 2024, Owens J delivered judgment in the matter. The High Court made an order setting aside the appeals officer’s conclusion on the issue of the appellant’s means and remitted that discrete issue for reconsideration. On 5 March 2025, the Court of Appeal (Collins J) allowed the respondents’ appeal. The appellant’s appeal to the Supreme Court brought up issues concerning: (i) what constitutes an adequate alternative remedy; (ii) on whom the onus lies to demonstrate that the remedy proposed is actually adequate; (iii) whether the existence of an adequate alternative remedy gives rise to the default position that judicial review does not lie in those circumstances; and (iv) specific issues regarding the social welfare system of appeals and revisions.

Held by Donnelly J that the appeal presented the opportunity to look again at the well-established principle that where there is an adequate remedy by way of an alternative appeal, then recourse to judicial review may be disallowed. Donnelly J’s judgment drew together general principles relating to the requirement to exhaust alternative remedies. Starting with the default position that alternative remedies must be exhausted, Donnelly J held that these principles will provide guidance for litigants and judges in applications for judicial review and applications for leave to apply for judicial review. Applying the principles to the proper interpretation of the remedies available under the 2005 Act, Donnelly J found that the appellant had available to her an adequate alternative remedy in the form of an application to the Chief Appeals Officer under s. 318 of the 2005 Act to revise the decision of the appeals officer; she had failed to exhaust that remedy and her application for judicial review ought to have been refused.

Donnelly J therefore dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Donnelly delivered on the 25 ^th of March 2026

1 . Judicial review is a vital public law safeguard for upholding the rule of law by ensuring that administrative decision makers exercise their powers in accordance with the law and the Constitution. Broadly speaking, judicial review provides a citizen or individual who interacts with the administrative arm of the State with access to a court so that grievances and complaints concerning the legality of decisions against their interests can be adjudicated upon. Judicial review contrasts with an appeal on the facts because it is not concerned with the merits of the decision; it is concerned with its legality.

2 . In modern Ireland, the breadth of the State's administrative reach is staggering. On a daily basis, there are probably hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions being taken on individual applications across a wide range of areas by various branches of the State's administration (central or local). Examples include decisions concerning social protection entitlements, tax obligations, planning and development matters, valuation of property, immigration and asylum matters, agriculture/fishing entitlements, and many other regulatory and licensing areas. There is no single type of decision-making structure that covers all such administrative decisions and, with great relevance to these proceedings, there is no single type of appellate structure.

3 . Good administrative practice makes provision for an appellate procedure. Depending on the nature of the issue involved, this can include internal administrative appeal processes or an appeal to some structured appellate body. The latter bodies, while not necessarily administering justice, may be quasi-judicial bodies with a requirement to act judicially. Some appellate structures, such as the Workplace Relations Commissions (as a statutory body it is subject to judicial review although it may be dealing with private law disputes), are involved in the administration of justice. Many, but not all, administrative decision-making structures provide for an appeal to the courts on a point of law while some permit an appeal on the facts which may or may not involve a complete rehearing of the case.

4 . It is well-established and was not contested, nor could it have been contested, that where there is an adequate remedy by way of an alternative appeal then recourse to judicial review may be disallowed. This appeal raises the question of how that fundamental principle operates in the statutory regime of appeals and revisions set out in the Social Welfare Consolidation Act, 2005 (“the 2005 Act”). To answer that question, it will be necessary to examine the origin of and the rationale for the development of the fundamental principle that an applicant for judicial review may be required to first exhaust an adequate alternative remedy.

The Determination Granting Leave to Appeal

5 . This appeal is concerned with Part 10 of the 2005 Act and the exhaustion of adequate alternative remedies provided thereunder before bringing an application for judicial review. The determination of this Court published on 30 July 2025 ( [2025] IESCDET 109) identified the issue in this appeal as follows:

“Where an applicant for a social welfare benefit or allowance is dissatisfied with the decision of an Appeals Officer, what effect does a) the availability of an application to the Chief Appeals Officer under s. 318 and b) the possibility of a statutory appeal under s. 327, have on the entitlement to proceed by way of an application for judicial review of the Appeals Officer's decision?”

Part 10 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 2005

6 . Part 10 of the 2005 Act sets out a detailed code for the revision of, and appeals against, decisions made thereunder. The most relevant of these are addressed in the following paragraphs.

7 . Pursuant to s. 300 of the 2005 Act, every question on entitlement to social insurance, social assistance and other payments under what can be termed the general heading of social protection, is to be decided by a deciding officer. Revision of those decisions can take place under s. 301 where, inter alia, it appears to the deciding officer that the decision was erroneous (a) in light of new evidence or new facts brought to their attention since the date on which the decision was given or, (b) by reason of some mistake having been made in relation to the law or the facts.

8 . Where the person is dissatisfied with the decision of the deciding officer an appeal may be brought. The procedure requires that a notice of appeal be sent to the Chief Appeals Officer who then assigns an appeals officer to the appeal. Under s. 311, where the matter is referred to an appeals officer, the appeals officer, in deciding the question, is not confined to the grounds on which the decision was based but may decide the question as if it were being decided for the first time.

9 . For the purposes of this appeal ss. 317, 318 and 327 of the 2005 Act are of particular importance.

10 . Section 317 allows for revision of a decision of an appeals officer by an appeals officer, and in so far as is relevant provides:

“(1) An appeals officer may at any time revise any decision of an appeals officer—

(a) where it appears to him or her that the decision was erroneous in the light of new evidence or new facts which have been brought to his or her notice since the date on which it was given, or

(b) where—

(i) the effect of the decision was to entitle a person to any benefit within the meaning of section 240, and

(ii) it appears to the appeals officer that there has been any relevant change of circumstances which has come to notice since that decision was given.”

11 . What is apparent from s. 317 is that, unlike the s. 301 provision for revision by a deciding officer, s. 317 is only directed towards revision where new evidence or new facts are produced or where there is a relevant change in circumstances. By contrast, the second limb provided for in s. 301 (i.e. revision for mistake) is, in accordance with s. 318, assigned to the Chief Appeals Officer.

12 . Section 318 provides that “[t]he Chief Appeals Officer may, at any time, revise any decision of an appeals officer, where it appears to the Chief Appeals Officer that the decision was erroneous by reason of some mistake having been made in relation to the law or the facts.”

13 . Section 327 makes provision for a statutory appeal on a point of law to the High Court.

“Any person who is dissatisfied with—

(a) the...