A.M.A. v The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration [No. 3]

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley
• Judgment Date: 30 January 2026
• Neutral Citation: [2026] IEHC 50
• Docket Number: Record No: 2025/1795 JR

Between/

A.M.A.

Applicant

and

The Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (No.3)

Respondent

[2026] IEHC 50

Record No: 2025/1795 JR

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

Judicial review – Deportation – Stay – Applicant seeking a stay on the execution of a deportation order – Whether there were adverse practical consequences of being deported pending the applicant's application to the Supreme Court

Facts: The applicant made an interlocutory application on 19 January 2026 for a stay on the execution of a deportation order pending an application to the Supreme Court seeking to appeal an ex tempore ruling delivered on 16 December 2025 where the High Court (Bradley J) refused an application made the previous evening for leave to apply for judicial review and an injunction. In terms of the arguments made on behalf of the applicant in the application, and bearing in mind developments which occurred after the initial ‘leave’ application was made on 15 December 2025 including the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dated 15 January 2026, in making an assumption that the applicant had established a stateable or arguable basis for the appeal, Bradley J then assessed the potential injustice that might result from, on the one hand, intervening in favour of the applicant only to find that he has lost, as opposed to not intervening in his favour only to find that the appeal was successful, on the other hand. What this meant practically for the applicant was that if Bradley J did not grant a stay, in all likelihood he would be deported and if he succeeded in his application to extend and his admission to appeal before the Supreme Court, the question arises as to whether this would amount to an injustice to the applicant and, alternatively, if Bradley J did grant a stay and the Supreme Court refuses his applications, the question arises as to whether this would amount to an injustice to the respondent, the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration.

Held by Bradley J that in this application for a stay on the deportation order served on the applicant, and having regard to the matters set out by Clarke J at para. 104(b)(iv) of Okunade v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 49 (that the court give all due weight to the consequences for the applicant of being required to comply with the measure under challenge in circumstances where that measure may be found to be unlawful), Bradley J did not consider that the applicant had established that there were adverse practical consequences of being deported pending his application to the Supreme Court or prior to 14 February 2026 such as, for example, the relevant conditions in Egypt, which was designated as a safe country and was the country to which the applicant was likely to be deported or that the presence of the applicant was necessary insofar as the determination of the Supreme Court of his applications to that Court or that anything more than ordinary disruption in being removed would apply to his circumstances. Bradley J refused the application for a stay or injunction on the deportation order dated 3 October 2025 which had been served on the applicant by letter dated 9 October 2025.

Bradley J proposed making an order refusing the applicant’s application for a stay or injunction on the deportation order.

Application refused.

REDACTED

RULING of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 30 ^th day of January 2026

INTRODUCTION

1 This ruling arises from an interlocutory application made on Monday 19 ^th January 2026 for a stay on the execution of a deportation order pending an application to the Supreme Court seeking to appeal an ex tempore ruling delivered on Tuesday 16 ^th December 2025 where I refused an application made the previous evening (Monday 15 ^th December 2025) for leave to apply for judicial review and an injunction.

2 The Applicant had applied for leave to apply for judicial review, on notice to the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration (“the Minister”), to challenge a deportation order dated 3 ^rd October 2025 which had been served on him by letter dated 9 ^th October 2025 and an injunction restraining the implementation of the deportation order.

3 During the week beginning Monday 15 ^th December to Saturday 20 ^th December 2025, I refused the following applications made by the Applicant: (i) the application for leave to apply for judicial review challenging a deportation order together with an application for an injunction restraining the Applicant's deportation (the “principal ruling” delivered on Tuesday 16 ^th December 2025); and (ii) an application for a certificate for leave to appeal the aforesaid refusals to the Court of Appeal (the “second ruling” delivered on Saturday 20 ^th December 2025).

4 After refusing the application for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on the point of law proposed pursuant to s. 5(6)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), having regard to the fact that this ruling was given on Saturday 20 ^th December 2025, when the Courts were closed for the Christmas vacation, and that its effect meant that if the Applicant wanted to pursue the matter any further, an application would have to be made for admission to the Supreme Court, I placed a temporary stay on the deportation order (the subject of the judicial review challenge) until 19 ^th January 2026, the week after the commencement of the new term. After delivering that ruling on Saturday 20 ^th December 2025, Senior Counsel for the Applicant indicated that the matter was concluded insofar as the High Court was concerned and that the only avenue available to the Applicant would be an application to the Supreme Court.

5 For what were essentially practical reasons, without any interlocutory hearing of the matter, and having regard to the particular time of year, the fact that the courts were closed and that the new term would not commence until Monday 12 ^th January 2026, and in circumstances where a certificate application to appeal to the Court of Appeal had been refused, I considered that a temporary and time-limited stay on the deportation order to 19 ^th January 2026 was warranted to allow the Applicant make an application to the Supreme Court, as indicated. By analogy, that approach was in keeping, in general terms, with the observations of the Supreme Court (Hogan J.) in MD v The Board of Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 (para.42) that if granting interim relief in judicial review proceedings, “ that relief should be time limited, and it should also provide that the onus lies with the moving party to apply for interlocutory relief on notice to the respondent.”

6 In this interlocutory application, the Applicant accepts that he is not in any sense entitled, because of the exceptional circumstances in which the temporary and time-limited stay was granted, that it be renewed simpliciter. Each of the parties accept that it is appropriate that this application for a stay be now made.

7 A letter dated 15 ^th January 2026 from the Applicant's solicitor together with the Application for Leave to Appeal (to the Supreme Court) dated 15 ^th January 2026 describes what occurred after the High Court ruling on Saturday 20 ^th December 2025.

8 In summary, it appears that the appeal or application to the Supreme Court was not in fact filed in the Supreme Court until 15 ^th January 2026, rather than 7 ^th January 2026, and is, therefore, also the subject of an extension of time application to the Supreme Court. It is explained that this arose due to a misunderstanding both in relation to the expiry of the time limit for filing the Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court and also as to when time would run from the order made on 16 ^th December 2025 (and perfected on 18 ^th December 2025).

THE APPLICABLE TEST

9 The parties agree that the test to be applied in this application is that set out by the Supreme Court in its decisions in CC & Ors v The Minister for Justice & Ors [2016] 2 I.R. 680 (“ CC”) referring to Okunade v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 49, [2012] 3 I.R. 152 (“ Okunade”) and in MD v The Board of Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 (“ MD”).

10 In CC, the Supreme Court held that in considering whether to grant a stay or an interlocutory injunction pending the hearing of an appeal, the court should apply the test applicable to applications for interlocutory orders pending a trial at first instance as set out in Okunade. The first question was as to whether there was any stateable or arguable basis for the appeal itself. If there was, then the court had to assess the potential injustice that might result from, on the one hand, intervening in favour of the appellant only to find that the appellant lost, as opposed to not intervening in favour of the appellant only to find that the appeal was successful.

APPLICATION OF THE TEST

11 Whilst there is scope for potential confusion as to the standards to be applied when the standard for the leave application in a challenge to a deportation order is ‘ substantial grounds’, the test for an injunction is that set out in Okunade, the first limb of which, at para. 104(a) of Clarke J.'s judgment, provides that the court should first determine whether the applicant has established an arguable case and if not, the application must be refused, and the standard for the certificate application is whether the principal ruling involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and it was desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken, the authorities cited make clear that my overarching approach in considering the parties' arguments in this interlocutory application is to minimise the risk of injustice and to apply the test set out in Okunade, CC and MD.

12 The weight to be attached to the considerations will vary depending on the type of case and the individual facts and whilst the...