M.A. (Bangladesh), S.A. and A.Z. (A Minor Suing by his Father and Next Friend M.A.) v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal, The Minister for Justice and Equality, The Attorney General and Ireland
| Jurisdiction | Ireland |
| Judge | Humphreys J. |
| Judgment Date | 26 April 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] IEHC 264 |
| Docket Number | [2017 No. 116 JR] |
| Court | High Court |
| Date | 26 April 2021 |
[2021] IEHC 264
[2017 No. 116 JR]
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Costs – Fall-back discretion – Dublin III regulation – Parties seeking costs – Whether costs should follow the event
Facts: The High Court (Humphreys J), on 8th November, 2017, referred certain questions concerning the Dublin III regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013) to the CJEU under art. 267 TFEU (M.A. (Bangladesh) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal (No. 1) [2017] IEHC 677). On foot of that reference, on 23rd January, 2019, in Case C-661/17 M.A. v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal (ECLI:EU:C:2019:53), the CJEU answered the reference in a sense that was, in essence, favourable to the interpretation advanced by the respondents, the International Protection Appeals Tribunal, the Minister for Justice and Equality, the Attorney General and Ireland. In separate proceedings (U. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2017] IEHC 490; U. v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2017] IEHC 613), O’Regan J had found for the State on the question at issue, namely who was to exercise the fall-back discretion under art. 17 of the Dublin III regulation. The Court of Appeal reversed that position and found for the applicants (N.V.U. v The Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2019] IECA 183) and the Supreme Court was to go on to reverse that judgment and reinstate the High Court’s finding for the State (N.V.U. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2020] IESC 46). The Supreme Court granted 50% of the costs in that court to the losing applicants, made no order as to costs in the Court of Appeal and upheld the order giving the applicants 50% of the High Court costs which was granted by the trial judge, despite the applicants having lost there as well. The judgment of the CJEU was of significant relevance in resolving the European law aspects of the problem and contributed substantially to the clarification of the questions at issue. The Minister for Justice decided on a discretionary basis to admit the applicants to the protection process, so as a result it had been agreed that these proceedings were moot and should be dismissed. The respondents sought full costs whereas the applicants sought a contribution to their costs albeit that counsel did not particularise that by reference to a percentage or a specific amount, but rather left that to the court.
Held by Humphreys J that this case was as or nearly as significant to the ultimate determination of the issue as was the N.V.U. case itself. Humphreys J held that this case provided the mechanism for the reference and the judgment of the CJEU which furnished an EU law interpretation without which it would have been difficult to envisage complete finalisation of the point. In these very special and unusual circumstances, therefore, and taking fully into account the default position of costs following the event as well as all of the other factors, whether reinforcing that default position or otherwise, Humphreys J held that it was appropriate to follow the lead of the Supreme Court and to award the applicants 50% of the total costs of the proceedings.
Humphreys J held that the proceedings would be dismissed and that the applicants would be awarded as against the respondents 50% of the total costs of the proceedings (which total would include the costs of and related to the proceedings before the CJEU and all reserved costs).
Costs awarded to applicants.
(NO. 2)
JUDGMENT of Humphreys J. delivered on Monday the 26th day of April, 2021
In M.A. (Bangladesh) v. International Protection Appeals Tribunal (No. 1) [2017] IEHC 677, ( [2017] 11 JIC 0801 Unreported High Court 8th November, 2017), I referred certain questions concerning the Dublin III regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013) to the CJEU under art. 267 TFEU.
On foot of that reference, in Case C-661/17 M.A. v. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal (Court of Justice of the European Union, 23rd January, 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:53), the CJEU answered the reference in a sense that was, in essence, favourable to the interpretation advanced by the respondents.
In separate proceedings, ( [2017] IEHC 490 U. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Unreported, High Court, 26th June, 2017); ( [2017] IEHC 613 U. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Unreported, High Court, 24th October, 2017), O'Regan J. had found for the State on the question at issue, namely who was to exercise the fall-back discretion under art. 17 of the Dublin III regulation.
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