Massey and Others v Kennedy and Others

• Jurisdiction: Ireland
• Court: High Court
• Judge: Mr. Justice Oisín Quinn
• Judgment Date: 30 October 2025
• Neutral Citation: [2025] IEHC 588
• Docket Number: Record No. 2025 / 3733 P

Between:-

Eoin Massey and Tom Murray Babyloncg Limited (In Liquidation) and Wildemontassets Limited (In Liquidation)

Plaintiffs

and

David Kennedy and David Kennedy Financial Consulting Limited and Danielle Colgan

Defendants

[2025] IEHC 588

Record No. 2025 / 3733 P

THE HIGH COURT

Ex Tempore Judgment of Mr. Justice Oisín Quinn delivered on 30 October, 2025

I. INTRODUCTION

1 This case concerns concerns an application on behalf of the plaintiffs for an order permitting Michael Leyden (the “Receiver”) to transfer the balance of funds held by him being €319,000 to an account designated by the plaintiffs for the ultimate benefit of the shareholders of the two companies in liquidation (both of which are plaintiffs), save for such fees, costs and expenses as are agreed between the plaintiffs and the receiver.

2 The application was heard over one day on the 29 October, 2025.

3 The Receiver, Mr. Leyden was appointed by the High Court, by order of Mr. Justice Cregan on the 23 July 2025. This order was made on consent and included inter alia, the granting of judgment in favour of the plaintiffs against the first named defendant in the sum of €588,301.89. In addition, and importantly, it provided at paragraph (n) that, pursuant to Order 45 rule 9 and Order 50 rule (6) of the RSC the Receiver was appointed by way of equitable execution to recover such funds to answer the judgment of €588,301.89 “subject to all just claims and allowances thereto and thereon”.

4 Both the plaintiffs and the Receiver want to pay the balance of the €319,000 over to the plaintiffs save for a deduction in relation to the costs and expenses of the Receiver. The first name defendant objects to the application on the basis that no account has been taken of any “just claims” which may relate to these monies.

5 The consent order of the 23 July 2025 also provided that the first named defendant was to transfer the sum of €300,000 euro from a bank account to the Receiver's account and secondly, it contained an order that the third name defendant (who is the first name defendant's wife) was to pay the sum of €19,000 to the Receiver. Aside from those sums, the receiver has not, as yet, collected in any other assets or monies to answer the balance of the judgment granted in favour of the plaintiffs.

6 The key dispute in relation to this motion is the meaning of the phrase at the end of paragraph (n) of the order, “ subject to all just claims and allowances thereto and thereon.”

II. BACKGROUND

7 The background to this matter is contained in the affidavits before the court. The two plaintiffs are liquidators, jointly appointed to the two companies in liquidation by way of the passing of a special resolution by the sole members of each of these companies on the 20th of May 2025. The plaintiffs were appointed as replacement liquidators for the first named defendant who was originally appointed as liquidator to each of the companies on the 25th of July 2024, but who was subsequently removed, also by way a special resolution on the 20th of May 2025.

8 The removal of the first named defendant arose after a breakdown in the relationship between the first named defendant, and the shareholders of the two companies, Mr. Cormac Quinlan and Mr. Gavin Quinlan. That breakdown arose because of the wrongful actions of the first named defendant in relation to his duties as liquidator. The two companies were formally shareholders in another company called KCR Taverns Limited which owned a gastropub known as the Black Lion in Inchicore. The two companies had operated as non-trading holding companies and their winding up, by means of a solvent winding up, was necessary to release funds to both of the Quinlans.

9 Mr. Kennedy was supposed to proceed with the liquidation and liaise with the Revenue and release the funds to the Quinlans. However, when he obtained the funds, he transferred them into accounts controlled by him and essentially appears to have wrongfully converted them to his own use while at the same time misleading the Quinlans as to the progress of obtaining revenue clearance. When this wrongdoing was discovered the first named Defendant was removed and the matter was reported to the Gardai and these proceedings commenced.

10 On the 3 July 2025 a successful ex parte application for a Mareva injunction was made. Thereafter, the matter moved quickly before the court, and by the 23 July 2025 the Consent order referred to above was made, essentially bring the substantive proceedings to an end.

11 The plaintiffs had claimed a proprietary interest in certain monies held by the first named defendant. Notably however, the consent order did not require the transfer of the €300,000.00 to the plaintiffs. Rather, as explained above, the monies were instead to be transferred to the Receiver. The first Defendant had filed an affidavit sworn on the 18th of July 2025 in which he admitted the wrongdoing complained of. He set out the background from his perspective. He explained that in addition to the plaintiffs' money, he also had wrongly diverted money belonging to others, including employees, and the money of other companies that were put into voluntary liquidation in a similar context to the plaintiffs' companies in this case, namely, to release funds to the shareholders of those companies.

12 Counsel for the first defendant, Mr. Mícheal O'Connell, SC, made it clear that the first defendant accepted his wrongdoing and would be pleading guilty to the criminal charges and was accordingly focussed on trying to ensure that all of the victims of his actions would get repaid. In that context, Mr. O'Connell, SC made the point that based on the affidavits that were before the court when the consent order was made, there was sworn evidence referring to other innocent persons who had also lost out who would appear to be in a similar position to that of the plaintiffs. It was submitted that if those claims had substance, then those claims were also proprietary claims and should at least be considered by the Receiver who, it was submitted, was obliged to have regard to any “just claims” to the funds recovered by him to answer the judgment.

13 On the other hand, both the Plaintiffs and the Receiver take the view that this is unnecessary and that what is really intended by the Order made is that the Receiver would simply deduct his fees and expenses and thereafter pass the balance of the sums of €319,000.00 to the Plaintiffs. Thereafter the Receiver would make efforts to get in more monies or assets to meet the balance of the judgment sum due.

14 Each side accepted that the matter therefore turned on what the phrase “subject to all just claims and allowances thereto and thereon” meant.

III. SUBMISSIONS

Plaintiff's Submissions

15 On behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr. Jarlaith Ryan, SC, made a number of submissions. By way of overview it was submitted that the Receiver's role was defined and confined by the terms of the order.

16 It was submitted that it would be wrong to consider that the Receiver had some wider role in adjudicating on competing claims or matters of that sort.

17 Reference was made to Order 45 rule 9, and Order 50 rule 6. In addition reference was made to ACC v Rickard [2019] IESC 29. It was said that this case (which concerns the jurisdiction of the court to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution) demonstrated that any claims by creditors must meet some threshold of being substantial, which was elaborated as meaning, at a minimum, that there be a payment obligation and a claim relating to the monies in the possession of the receiver.

18 In addition, reference was made to an extract from the textbook Picarda on the Law of Receivers, 4th edition, and in particular, the passages on “Judgment Creditors” and “Persons with Paramount Rights” which states that “[t]he appointment of a receiver by the court does not affect or prejudice persons with paramount rights who are actually in possession of those rights in their enjoyment of those rights”.

19 Relying on these materials a sequence of propositions...